Thread by @MrBenSellers

[thread on 2019] In politics, I think it’s important to be honest. If you don’t you’ll either (a) be found out or (b) not learn. So, in that spirit, I have to say that #GE2019 wasn’t the best I’ve been involved in & compared unfavourably to 2017. It’s important to ask why. (1/21)

Of course, there were factors that could be described as external that contributed to how hard that campaign was for us as socialists, Brexit being the principal one. And we now know that many of our own side were working against. But it wasn’t all bad luck & sabotage. (2/21)

I was in Labour HQ for #GE2017, working mainly on @jeremycorbyn’s social media & I have to say, it was breathtakingly exciting. It felt like we were breaking new ground & the connection between Jeremy’s office & the movement outside (offline & online) was palpable. (3/21)

I will acknowledge that being at the heart of something in that way changes your whole perception of a campaign, so I’ll admit to some bias, but I’ve talked to a lot of people since & there is something else. There just wasn’t the same buzz about 2019 as 2017. (4/21)

I think there were three major internal factors why that was - and why we couldn’t break out of that straitjacket of a campaign that felt lost before it had begun. And only one of them was directly related to the EU and Brexit. They all deserve some consideration. (5/21)

The first was without doubt the choice made by various elements of the party to push for a Second Referendum. Plenty has been written about that, but an often forgotten factor is how that confusion translated onto the doorstep during the #GE2019 campaign. (6/21)

There was a dread whenever Brexit came up on the campaign trail, not because members didn’t understand the issues, but because senior members of the party (& not just @Keir_Starmer) were constantly undermining any line that has been established. That was dispiriting. (7/21)

Secondly (and for me, this was an important & under-analysed factor), there was not the same sense of unity, excitement & determination amongst the grassroots in 2019 as in 2017. It wasn’t just the numbers, it was a dislocation between the centre & the activists. (8/21)

The reasons why are quite complex. One is that many members had already been battered by attacks from the bureaucracy of the party, and felt that they were not being defended by those in Westminster & the organisation set up to represent them - Momentum. (9/21)

Worse, the fracturing of the left which became so apparently post-2020 was already evident in the run up to the election. There was a lazy description of grassroots activists of an older generation or those new to political activity as “cranks”. (10/21)

This was very damaging to the internal unity of the left, even under @jeremycorbyn’s leadership. People on the receiving end of the rightwing of the party, also found themselves abused by sections of the left. I wrote about it way back in 2017: labourlist.org/2018/08/the-da… (11/21)

This spiralled in 2018 & 2019, as the antisemitism row took hold & left activists were targeted as racists & conspiracy theorists. So, cause & effect, there was an impact on turnout, enthusiasm & confidence amongst the same people who had turned out in force in 2017. (12/21)

I think there’s a chance that these schisms could have been overcome by a strong & focused campaign from the centre. To a certain extent, that’s what happened in 2017, engaging people in creating their own energy. In 2019 that was lacking & for me that’s the third factor. (13/21)

The campaign proper was often confused & overly busy. Often, there would be two or three policy announcements a day, far too many to get a narrative out around them. In reality, we needed to gather around some core messages about what @UKLabour would do differently. (14/21)

Those core messages should, in my view, have been about driving the private sector out of health & education - alongside a raft of employment rights & protections that would turn our workplaces upside down & hand power to workers. (15/21)

There were some issues with these three big themes, however. In both education & the NHS, feet were dragged in developing a really radical plan of transformation. The pull of Labour centrism held back the idea of a refounding / reinstatement of the NHS, for instance. (16/21)

In education, there was a lot of talk about a national education service, but very little detail on what that meant practically, & crucially, mealy-mouthed opposition to academisation. This undermined two areas that could have been a centrepiece for a future Corbyn Govt. (17/21)

Only in the Employment Rights field was there the comprehensive reset required (years of work by the likes of @JohnHendyQC being the inspiration). The ‘Work’ part of the manifesto was truly transformational & should have been the beating heart of Labour’s programme. (18/21)

Instead we had a bit of a scattergun approach of individual policies, sent out rapid fire into the wilderness, with a non-plussed media losing interest & an activist base which was confused by the sheer amount of information they were being asked to communicate. (19/21)

While there were reasons for this approach, as opposed to a more structured & narrative-based campaign, it felt to me to be a major reason why we weren’t able to get off the Brexit / Second Referendum track for more than a few hours. We needed to tell a story & we didn’t. (20/21)

Ultimately, it may be that - whatever we did internally & however much we involved our activist base - we wouldn’t have overcome Brexit. But some damage may have been averted & the extreme fracturing of the left that followed may have been avoided. That is my hunch. (21/21)