While both articles describe the "what," there isn't much on why, how, or when the the training will take place.
Background is required.
But 1st, some comments on @7thATC, @HohenfelsJMRC & the Joint Multinational Simulation Center located at Grafenwoehr & Hohenfels, Germany. 4/
"Graf" (as it's called) was a training center for Bavarian Artillery in the 1800s.
During WWII, Rommel trained tanks there.
Germans mothers used to say to their sons: "don't be a bad boy, or they'll send you to Graf!"
The US Army took over the training site in 1947. 5/
During the Cold War, Graf was the place where the 300,000 US forces assigned in Germany used to train to defeat the Soviets.
The main gate of Graf was known by all soldiers, and even Elvis trained their (and sang at one of the German gasthaus's outside the gate!). 5/
In 2004, after returning from Iraq, I took command of 7th ATC. Truthfully, it was one of the top three jobs I had in the Army.
The HQs is located at "Graf" proper, but the command also includes a maneuver center at Hohenfels, Vilseck, & several other smaller training posts. 6/
Because the US Army in Europe was reducing in size (directed by Rumsfeld), my boss gave me some guidance as I took command.
"Increase multinational training to prepare alliances of the future!" (of course, we were also training other countries to fight w/ us in AFG) 7/
From 2004 forward, the training of allies & partners increased signficantly. Soldiers from over 36 different European allies (and later, some African countries started training there, too) trained their regularly.
Graf, is one of the 3 best training facilities in the world. 8/
The training is from individual soldier to battalions, brigades and even multinational task force.
Sergeants from all nations train at the NCO Academy. Battalions maneuver at Hohenfels. Tanks shoot on the ranges. The simulation center trains large Multinational Task Forces.9/
Lots of old retired soldiers think of Graf as a big "mud hole," because that is what most remember from the Cold War days.
Today, IMHO, it is the most state of the art training facility in the world. I loved serving there! 10/
Which brings us back to Ukraine's Army.
When I served in EU (& after I left), UA sent their young soldiers to our NCO Academy & our training sites...and we did the same NE of Lviv, in Yavoriv (the below picture from 2011 during Exercise Rapid Trident) 11/
The @7thATC established a expeditionary training center in Yavoriv in 2014, calling it JMTG-U (Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine).
Active soldiers from the @173rdAbnBde and @NationalGuard soldiers from California trained w/ Ukraine Soldiers for years. 12/
All that was considered "small scale."
Individual soldiers, teams, platoons, company level training. It served both the UA & US Army very well.
But as both articles in this 🧵 cited, there is now an desire to train "up to 2500 soldiers" in combined arms operations. 13/
As I've said in previous threads, Combined Arms Operations is when ALL units - infantry, tanks, artillery, engineers, transportation, logistics, aviation, special forces, air defense, military intel - come together & synchronize actions.
It takes time & tough training. 14/
The team at 7ATC (as well as at a few other NATO allied locations in Europe) are great at this.
You need large training areas, observers who understand doctrinal effectiveness who can teach, simulations providing perfect oversight, & after-action reviews.
It's next level. 15/
Those are the "whys."
The "hows" require getting a large # of UA recruits/foces/leaders to the training site with the equipment they will use in combat.
Think of recruiting a team, with all their kit, and putting them on a practice field for drills. 16/
I don't know the current status is for these actions, as I'm no longer privy to classified information.
This is PhD-level work requiring coordination, approval by foreign governments, training, equipping, manning.
But it's what many of us have suggested. And it's doable. 17/
It is the next kind of next level preparation & training the UA needs to continue their successful fight.
(and, for all those who will now "why didn't we do this earlier?" please know this ain't that easy to do.
I'm just glad it seems to be happening now. 18/18
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Many suggesting how Ukraine should "keep up the momentum" against the Russians in the NE (Donbas) while continuing to Melitopol (further east from Kherson Oblast).
While certainly desirable, both those efforts will be tough.
Here's why. A brief 🧵 1/18
1st, let's discuss the NE, Donbas.
Since 2014, trench warfare in the Donbas has been prevalent.
The line between the falsely described "people's republics" of Donetsk & Luhansk has become a no-man's land, and Russia's attempt at a "frozen conflict." 2/ washingtonpost.com/world/interact…
Small UKR villages were shelled & extensively mined. Prior to 9/24 there weren't many territorial gains by either side.
Expanding this area was an early (& failed) RU operational objective.
Many of my followers are asking for a new Ukraine thread, but perhaps an AAR is better. 1/
Ukraine is 9 months into this fight. They're at the start of a new phase (Phase IV). Let’s review & then look at what may be ahead.
In this AAR, I’ll include past descriptions, slides I made at different times, news articles…and predict what we may need to watch.
Here goes. 2/
On 2/24 - the first night of the war - I did a twitter 🧵 on what I thought would happen.
That 🧵was based on an assessment of RUF (Russian Force) & Ukrainian Army (UA) & things gleaned from intel reports from my time in command of @USArmyEURAF 3/
But looking at the map in this @nytimes article shows 1) how close the strike is to the Polish border 2) how close the strike is to the Ukrainian town of Lviv 3) while it's not shown on the map, how close the strike is to the Ukrainian military base at Yavoriv, NW of Lviv. 2/
One must also considered 1) RU missiles (even "precision" ones) have shown to be VERY inaccurate 2) Most UKR mid-range air defense is near the front lines (& short range AD would not cause the type explosion shown on film) 3) BDA will revel pieces of whatever hit the ground. 3/
I've had this photo hanging in my office everyday since 2004 as a reminder of what we ask of our military. Let me tell the story in a short 🧵.
It's a picture of a soldier from the 173d Airborne Brigade.
He had just parachuted in on a mission. 1/4
When most see it, they are appalled by the soldier's load. And yes, that's what they carry into combat.
But look closer...
It's hard to see, but he has a comrade right next to him. Soldiers always have "battle buddies" to help them through the tough times. 2/
He looks exhausted. He likely is. But the load is more than physical.
Looking at his face, there's more to his load.
-Is it the mission?
-Is he wondering if he'll live up to expectations of his troopers?
-Is he concerned about his family back home? 3/
@soledadobrien@CNN Basically, Kherson is a critically important piece of terrain due to major roads (from Rostov in Russia to Odesa and beyond), wide rivers, important bridges, and ability to control access to Crimea. RU army made a bad operational mistake of moving forces beyond their ability.. 1/
@soledadobrien@CNN …to resupply. They also made the mistake of attempting to establish a RU government w/o the adequate supply of troops to “secure” cities in the Oblast. But the biggest mistake was pushing 40k troops across the Dnipro River. Without going into tactical details…2/
@soledadobrien@CNN …the RU Army was split on two sides of a wide river without resupply capabilities, and the UA blew bridges behind them…then maneuvered to surround they forces who had their backs to the river (tough to escape). The RU move is similar to the mistakes German forces made…3/
Lots of commentary on RU withdrawal from Kherson & potential for UA capturing equipment & personnel.
Yes. Watching RU activities in this Oblast since about 3 Oct, was predictable.
Plus, from experience an enemy's withdrawal provides many opportunities. 1/6
Please know that armies can gain a great deal of intelligence from an enemy's withdrawal.
The UA has great intelligence gathering and that capability is supplemented by its partners & allies.
They won't be fooled. They'll know if RU action is a "ruse" or "feint." 2/
A real (or a fake) RU withdrawal from Kherson will provide a lot of intelligence.
Intel will consist of new targets, signal intercepts, routes, new locations for assembly areas and supply caches, and things "left behind" that will indicate the capabilities of those who left. 3/