Here's a fun one. I came across a declassified report referencing North Korea's first known facility to produce liquid propellants, near Manpo-up. Analysts judged the plant produced hydrogen peroxide.
I downloaded a declassified KH-9 satellite image of the place toward the end of construction in 1974 -- although there is a cloud over part of the facility. Still, what a lovely image.
Hydrogen peroxide has its uses in rocketry, but it's not part of common propellant combinations today. North Korea eventually imported Scuds that use RP-1/RFNA, then moved on to using UDMH/NTO. So I wondered whether this site is, or ever was, relevant. hydrogen-peroxide.us/history-US-Gen…
So, I just started perusing satellite imagery of the site, initially using @googleearth as one does. Wow, that's quite a picture! That certainly looks like a #BFRC to me.🤢
If you don't know what a BFRC is, here is a link to @madwonk's entry in the Wonkpedia. But, long story short: Yes, it looks like it still makes propellants. Just not all that safely. (Not that we were much better, back in the day.) wonkpedia.org/mediawiki/inde…
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This article by @DaslYoon is bad. We've seen lots of testing of this system and its components over the past two years. While I am sure the HS-17 has shortcomings as any new missile would, you do not want a bunch of them fired at your house. wsj.com/articles/north…
There are several factual statements in the article that are either confused or false. @aaronstein1 and I walked through the modeling that @DuitsmanMS and I have been doing on the Hwasong-17 in the more recent @ACWPodcast so I won't repeat all that here. patreon.com/posts/how-stin…
As I have pointed out previously, some of the shorter-range tests out of Sunan identified by the USG as being related to ICBM development were probably tests of attitude control systems for a post-boost vehicle that carries multiple warheads.
This chart shows the trajectories, as announced by the Government of Japan, of North Korea's Hwasong-15 ICBM launch in March 2022 and the launch conducted yesterday. The similarity is why I suspect North Korea tested a Hwasong-15 variant yesterday.
To be clear, the Hwasong-15 is an ICBM capable of delivering a nuclear weapon anywhere in the continental United States. This was first tested in 2017. It's got a monument and a postage stamp.
A couple of clarifications. North Korea claimed the March 24 launch was of an even *larger* missile, the Hwasong-17, which could deliver *multiple* warheads anywhere in the continental US. They released an awesomely bad video showing the launch.
Biden is really mangling the details here, but the meaning is clear enough. There is a reason I don't ever talk ranges without notes. A quick explainer.
To start. HIMARS is the launcher or vehicle (left). The two primary munitions are GMLRS and ATACMs (right).
GMLRS and ATACMs have very different ranges, as Biden said. Just, uh, not the ranges he mentioned. GMLRS is 70+ km (45 miles). ATACMs is 300 km (180 miles).
This is really important reporting. It is important, though, because it explains why the Biden Administration reacted the way it did in mid-October. It tells us rather less about exactly what is happening in Russia.
One criticism I have of most modern reporting is how the few hard facts are scattered through a story filled with vibes. As best I can tell, this is the reporting on the intelligence itself. The rest is context and analysis.
In May, Russia started serial production of a new "uninhabited combat module" (really just a turret) called BM-30-D Spitsa (32V01) for its armored vehicles.
Some Russian armored vehicles with the Spitsa turret were spotted on a train. This is the "convoy" in question.
Also, if the RV fell 3,000 km east of Japan, that makes the range from Mupyong-ni ~4,200 km -- which is pretty much what our estimate for the Hwasong-12 IRBM.