Some people have been wondering why Russians have concentrated several brigades near a tiny town called Vuhledar, which approximately occupies only 5 square kilometers, and what makes Russians so obsessed with the idea to take it?
To understand that, we need to look at the Russian military doctrine. Railroads are a core of Russian logistics and essential to supply entire armies. It allows Russia to move large numbers of supplies and reinforcements within a relatively short period.
After the destruction of the railroad section in the Crimean bridge, Russians are facing significant logistics issues and frantically looking at possible solutions to reinforce their Southern group.
The railroad pathway highlighted in red color would allow the Russian army to establish an important logistics route between Russia-Luhansk-Donetsk-Mariupol and possibly Crimea.
The proximity of the railroad to Vuhledar, Novomykhailivka, and Mar'inka makes this endeavor difficult, as the Ukrainian army has fire control over the railroad, making it impossible for Russians to use. I marked that small railroad section with the red line
This brings us back to the Vuhledar question. Despite the small size, Vuhledar is located at an important strategic point that allows the Ukrainian army to keep under control both the railway and railway stations, more importantly – Volnovakha
To get closer to the Vuhledar, the enemy made a series of attempts to take over Pavlivka in October and November, which resulted in the total loss of about 2000 people as KIA, MIA, POWs, or seriously crippled on the Russian side.
While the enemy was able to push out Ukrainian troops from Pavlivka, they couldn’t establish control over the settlement, as it’s located much lower than Vuhledar and gives Ukrainian troops great fire control over the area.
After suffering devastating losses during the Pavlivka offense, the enemy replenishes its forces with manpower and vehicles. It seems like the enemy is planning to utilize additional battalions which just underwent training and rotation.
The same units involved in Pavlivka will be used in Vuhledar – 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, special task unit “Kaskad” and various volunteer battalions such as “Tigr”
At this moment, the enemy focuses on Vuhledar's defense suppression. To achieve that, the enemy uses regular and rocket artillery, direct and indirect tank fire, and occasional unguided rocket barrages from helicopters and jets.
The morale remains low, and the regular army units perform fake offensives - they retreat under minimal fire and exaggerate combat reports to justify their retreats. To avoid stalling, the Russian command utilizes brutal tactics:
They use units consisting of BARS(Active Combat Military Reserve), volunteer battalions, and freshly mobilized, supported by armored units to perform assaults and to exhaust available Ukrainian material and human resources
Another offensive operation will result in much worse losses than during the Pavlivka offense, but the threat to Vuhledar remains real and needs to be taken seriously - the Kremlin wants this task to be done, no matter the cost.
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With an uncertain battlefield position, Russia has intensified hybrid operations to shape European public opinion. A key element is the spread of narratives portraying Ukraine as using “energy blackmail” against Europe, often echoed by politically sympathetic actors. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the full-scale invasion began, Russian missile and drone strikes have targeted Ukraine’s energy system, damaging power plants, gas facilities, and transmission networks nationwide. Ukraine has lost about 11.5 GW of capacity, with damage reportedly exceeding $24.8 billion
3/ The war has also affected energy transport infrastructure. Ukrainian oil facilities have been attacked more than 400 times since the invasion began. On 27 January 2026, a strike damaged equipment working for the Druzhba pipeline near Brody in western Ukraine.
Leaked internal files from Moscow reveal that Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, keeps intelligence-style dossiers on its own politicians. They document corruption facts, criminal ties, and personal vulnerabilities, information used to manage Russia’s politics
Thread 🧵:
2/ United Russia is the political party that dominates Russia’s parliament and regional governments and serves as the main political vehicle of Putin.
Leaked documents from the party, published by @dallasparkua and @256CyberAssault, reveal details of an internal vetting process
3/ Meet Evgeniy Gnedov, who oversees the vetting of candidates for various lawmaking bodies - from local assemblies to the federal parliament.
A longtime security official, he spent decades inside the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia, eventually rising to a senior role
Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly become a war of drones, but artillery still plays a key role on the battlefield. Newly obtained documents from 2014 to 2025 show that Russia continues to modernize its artillery production using industrial machinery from Europe. 🧵Thread:
2/ In a joint analysis, Frontelligence Insight and the @dallasparkua company reviewed hundreds of internal documents from Russian defense contractor Zenit-Investprom and found that Plant No. 9, a maker of artillery barrels and tank guns, went through major upgrades in 2025
3/ Six facilities within the Uralmash industrial zone were found to be undergoing modernization, including planned delivery of industrial machinery from several European countries. Several workshops were dedicated to work on the Armata project and the Koalitsiya SPG.
As we approach a point marking the beginning of the war’s 5th year, it is time to discuss how we assess the war’s overall dynamics, strictly from a military standpoint. One method many analysts use is the pace of territory capture. However, this methodology has a serious issue🧵:
2/ Generally, this is not a bad method of analyzing battlefield dynamics, as the history of wars shows far more cases of states advancing along frontlines or into enemy territory before a war ends in their favor than the opposite. The devil, however, lies in the details
3/ Putting aside other domains of war, such as economics and socio-politics, battlefield dynamics are often judged by metrics like casualty rates and square kilometers of controlled territory. This can produce a distorted picture, a problem I informally term the “Sahara Fallacy”
The catastrophic situation of Russian forces trapped in Kupyansk, who continue to lose ground, together with a second consecutive year of failure to fully seize Pokrovsk, represents one of the more optimistic scenarios for 2025.
Thread:
2/ As war fatigue increasingly affects Russia, the prospect of enforcing a rapid, unfavorable capitulation of Ukraine through Washington, DC now appears even more remote, not not entirely excluded
3/ While Russia has used the negotiation process primarily to delay new sanctions and slow support for Kyiv, its economic situation continues to deteriorate, and tactical gains have failed to translate into strategic breakthroughs.
Information about a new modification of Russia’s Geran-2 drone has been published by Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, including a detailed technical breakdown. According to the analysis, the Geran drone has been fitted with an R-60 air-to-air missile mounted on its fuselage:
2/ The missile, fitted with an APU-60-1MD (P-62-1MD) aircraft launcher, is mounted on a special bracket located on the upper front section of the Geran’s fuselage.
3/ The most likely employment of rocket involves transmitting images from the drone’s cameras to an operator via the modem. If a Ukrainian aircraft or helicopter enters the engagement zone, the operator sends a launch command to the missile’s control unit.