Thread by @ashleytownshend

1/ This year's #AUSMIN is a wrap. On Indo-Pacific defence and security, its a lop-sided outcome. Ongoing progress on force posture integration, but little on AUS' push for US support to empower its defence industrial base in aid of the alliance. Short 🧵: defense.gov/News/Releases/…

2/ As expected, AUSMIN fleshed out some of the big force posture enhancements laid out in 2021. Progress here is incremental. For Air Force, it's more of the same infrastructure buildup and rotations. For Navy and Army, no specifics are agreed to yet, which is surprising.

3/ On the logistics, sustaining and maintenance front, there's more tangible progress. Prepositioning warstocks and preparing bare bases/airfields for military rotations is essential for distributing US forces and leveraging Aus strategic geography.

4/ All of this advances the collective defence agenda which both sides recognise is essential to upholding a stable regional order. Formally bringing Japan into our FPIs is new and sensible, though I'd expect this to stay at the level of access, exercises and prepo for some time.

5/ Now the bad news: In contrast to posture progress, AUSMIN has done little to advance defence industrial integration, empower and leverage Australia's industrial base, or reform outdated US tech-sharing and export control rules. Here, US commitments are still largely rhetorical

6/ Sure, we had small wins on local MRO for munitions (which will grow AUS capability and streamline stockpile mgt) and a vague resolve by US to improve export controls via DTCT. But this is a far cry from helping AUS build munitions in theatre or freeing it from ITAR rules.

7/ This is a problem for both sides. Australia isn't being empowered to reach its potential as a security actor, capable ally or industrial base. US is missing out on a trusted source of supply for munitions/tech from an ally who's willing to foot the bill

https://twitter.com/ashleytownshend/status/1600120452487471109?s=20&t=bAU_bn0-qhH_Uxue_TXC4Q

8/ In sum: we're seeing the emergence of a lop-sided alliance integration agenda where Australia's sovereign capability needs are not being met at the same pace as bilateral posture enhancements. This must change if we're to unlock positive feedback btw these two lines of effort.