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Shashank Joshi Profile picture
@shashj
Dec 7, 2022 • 13 tweets • 5 min read • Read on X
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🧵 There's been a lot of criticism that #gptchat provides inaccurate information. Thought I'd test this with a series of military-themed questions. I'll let experts judge the accuracy of the results.
Explaining military formations.
Explaining combined-arms warfare.
Explaining the evolution of weaponry.
Explaining Jomini vs Clausewitz
Explaining the history of drones (cc @David_Hambling, @RikeFranke)
Explaining military force ratios (cc @dupuyinstitute)
Explaining the evolution of special forces (cc @JJSchroden)
Explaining military command (cc @LawDavF)
Explaining the relationship of cyber operations and electronic warfare.
Explaining logistics (this is obviously wrong)
Explaining manuever vs attrition (cc @HoansSolo)
Explaining Javelin (cc @JakOSpades)

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More from @shashj

Shashank Joshi Profile picture
Jul 23
Important from @DanWBlack. "Mounting evidence" from early 2023 on "indicates that multiple Russian cyber units have shifted their sights away from strategic civilian targets toward soldiers’ computers & mobiles endpoints" for "tactical military objectives" rusi.org/explore-our-re…
"This change in operational focus has been cross-cutting, with Russian military intelligence (GRU) and the domestic security service (FSB) – long renowned for rivalry and mistrust – unifying their earlier disjointed cyber efforts" rusi.org/explore-our-re…
"the [Ukrainian] military’s dependence on free encrypted messaging applications (EMAs), such as Signal for secure operational communication, has made the ability to eavesdrop on these devices of paramount importance for both the GRU and the FSB." rusi.org/explore-our-re…
Read 7 tweets
Shashank Joshi Profile picture
Jul 12
A thread on the new RUSI report on tactical lessons from the IDF in Gaza principally in Gaza City in 2024. ("Hamas commanders were not accessible for interview", they note)

(PDF of report)rusi.org/explore-our-re…
static.rusi.org/tactical-lesso…
On Oct 7, RUSI notes that although Hamas combat groups "had been instructed to train and equip for the assault and capture of Israeli villages & IDF outposts for some time, these small-scale exercises by individual Hamas units had become somewhat routine." static.rusi.org/tactical-lesso…
On Hamas' operational and communications security: "The original [Hamas] breaching force also operated with effective communications discipline, with very little use of mobile phones or other communications systems until they were engaged by the IDF." static.rusi.org/tactical-lesso…
Read 17 tweets
Shashank Joshi Profile picture
Jul 12
Cable security, Norway style. 'He and his brother, who’s a year younger, have never seen anyone suspicious, but if anyone did try to break in, they’re prepared: “We’d shoot them,” he deadpans, “with harpoons.”' bloomberg.com/features/2024-…
"Last year the Norwegian military released videos showing Russian nuclear attack subs patrolling off Norway’s coast and following the routes of undersea gas pipelines and telecommunications cables." bloomberg.com/features/2024-…
"But one ship, a 197-foot-long, Russian-flagged trawler called the Saami, had behaved differently. Traveling at about 10 knots, it had passed back and forth over the LoVe cable at least four times." bloomberg.com/features/2024-…
Read 5 tweets
Shashank Joshi Profile picture
Jul 11
In the Cold War there was a lot of prep for wartime sabotage, incl KGB plans for assassination of pol & mil figures, and attacks on industrial sites. But don’t think there was ever a covert post-war campaign in Europe, outside what wd become Sov bloc, on scale we are seeing now?
On the history of GRU & KGB preparation for *wartime* sabotage, much of which was revealed by the defections of Oleg Lyalin in 1971 & Vladimir Rezun in 1978.
intelligencestudiesreview.blog/2024/05/04/bac…

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"The GRU’s sabotage agents had two main classes of target.  The first was the basic armature of warfighting...Second was what Rezun termed ‘anti-VIP’ actions, essentially the assassination key figures in the political and military leaderships" intelligencestudiesreview.blog/2024/05/04/bac…
Read 5 tweets
Shashank Joshi Profile picture
Jul 8
I violently agree. I’m now losing patience with the genre of article that grossly misrepresents what NATO is doing WITH (hardly IN) Asia. Look at phrases like “Pulling the alliance into Asia”, “insert itself into the Indo-Pacific”, “intervene in Asia” etc.
look at the specific NATO activity cited here.
- “strengthening political dialogue and … cooperation with its Indo-Pac partners … incl cyberdefense”
- “in 2022… observers attended regional military exercises”
- invited IP4 to summit
- aim of liaison office in Tokyo
Now ask: does ANY of this list look like it’s going to alienate SE Asia, “fuel insecurity and instability”, cause a “security dilemma” or suggest NATO wants to “deal with Asian contingencies”? The answer is obviously not, not even remotely.
Read 5 tweets
Shashank Joshi Profile picture
Jul 3
🧵 Last week I attended the Oxford Cyber Forum run by @cyber_conflict. Most of it was under the Chatham House rule, but a few bits & pieces that struck me as notable, all from very well-informed people. Bottom line is that cyber landscape reflects darkening mood in wider security
On the Russian cyber threat landscape: the number of actors is proliferating, with new threat actors 1/ within Russian intelligence services 2/ tied to other parts of the Russian government and 3/ semi-autonomous outside it.
In Israel I heard big concern about Russia passing advanced cyber tools & tradecraft to Iran. In Oxford one person noted that this would be surprising, as Russia has history of infecting Iranian infrastructure for fourth-party collection (i.e. piggybacking on Iranian spying)
Read 17 tweets

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