The heart of Cohen's piece is to criticize calls for a negotiated settlement/peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.
As the piece succinctly states at the end, "pass the ammunition and to stop talking about talking."
Cohen specifically targets "Baloney Realism", which is the argument to accept "the reality" that wars end in negotiation:
"There is a large dose of what one might call `baloney realism' in the judicious declarations by those...who say that all wars must end in negotiations."
I do agree with some of the points raised in the piece. But I want to focus here on my criticisms.
I have three problems with the piece:
- an ethical problem
- an accuracy problem
- an intellectual problem
First, I have an ethical problem with Cohen's argument. It strikes me as a "fight to the last Ukrainian" type of statement. 😬
For instance, it seems to forget that there was a negotiated ceasefire/peace deal between the United States and the Taliban that happened WELL BEFORE the final US withdrawal in August 2021.
On the other hand, though some "realist" scholars and analysts are calling for negotiations, such calls are by no means limited to self-identified realists.
In that piece, I directly address restraint and its relationship to realism. From my point of view, restraint is NOT a product of realist theory.
As I wrote, "Realism can explain why the United States finds itself in a particular geopolitical situation, but it doesn’t offer an obvious answer about how the United States should behave in that situation."
As @spectermatt well describes, this means viewing realism as a underdeterministic heuristic rather than an overdeterministic predictive theory.
Realism would also say that Ukraine is receiving support from states that perceive Russia as a potential threat to themselves (i.e. NATO countries that border Russia or Ukraine fear being next if Russia isn't stopped).
Does realism have anything to say about the ending of the war? Sure. The war will end when perceptions change, namely when Russia no longer sees military force as the most useful tool for achieving control of Ukraine.
This is in line with how "bargaining theories of war" view the ending of war.
Since I'm wrapping up "Intro to International Relations" this week, here is a THREAD of the scholars and writers the students meet throughout the lectures (in the order they appear).
First up, John Maynard Keynes, "Economic Consequences of the Peace"
Why does International Relations scholarship sometimes resemble physics?
Because of a physicist. Let's talk about Lewis Fry Richardson and his work.
[THREAD]
To start, some context.
Why do I feel the need to write a 🧵 about Richardson?
One, b/c his work is awesome.
Two, to set the record straight after this @RadioFreeTom 🧵, which, like everything else he writes, is worth reading in full whether you agree or disagree (link at end)
The prominence (call it "obsession") of quantification in IR scholarship started WELL BEFORE the 1990s.
Admittedly, the 1990s did see large growth in such work, partially due to improvements in computing (hard to lots of statistical work with punch cards)...
Illustrates an important point: while foreign policy (i.e. support for Ukraine) is not a priority to voters, foreign affairs (i.e. War in Ukraine) impact the priorities of voters.
What if genocide, not war, was considered the central problem of International Relations? How would the study of international relations be different?
I ask that question of my Intro to IR students. Here's what we discussed.
[THREAD]
Viewing "war" as the central problem of international relations was well said by Robert Keohane in a review chapter from 2013: "The study of world politics starts with the study of war." academic.oup.com/edited-volume/…
This is unsurprising, given how the modern discipline of international relations was impacted by World War I: a surge of funding and establishment of institutions after the war focused on understanding its causes and prevention.