Thread by @loghmanahmedi

🧵 A somber overview on ways the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ministry of intelligence use nationalism to sow division among opposition groups, control the narrative in foreign media and think tanks and how it is impacting the ongoing uprising in Iran. #IranRevoIution #Kurdistan

Iran’s intelligence agency began in the 1990s to send agents to infiltrate different Persian and English speaking media outlets and think tanks in order to control the narrative by spreading disinformation and influencing the way that events in Iran are reported and perceived.

Since then, Iran’s intelligence agency has focused on amplifying and using, sometimes existing, nationalist sentiments as its main tool to rally the Persian population against attempts to bring about regime change.

Nationalism has also been used as the main tool to prevent different opposition groups from cooperating and working together and to discourage people from supporting the opposition.

Iran’s intelligence agency use a variety of tactics to infiltrate and influence media and think tank organizations in order to maximize the impact on public opinion and sow division within and between opposition organizations, this is three of the ways:

1. Promote the idea that the opposition, especially the Kurdish opposition, is disloyal “to the territorial integrity of Iran” and that the opposition is a threat to Iran’s stability and security and that the opposition wants to turn Iran into Yugoslavia, Syria, Iraq, etc.

This is also a tactic that is used in order to legitimize violence and repression against the opposition and the Kurdish people in general. Essentially the argument is that if the Islamic Republic ceases to exist Iran as a country will cease to exist.

We see the effects of this tactic in some of the Persian opposition groups. Some Persians, especially in the diaspora, have developed a irrational rabid fear of the Kurdish opposition and see all Kurdish demands as a direct threat to their notion of what Iran is or should be.

This is why you will rarely see a Kurdish opposition leader being interviewed by a Persian media outlet without being asked the question “are you a separatist?” Or what is your position “on the territorial integrity of Iran.”

This is also why some Persian opposition figures list “support for the territorial integrity of Iran” as a prerequisite for cooperation with any other opposition organization.

This is also why we see some Persians attack, sometimes physically, Kurdish demonstrators in the diaspora who are holding Kurdish flags or who are chanting Kurdish demands during joint demonstrations.

This rabid fear by some Persians in the diaspora have also created fear and worry among Kurds. Giving rise to arguments that there should not be any cooperation or coordination with Persian opposition groups and that “they are worse than the regime.”

Kurdish public opinion is not immune to the effects of this tactic either, Iran’s ministry of intelligence have infiltrated and created several Kurdish media outlets and organizations who attempt to impact Kurdish public opinion.

This is done by labeling any Kurdish political party that seeks cooperation or coordination with Persian organizations as traitors. The aim being to prevent cooperation or coordination beyond national and ethnic lines.

This in turn is used by regime think tankers to argue that the opposition is “fragmented” and that the “opposition is not a alternative to the current regime” and that if they are successful Iran would become a failed state, resulting in conflict and instability.

This argument has been systematically disseminated in media, think tanks and in government institutions in western democracies.

2. The regime also seeks to disseminate disinformation in order to shape the way that events are reported and perceived by both the public and by democratic western governments.

This is a tactic used by the regime and it’s supporters who portray themselves as “Iran experts” whenever something happens that is a problem for or threat to the regime. We have seen this during different protest movements in the past and during the current uprising.

We have also seen it when Iran’s meddling in other countries are explained or when IRGC commander Qasem Suleimani was killed. The argument in both media and western think tanks are often that the Iranian population is so fiercely nationalistic that they will reject support…

from western democracies and they will rally around the regime if western democracies intervene or express support for protest movements. Or that Qasem Suleimani was “a national hero”, hence killing him only strengthened peoples support for the regime.

The same arguments are being levied during the current uprising, “Iranians don’t want outside support, don’t intervene”, human rights violations are “not as widespread as portrayed by opposition organizations”, and “the regime still enjoys support”, and so on.

This is done so that western governments hesitate to support the people of Iran and refrain from interacting or listening to opposition organizations. Instead the aim is that they pursue other policies, like the JCPOA.

3. The regime is also using social media accounts and bots to spread nationalistic notions and to promote views and individuals that promote extreme positions in order to influence public opinion and to suppress dissenting voices.

The regime’s troll factories do not only work to amplify the voices of its government officials. They work stringently to amplify the most radical nationalist individuals and groups, sometimes created and controlled by the regime itself.

The objective is to make different groups more scared of each other than the regime. It is also a way to sow division and fear among the opposition by portraying the most radical groups as more influential than they really are.

Essentially, by amplifying these voices on social media the regime hopes to portray these groups as more dangerous to certain segments of society than the regime itself. Public opinion often confuses followers and likes on social media with support.

Hence, when some of the most radical and racist social media posts go viral it is perceived by the public as reflective of the view of a whole segment of society.

Regime apologists and lobbyists in western countries use these social media posts to both discredit the opposition and to portray the regime as more moderate than the opposition.

So, how can we counter these tactics by the regime? The best way is to stay aware, focused, organized and be inclusive in both words and action. Success in bringing about freedom is determined by having clear goals and strategies, accumulating broad-based support…

and fostering a willingness to use a variety of tactics. In order to do this we have to be open and inclusive and not allow fear to guide or control the struggle against the regime.

The Kurdish opposition has shown that it is able to adapt to changing circumstances and modify our strategies and tactics in response to new challenges or opportunities and we will continue to interact with everyone who seeks to bring about democracy and freedom.