First up: appraisal of the operation under Surovikin’s command, Russia’s transition to the defensive, and the strategy underpinning their strikes on Ukraine’s electrical grid. (/1)
I've observed some differences in the operation since Surovikin was appointed overall commander – mostly a steadier hand. Surovikin is many things, he is not incompetent. He’s probably the most competent commander Russia has put in place so far (/2)
When Surovikin took over in October, the Kharkiv front collapsed, Russia had just ordered mobilization, some Russian officials were considering nuclear use, With too many objectives and too many broken units, the front was in trouble /3) nytimes.com/2022/11/02/us/…
Surovikin's first task was to move troops across the Dnipro river out of western Kherson, which was done under fire with few Russian casualties. Losing what remained of Russia’s VDV and others would have been not only a morale blow but impacted overall fighting power /4
During that operation, I saw a few predictions on here that the withdrawal across the river would end in a Russian forces’ bloodbath, it did not. Those forces have been moved around to other areas of the front now. /5
The second characteristic I notice under Surovikin’s command is better prepared positions. Surovikin ordered network of trenches and defensive positions to be built in many areas, as Russia transitions to an overall defensive position through the winter. /6 @ISW
Surovikin’s Operational Group South was the only sector that seemed to properly prepare a network of positions, so he’s bringing this style with him as commander. These lines were noticed by Ukrainian forces and some said it made counteroffensives difficult. /7
Third: the precision strike campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure is terrible and it is effective, impacting water and electricity for millions of Ukrainians. Unfortunately, these concepts are cooked into some aspects of Russian military strategy..../8
Highly recommend this CNA report if you want to learn more about strikes on critical infrastructure /9 cna.org/reports/2021/1…
In Russian strategy, strikes against critical infrastructure (and other mil targets) happen at the start of war for weeks-month+ before ground forces are committed. didn’t happen here likely due to political decisions, i.e., Moscow assuming it could install a new govt. /10
I think about an article that appeared in Vooruzhenie i Ekonomika in 2021 discussing attacks on a country’s “anthropogenic shell” – life support systems like sewage, water-treatment, power plants, train stations, local government and so on .. /12
As this and other Russian articles like it suggest, damaging civilian critical infrastructure will create destabilizing waves of refugees and grind the government's functioning to a halt – their sought after 'secondary effects'. /13
Russia is firing larger batches of missiles against Ukraine and try to confuse and overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Ukraine is getting NASAMS and IRIS-T, but these attacks draw down Ukrainian interceptor stockpiles. /14
If you consider this as an RS alternate approach to SEAD (suppression of enemy air defenses), it is very troubling. If Ukraine’s SAMs are depleted, the Russian VKS can come back in with more deep strikes. /15 rusi.org/news-and-comme…
It’s possible that Surovikin is providing more accurate assessments to the Kremlin. Putin’s recent speech shows that he understands for now, his diminished military prospects and that the operation may take a long time and have problems. /16 rferl.org/a/putin-ukaine…
According to Putin, 25% mobilized forces are in combat units, 25% in rear positions, while 50% train in Russia. Suggests some type of rotation scheme is in place for the winter inside the zone, and some forces may be in longer-term training. /17
In sum, Surovikin is shoring up Russia’s defensive positions with resources he has. Under his command the precision strike campaign is harmful to Ukraine. He may be relaying news accurately to Putin. Relaying disappointing news can be dangerous over there./end
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The Kremlin is aware of growing frustration among military and mobilized families. It is attempting to relieve some of this pressure in a typical managed way, by meeting with some families and preferred groups, while excluding others. (/1)
Since mobilization was declared, there is growing agitation among family and draftees, as some make complaints and videos. The old ways (bribes, hiding, going to the conflict zone to get their soldier) are coming back too. Not in large numbers, but the trend is going up (/2)
The Kremlin, I assume, is scared of unauthorized demonstrations like an “Immortal Regiment” of KIA from the war, or a large protest against service conditions. Imagine if those families came forward tighter—the imagery/ power of collective bargaining.Yet, doesn’t work that way…
10 months ago, I wrote that Ukraine urgently needed air defenses and help surviving Russian missile and air strikes. Some of these methods were implemented (relocation/dispersal and information sharing) while provision of air defense systems has lagged. (/1)
Since writing, more is known on the extent of secrecy, technical problems, planning, and BDA shortcomings in the VKS for an operation of this size. Nor did Russia follow its strategy or planning principles when committing ground forces so early when VKS had not achieved tasks.
Ukraine’s IADs have been effective at blunting some of this, despite the attacks. Yet they do not have have infinite interceptor missiles or TELs and getting more is hard. There are inventory challenges & production issues with western systems too. csis.org/analysis/can-u…
Looks like Russian forces made efforts to destroy their equipment in Kherson as part of a controlled retreat. Especially types that couldn’t make it across the river for whatever reason, or advanced kit. Thread below that I’ll add to as I see examples (/1)
This Zoopark counter battery radar looks like it was stripped/disabled on the way out. Note the stripped and fried electrical panels, tread destruction on the side, and lack of burned foliage one would expect if it was a large explosion (/2).
The public roll out of Russia’s partial withdrawal from Kherson finally caught up to ground actions over the last few weeks. Russians are trying to manage this one tightly, and that’s why it’s rolled out like this. Some quick thoughts: (/1)
The Russians have been withdrawing from the area in a controlled way for some time now. The forces there were too vulnerable, and their front line too brittle to take another collapse. My thoughts last week 👇 (/2)
The public taping aspect is interesting. Surovikin is the operational commander and has controlled this area since the start of the war, so withdrawal was most likely his idea—and really the only viable choice for months. But Shoygu also likes status and attention 👇 (/3)
Russian forces are in the middle-to-late stage of a controlled withdrawal/retreat from the west bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson. A few thoughts about why it’s different than the panicky collapse near Kharkiv, and things to consider moving forward (/1 )
First, a word about the forces in Kherson. From @JominiW and @HN_Schlottman’s maps, the forces deployed to the west bank are (or were) considered some of Russia’s best units – multiple VDV units like the 76th, 98th,7th, 108th, and others (/2)
By accounts of local Ukrainian soldiers in the area, the Russian grouping on the west bank has not been considered a motley crew. It was considered an experienced and exhausted force with prepared positions (/3)
Russian leaders declare mobilization complete as of 10/31. Below, some thoughts on the stark disconnect between Putin/Shoygu's assurances and actual field conditions for Russian soldiers through the winter. This thread also comes with a very specific soundtrack. /1
This song is on my mind lately, it is from Kino, a Soviet rock band, check them out. The song is Мама, мы все сошли с ума...(Mama, we have all lost our minds) /3