🧵 There's been a lot of criticism that #gptchat provides inaccurate information. Thought I'd test this with a series of military-themed questions. I'll let experts judge the accuracy of the results.
Quite the NYT story from 1977 on CIA's recruitment of journalists. It notes "astonishment recorded in the offices of The Times" when they learnt "that Henry Pleasants, a stringer who reviewed music for the paper, was also chief of the CIA's Bonn station." nytimes.com/1977/12/27/arc…
"a Time magazine correspondent in Eastern Europe, was working for a Soviet‐bloc intelligence service. But a former Time editor said the magazine had known of the connection and “considered it a kind of double bonus.”" nytimes.com/1977/12/27/arc…
Four!! "In Tokyo, where the Newsweek office alone had contained at least four C.I.A. employees during the 1950's, a C.I.A., man named Glenn Ireton was sent out in the mid‐1960's as a correspondent for Film Daily." nytimes.com/1977/12/27/arc…
.@olliecarroll & I write on lessons from the cyber conflict in Ukraine. Tho’ it’s been intense, many say Russia has underperformed. That’s partly due to Ukraine’s superb defence. Others argue that offensive cyber power has also been misunderstood. economist.com/science-and-te…
The early view was that cyber had played a minimal role in the war. Officials pushed back strongly against that. In September NCSC head said Ukraine was "most sustained and intensive cyber campaign on record". Two NATO officials published below in April. foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukrai…
Others argued the nature of the Russian cyber campaign had evolved over time, with a shift to simpler and lower-cost operations to enable a higher tempo of wartime attacks. This is what @gabby_roncone & John Wolfram of Mandiant told me. economist.com/science-and-te…
RUSI has a new report out today on lessons from the first phase of the Ukraine war The authors include a Ukrainian lieutenant-general & @Jack_Watling. The paper is full of rich data & implications for other armed forces. I wrote up some highlights here: economist.com/europe/2022/11…
The full paper can be found here. "this report seeks to outline key lessons, based on the operational data accumulated by the Ukrainian General Staff, from the fighting between February and July 2022." rusi.org/explore-our-re…
The paper includes the most detailed and accurate account to date of the first phase of the war. "Many Russian soldiers arrived in towns [in the north] without their weapons loaded. They were – for the most part – not anticipating heavy fighting" static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine…
Ru "cyber campaign appears to have consisted of a small number of carefully planned offensive cyber ops...in the early phases of the war...& has since reverted to unsophisticated (yet prolific & sometimes intense) denial-of-service operations and phishing" carnegieendowment.org/2022/11/03/eva…
"Cyber defense at scale relies on the involvement of the largest commercial technology and cybersecurity companies. This is because of both the deep dependence on the services of a small number of providers and [reliance] on automated protection" carnegieendowment.org/2022/11/03/eva…
|"the most indispensable commercial partners for cyber defense are American. Even European governments, let alone those who view Washington less favorably, might be uncomfortable relying on the decisions taken in a handful of boardrooms in America" carnegieendowment.org/2022/11/03/eva…
"Belgium and the UK have become embroiled in a row after the Belgian government blocked the export of technology that is critical for maintaining the British nuclear deterrent, despite both countries being Nato allies." thetimes.co.uk/article/belgiu…
"Two weeks ago, the federal Belgian government refused authorisation for a specialised isostatic press needed to maintain Britain’s nuclear arsenal because the greens, which make up a fragile ruling coalition, vetoed the export." thetimes.co.uk/article/belgiu…
A sentence to be savoured. "Military sources said Britain’s nuclear deterrent would remain fully operational without the Belgian-made equipment." thetimes.co.uk/article/belgiu…
Excellent two-part conversation (subscriber-only) between Michael Kofman, Justin Bronk & Jack Watling on the Russia Contingency podcast. A lot of the discussion is essentially myth-busting about the war. A few highlights below. warontherocks.com/episode/therus… warontherocks.com/episode/therus…
1/ Russian air/missile power was effective. That, plus electronic warfare, worked to "disable & suppress the Ukrainian air defence system very effectively in the first couple of days" says Bronk. Air force punched hole in defences to allow VDV to seize airfields, notes Watling.
The problem was when ground forces didn't advance fast enough, Russia struggled with "dynamic" targeting (e.g. new targets). Russia had, and still has, plenty of HUMINT on targets but "their ability to get that to their air force in a timely manner is non existent" says Watling.