Some details from ONI:
- additional Type 055 cruisers are under construction. We've seen signs of this in O/S imagery, but good to see confirmation.
- 7+ Type 052DL DDGs under construction. We've seen 5 building at Dalian, and 1 or 2 at Jiangnan shipyard (looks like it's 2).
Here is some of my previous speculation based on imagery of Jiangnan shipyard. At the time, I had thought that in spotted there were for a Type 055, then received feedback they were probably 052DL parts. Turns out that perhaps the answer was: Yes, both! 😐
Another update: looks like the PLAN is up to 15+ hovercraft now (2020 chart showed 10+)
As discussed in the recent China Military Power Report, the charts shows 22 Type 056 FFLs transferred from the PLA Navy to the China Coast Guard.
In with the new, out with the old: looks like the PLAN has gotten rid of more of its older, obsolescent ships, though I'd note that some of these are of about the same age as the first USN Arleigh Burke class destroyers (if nowhere near the same capability).
On that note, on the left what the USN was building in 1991 vs. on the right what the PLA Navy was building then...
...aaaand on the left what the USN is building now vs. on the right what the PLA Navy is building now 😐
To clarify, the comparisons above weren't to poke at the Burke class, which has been a fantastic success, nor to minimize the advances in the Flight III or say whether a Type 055 is "better".
The point was to highlight the incredible strides the PLAN has made over that timeframe.
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I’m excited to share that @ChinaMaritime has just released a short paper I co-wrote with Mike Dahm titled “Flooding the Zone: The Use of Civilian Landing Craft (LCTs) in PLA Amphibious Operations”.
This paper follows the surprising observation last year that the PLA appears to be using civilian “LCTs” - a civilian derivative of WWII landing craft - to go straight to the beach in practice landing exercises.
...first up, China's nuclear warhead totals. This year's report says that warhead production has slowed, with a total in the low 600s, but that the PLA is still on track to have 1000+ warheads by 2030.
Regarding China's early warning capability, we get a lot more specificity than I've seen before: that China now has IR warning satellites that can detect and warn of an incoming ICBM within minutes.
Last week saw the release of the 2025 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s Congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open-source data.
So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report:
I'll focus on those things that I thought were most noteworthy: significant changes from previous reports, reveals of information not previously seen in the open-source world, etc.
Where there is a point of comparison I'll have the new report on the left, older on the right.
The new report is fairly different: for one thing, it clocks in at 100 pages to the previous report's 182.
From the top, the preface differs: the 2024 report's reads mostly like an intel product, where there's more proclamation of administration policy in the new one.
PRC SEALIFT UPDATE: based on a review of satellite imagery & AIS data from recent landing exercises, it appears China is practicing using dual-use civil-military landing craft for direct beach assault.
Of note, while info is sparse, these ships appear to exist in large numbers.
To the details: for a few years now, we've seen what've been known as "deck cargo ships" being used in PLA military transport exercises.
This has been making the rounds—another article calling for U.S. conventional submarines—so I suppose it's time to weigh in. In this case, the article is written by someone personally knowledgeable of submarine operations—a U.S. submariner.
...the article seems to be missing consideration of two key factors that IMO continue to make the idea of U.S. (manned) diesel-electric submarines a bad idea: advances in autonomy, and the PLA Rocket Force.
First, autonomy: he explicitly calls for these diesel boats as cruise missile platforms (SSGs), making a point to separate them from the multi-mission capabilities of U.S. SSNs.
No need for ISR, ASW, or torpedo capability. Ok, great—this sounds like a perfect job for an XXLUUV.
She's pretty clear about how we got where we are: close to a US-PRC war, that the problem started with Taiwan.
She says the situation is not pre-ordained, and that the best way to avoid a war is to restrain US military posture in the region and tell Taiwan they may be on their own.
(I'd say she's half-right: it didn't have to be this way; but I'd place the blame elsewhere.)