(1/6) Russia has recently started extending defensive positions along its international border with Ukraine, and deep inside its Belgorod region. On 6 December 2022, the governor of Belgorod announced he was establishing local โself-defence unitsโ.
(2/6) Trench digging has been reported in Belgorod since at least April 2022, but the new constructions are probably more elaborate systems, designed to rebuff mechanised assault.
(3/6) There is a realistic possibility that the Russian authorities are promoting defensive preparations within internationally recognised Russian territory to burnish patriotic feeling.
(4/6) However, it probably illustrates some Russia decision-makersโ genuine (but false) belief that there is a credible threat of invasion by Ukrainian forces.
(5/6) Paucity in strategic assessment is one of the critical weaknesses in the central Russian government architecture: as highlighted by Russiaโs original decision to invade Ukraine.
(6/6) Impartial official analysis is almost certainly frequently undermined by a tendency toward group-think and politically expedient conclusions.
โข โข โข
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Between the 18-19 November 2023 Russia launched around 50 Iranian-designed Shahed one way-attack uncrewed aerial vehicles, primarily towards Kyiv. These were launched in waves on two axes โ from the Kursk to the east, and from Krasnodar to the south-east. (1/4)
One of Russiaโs objectives was likely to degrade Ukraineโs air defences, to shape the battlespace ahead of any concerted winter campaign of strikes against Ukraineโs energy infrastructure. (2/4)
(1/5) As of late October 2023, large elements of the Wagner Group private military company had likely been assimilated into the command structure of Russiaโs National Guard (Rosgvardiya) and resumed active recruitment.
(2/5) This Wagner arm under Rosgvardiya is likely led by Pavel Prigozhin, son of the late Wagner owner Yevgeny Prigozhin.
(1/5) Over the past three weeks, Russia has likely lost around 200 armoured vehicles during its assaults on the Donbas town of Avdiivka.
(2/5) This is likely due to a combination of relative effectiveness of Ukraineโs modern hand-held anti-armour weapons, mines, uncrewed aerial vehicle-dropped munitions, and precision artillery systems.
(1/5) Recent Russian assaults in Avdiivka have contributed to a 90% increase in Russian casualties recorded by the Ukrainian MoD.
(2/5) Since February 2022, Russia has significantly increased its force footprint on the ground in Ukraine by intensifying recruitment using financial incentives and the partial mobilisation conducted in Autumn 2022.