On Shoigu's unexpected visit to Minsk. It was most likely arranged yesterday after Putin's phone call to Lukashenko. First, Shoigu together with his Belarusian counterpart signed amendments to the 1997 security treaty (signed in a hurry, at the airfield, not at MoD HQ). 1/4
Shoigu then went straight to Lukashenko, who was playing hockey on his day off. He thanked him for training Russian mobiks (the first time this was publicly acknowledged) and said that the joint regional grouping "already looks like a sort of force that can carry out tasks". 2/4
But most importantly, for the first time, Shoigu explicitly said that Russia expects more active and constructive contacts from the Belarusian MoD and Lukashenko himself. After the meeting, Lukashenko remained in his palace until midnight (very unusual, esp. on his day off). 3/4
It's too early to talk about more active involvement of Belarus - there is no increase in military activity on the ground. But the fact that Russia is taking active steps and expressing its discontent is in any case very significant. 4/4
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Let me try to explain what's wrong with the new wave of deployment of Russian troops in Belarus and why the threat of a new attack on Kyiv from the north is a bluff.
A🧵 1/
Last week Lukashenko announced the deployment of a joint Belarusian-Russian regional grouping of troops composed of Belarusian ground forces and several thousand Russian troops (Belarusian MoD later specified there would be 9,000 of them). 2/
The first trains with Russian troops have already started arriving in Belarus, and three important points should be made here. 1) Judging by the photographs, it is not regular Russian army units that arrive in Belarus, but freshly mobilised Russian reservists. 3/
The release of the Azov leadership is an even bigger blow to Russian nationalists than the Kharkiv retreat. The retreat could be explained by the mistakes of the military, while the release of the Azov command undermines the very idea of "denazification". 1/
A🧵
Russian propaganda has been demonising the Azov regiment for the last eight years, telling stories about how they "kill Russian children of Donbas". They have become something like the SS and have been opposed to ordinary Ukrainian soldiers "who are just like us". 2/
One of the main aims of denazification was the elimination of Azov, and the fall of Mariupol and their capture was the main triumph of the war to date. Their trial and execution were supposed to be the culmination of the "liberation" of Ukraine. 3/
Przez przypadek odkryłem coś tak dziwnego, że muszę się tym koniecznie podzielić. Okazuje się, że białoruskie służby specjalne stworzyły w Telegramie cały ekosystem informacyjny skierowany do Polaków myślących samodzielnie. Krótki wątek 1/
Wczoraj największy białoruski kanał propagandowy udostępnił wpis kanału "Ktoś" prowadzonego w języku polskim. Kanał ten został stworzony w październiku 2020 podczas protestów antyaborcyjnych przez jednego z białoruskich propagandystów jako parodia na nextę. 2/
Od tamtego czasu nic nie było o nim słychać, więc myślałem, że ten projekt już dawno nie żyję. Otóż nic bardziej mylnego. "Ktoś" nadal ma się całkiem nieźle, a co najważniejsze jego twórcy stworzyły też dziesiątki innych kanałów w języku polskim o tzw. tematyce szurowskiej. 3/
Yesterday, RIA Novosti published a lengthy piece titled "What Russia should do with Ukraine", which explains in detail what Russia understands by denazification. It's truly horrific: 1/6
The special operation revealed that not only the political leadership in Ukraine is Nazi, but also the majority of the population. All Ukrainians who have taken up arms must be eliminated - because they are responsible for the genocide of the Russian people. 2/6
Ukrainians disguise their Nazism by calling it a "desire for independence" and a "European way of development". Ukraine doesn't have a Nazi party, a Führer or racial laws, but because of its flexibility, Ukrainian Nazism is far more dangerous to the world than Hitler's Nazism 3/6
In other news: according to official figures, 65% of Belarusians voted yesterday in favour of the new "transitional" constitution, which Lukashenko was pushed into by Russia. Despite the war, it's still kinda important development, so very briefly what's next. 1/
The main change is the reduction of presidential powers and the creation of a new body that will control the president (All-Belarusian People's Assembly). Lukashenko plans to combine the posts of president and APA chairman for the first two years or so. 2/
Next, he plans to appoint the current speaker, Natalya Kochanova, as president, while remaining the APA chairman. Kochanova is as much a Soviet person as Lukashenko and the most loyal of his apparatchiks, so Lukashenko expects to continue to control everything through her. 3/
This week I’m away in the mountains, so don't have much time to write, but like everyone else I’m following the situation in Kazakhstan. Here’s my layman’s attempt to make sense of what the hell is going on there. A thread 1/
First, what triggered the protests? A sudden doubling of the gas price. Every autocrat knows that a sharp rise in price of essential commodities is bound to spark mass protests of the working class. For example, in Belarus they raise petrol price every week but only by 1 cent. 2/
Kazakh autocrats aren’t fools either, they understand perfectly well how it works. That’s why Tokayev is right when he says that KazMunayGas and KazakGas are responsible. But mistakes happen, and the decision to raise gas prices may well not have a second bottom. 3/