Some people have been wondering why Russians have concentrated several brigades near a tiny town called Vuhledar, which approximately occupies only 5 square kilometers, and what makes Russians so obsessed with the idea to take it?
To understand that, we need to look at the Russian military doctrine. Railroads are a core of Russian logistics and essential to supply entire armies. It allows Russia to move large numbers of supplies and reinforcements within a relatively short period.
After the destruction of the railroad section in the Crimean bridge, Russians are facing significant logistics issues and frantically looking at possible solutions to reinforce their Southern group.
The railroad pathway highlighted in red color would allow the Russian army to establish an important logistics route between Russia-Luhansk-Donetsk-Mariupol and possibly Crimea.
The proximity of the railroad to Vuhledar, Novomykhailivka, and Mar'inka makes this endeavor difficult, as the Ukrainian army has fire control over the railroad, making it impossible for Russians to use. I marked that small railroad section with the red line
This brings us back to the Vuhledar question. Despite the small size, Vuhledar is located at an important strategic point that allows the Ukrainian army to keep under control both the railway and railway stations, more importantly – Volnovakha
To get closer to the Vuhledar, the enemy made a series of attempts to take over Pavlivka in October and November, which resulted in the total loss of about 2000 people as KIA, MIA, POWs, or seriously crippled on the Russian side.
While the enemy was able to push out Ukrainian troops from Pavlivka, they couldn’t establish control over the settlement, as it’s located much lower than Vuhledar and gives Ukrainian troops great fire control over the area.
After suffering devastating losses during the Pavlivka offense, the enemy replenishes its forces with manpower and vehicles. It seems like the enemy is planning to utilize additional battalions which just underwent training and rotation.
The same units involved in Pavlivka will be used in Vuhledar – 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, special task unit “Kaskad” and various volunteer battalions such as “Tigr”
At this moment, the enemy focuses on Vuhledar's defense suppression. To achieve that, the enemy uses regular and rocket artillery, direct and indirect tank fire, and occasional unguided rocket barrages from helicopters and jets.
The morale remains low, and the regular army units perform fake offensives - they retreat under minimal fire and exaggerate combat reports to justify their retreats. To avoid stalling, the Russian command utilizes brutal tactics:
They use units consisting of BARS(Active Combat Military Reserve), volunteer battalions, and freshly mobilized, supported by armored units to perform assaults and to exhaust available Ukrainian material and human resources
Another offensive operation will result in much worse losses than during the Pavlivka offense, but the threat to Vuhledar remains real and needs to be taken seriously - the Kremlin wants this task to be done, no matter the cost.
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1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war
While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:
1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire
2/ The Pokrovsk area now appears more stable than in February. At that time, Russian forces had established a foothold in Zvirove, with deeper advances into Pokrovsk looking imminent. Since then, not only have the Russians stalled, but they have actually lost some ground.
3/ The overall composition and number of Russian forces near Sumy oblast currently seem insufficient to support a large-scale offensive operation deep into the region.
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.
🧵Thread
2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement.
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:
1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10.
Frontelligence Insight Special Report: AWOL Trends and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine
In assessing overall manpower casualty ratios, we analyzed Russian AWOL figures alongside Ukrainian estimates, factoring in KIA, MIA, and recruitment rates to assess the war’s prospects
2/ Thanks to @InformNapalm, a Ukrainian OSINT community, we analyzed a screenshot of a Russian presentation slide detailing desertion numbers. The percentage and corresponding figures allowed us to calculate the total number of AWOL cases across all Russian military districts.
3/ As shown in the translated graph, the Southern MD has the highest number of desertion cases. This is unsurprising, as it includes the former 1st and 2nd Army Corps (now the 51st and 3rd CAAs), which are largely composed of forcibly mobilized residents from occupied territories