1/ This year's #AUSMIN is a wrap. On Indo-Pacific defence and security, its a lop-sided outcome. Ongoing progress on force posture integration, but little on AUS' push for US support to empower its defence industrial base in aid of the alliance. Short 🧵: defense.gov/News/Releases/…
2/ As expected, AUSMIN fleshed out some of the big force posture enhancements laid out in 2021. Progress here is incremental. For Air Force, it's more of the same infrastructure buildup and rotations. For Navy and Army, no specifics are agreed to yet, which is surprising.
3/ On the logistics, sustaining and maintenance front, there's more tangible progress. Prepositioning warstocks and preparing bare bases/airfields for military rotations is essential for distributing US forces and leveraging Aus strategic geography.
4/ All of this advances the collective defence agenda which both sides recognise is essential to upholding a stable regional order. Formally bringing Japan into our FPIs is new and sensible, though I'd expect this to stay at the level of access, exercises and prepo for some time.
5/ Now the bad news: In contrast to posture progress, AUSMIN has done little to advance defence industrial integration, empower and leverage Australia's industrial base, or reform outdated US tech-sharing and export control rules. Here, US commitments are still largely rhetorical
6/ Sure, we had small wins on local MRO for munitions (which will grow AUS capability and streamline stockpile mgt) and a vague resolve by US to improve export controls via DTCT. But this is a far cry from helping AUS build munitions in theatre or freeing it from ITAR rules.
7/ This is a problem for both sides. Australia isn't being empowered to reach its potential as a security actor, capable ally or industrial base. US is missing out on a trusted source of supply for munitions/tech from an ally who's willing to foot the bill
8/ In sum: we're seeing the emergence of a lop-sided alliance integration agenda where Australia's sovereign capability needs are not being met at the same pace as bilateral posture enhancements. This must change if we're to unlock positive feedback btw these two lines of effort.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
The #AUKUS Submarine Rotational Forces-West is the most important near-term contribution to bolstering deterrence in the Western Pacific in the entire AUKUS construct--and one of the most significant US and allied force posture steps in recent years. A short 🧵1/
From 2027, the US and UK will build a rotational force of 4 Virginias & 1 Astute at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. Assuming US subs come from CONUS -- rather than Guam -- and all 5 subs are present, this would double the number of allied SSNs west of the dateline by 2031 2/
This kind of increase normally takes years. Currently, the US has 6 Virginias and 6 LA-class in Hawaii and 5 LA-class in Guam. Getting Guam from 0-3, then 3-5 subs wasn't easy. As AUS' Virginias come online from 2032, allied SSNs in West Pacific will reach 20 boats. That's big 3/
1/ This year’s Australia-US Ministerial Consultations (#AUSMIN) are taking place today with a focus on collective deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. I expect the alliance to accelerate down this path. But it must also attend to the challenges this involves 🧵 smh.com.au/politics/feder…
2/ For context, the Australia-US alliance has become the pace setter for regional efforts to balance China’s power, bolster America’s eroding strategic position, and deepen integration btw allies and partners to collectively defend the Indo-Pacific order. iiss.org/publications/s…
3/ Nowhere is this agenda more apparent than in the rapid expansion of US-Australia force posture initiatives, which recently attracted a lot of attention when news “broke” about Canberra’s decision to support US bomber operations from northern Australia.
A lot of breathless chatter about B-52s in Australia. For such an important bilateral force posture initiative, this isn't helpful for public understanding or debate. I given my own analysis to @4corners. But sensationalism is taking over. So a brief 🧵1/ abc.net.au/news/2022-10-3…
The story's headline is misleading. It’s not a US Air Force plan to deploy B-52s. It’s a joint Australia-US decision. Or, more accurately, a series of decisions Canberra has made with Washington since 2011. You can trace these on @DefenceAust's website: 2/ defence.gov.au/Initiatives/US…
Australia's agency should be central to @4corners story. Instead, it implies Washington is calling the shots and embroiling Australia in its warplans. This is wrong. The decision is bilateral, governed by a 2014 treaty, and supported by a working group. 3/ dfat.gov.au/geo/united-sta…
Biden’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) is finally out. From an Indo-Pacific standpoint, it can be summed up as follows: China's the priority threat, the US can’t deter it alone, so much more is required from allies and partners. My initial thoughts: 1/ media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/20…
NDS deserves credit for frankness about the demands of competition w China/Russia. This requires accepting risks in other areas, deeper reliance on allies/partners, and reform to broken DoD processes (ie R&D, acquisition) and defence ecosystem (ie export controls, innovation) 2/
It also deserves credit for its brief but intelligent grasp of the reqs for successful deterrence of China – which involve denial, resilience, and collective cost imposition (strategic, conventional, horizontal) in a dynamic where perceptions are key and deterrence is tailored 3/
The Biden admin’s National Security Strategy is finally out. It’s far too late to meaningfully set policy direction, serving instead as a fairly predictable strategic messaging exercise. Some initial takeaways from an Indo-Pacific security perspective🧵 1/ whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…
First, this is maximalist strategy out of sync with US means, as @EmmaMAshford has noted. In fact, only thing taken off the agenda is regime change in Middle East. A strategy that doesn’t make hard choices isn’t a strategy. Those choices will, instead, be made by circumstances 2/
Second, there’s a stronger emphasis on interconnections btw Europe and Indo-Pacific than in the interim NSS. Some links clearly exist. But the idea that these security orders are fundamentally interdependent is unproven. It’s convenient to say so if you want to avoid tradeoffs 3/
My 2c: I’d call AUKUS a “work in progress” set of defence industrial and tech sharing/development initiatives.
Agree, it’s more than an arms deal, more than just military, builds on existing cooperation, and is *not* an alliance or vehicle for foreign/defence policy action.
This isn’t necessarily good. AUKUS (advanced capabilities, not subs) is at risk of overstretch because it means different things to different bureaucratic actors within and between 🇺🇸 🇬🇧 🇦🇺 — which is why we have all these well-informed debates about *what it is* on Twitter.
2/
For some it’s about fielding game-changing military capabilities in the 2020s; for others it’s about next-gen tech co-development, or new research collabs, or leveraging advanced tech p’ships for whole-of-society payoffs etc. Some are focused on acquisition, others on R&D.
3/