Thread by @Inkvisiit

THREAD: Northern Luhansk Front 19 DEC 2022 - Frontline situation overview and analysis of estimated Russian Order of Battle (ORBAT). 1/

First some disclaimers: Sources, notes and possible biases are presented in the pictures, but in general be aware that the drawn maps and the analysis leans heavily on secondary sources who often do not disclose their primary sources. 2/

K. Mashovets is a good example of this problem and while this presentation relies uncomfortably heavily on information, he has provided the public with his analysis on social media (FB, TG), we must remain conscious on just how limited and error prone such data truly is. 3/

Identifying and tracking individual units done by actors like Mashovets and the various OSINT communities, may be heavily biased towards detecting new units arriving at any given location, but are less likely to detect the units that are pulled back towards the rear. 4/

An example of this, could be the seeming pilling up of AFU units near Bakhmut, along with the concentration of RuAF units near Kreminna, presented by various OSINT ORBAT trackers. Both are hot spots of intense fighting where troops maybe rotating more frequently than realized. 5/

The ORBAT drawings presented in this thread try to portray the various estimated units, areas of responsibilities and organization of forces, simultaneously in simplified fashion yet as realistically and doctrinally correct as is possible. 6/

Therefore, great care was placed by the author on terrain analysis and how geography and infrastructure of the battlefield and assumed missions of each individual unit and group of forces might affect their organization and battlefield disposition. 7/

Russian Armed Forces on the Northern Luhansk Front are likely subordinated under overall command of 20th Combined Arms Army and an Army Corps level command (either 11th or 14th) 8/

with 20th CAA directly commanding 4th GTD, 144th GMRD and 3rd MRD along the Svatove-Kreminna line. Army corps is responsible for the northern shoulder of the N. Luhansk Front with 18th GMRD probably acting as the principal subordinate. 9/

RuAF forces are most likely divided along battlefield geography, infrastructure, and group specific missions in nine “tactical groups of forces”. 10/

Each tactical group consists of consolidated C3 and supply elements drawn from one or two of their principal brigade or regimental constituents. Each group also has an consolidated and combined artillery group, usually 3-4 battalions of tube and rocket artillery. 11/

Tactical groups usually have between 3-5 “principal manoeuvre elements” consisting of various collections of ad hoc battlegroups, consolidated BTG remnants, reconstituted battalions, volunteer and conscript battalions and mobilized personnel. 12/

Manpower, equipment and training levels may vary wildly between each principal manoeuvre element with many formations consisting mostly of conscripted or mobilized light infantry, while others are fully equipped and experienced mechanized tank and infantry battlegroups. 13/

The recent arrival of Russian mobilized personnel to the front in large quantities can be observed by the presence of multiple “territorial” units that have started to appear all over the front. It can also be assumed that most RuAF regular units have also been “topped up” 14/

with mobilized personnel. Each tactical group is also backed up by sizeable and growing reserves in the divisional rear areas 20-25km from the frontline and further reserves are also being gathered at the front rear 50-75km from the frontlines. 15/

Extensive fortification efforts are ongoing all along the front in multiple layers, most notably in the “divisional reserves” areas, with the apparent goal of ensuring fallback positions in case of sudden routs and also to keep the reserves busy and discipline maintained. 16/

Starobilsk, Bilokurakyne, Solidarne and Troitske, probably act as major reserves, supply, and transit hubs. Steady flow of new and refurbished equipment is constantly observed. 17/

Depleted units from the aftermath of battles near Izyum and Lyman have probably now largely been either withdrawn, replaced, or reconstituted (with some exceptions like the 26th TR/47th GTD). 18/

I will next go through each divisional group of forces, their subordinated tactical groups and their likely stated mission goals and intentions for the near future. Starting from north and going through southwards all the way to Kreminna. 19/

11th (or 14th) Army Corps consists of the 18th GMRD sector, divided in 18th GMRD rear and support area and the “northern” and “V. Duvanka” tactical groups. 20/

18th GMRD and the Northern and V.Duvanka tactical groups intention is most likely to PREVENT AFU from threatening the major supply road of P66 from Troitske to Svatove. 18th GMRD and its tactical groups will also PRESSURE and the northern flank of AFU advance towards Svatove. 21/

“Northern” tactical group:
ANCHORS the N. Luhansk Fronts northern shoulder.
PREVENTS AFU from taking rest of the Oskil left bank.
HOLDS Lyman Pershyi-Vilshana-Pershotravne line.
GUARDS remaining Oskil riverline from AFU infiltration and crossing attempts. 22/

“Northern” tactical group also PRESENTS a constant flanking threat towards Kupyansk
Tactical group is one of the largest, so it could arguably be further divided in two. So far AFU has not conducted any significant efforts on dislodging this group. 23/

However, in its current disposition, this group could serve as a basis for future RuAF effort for retaking the left bank of Oskil river and thus re-establish the defences along Oskil. Therefore, its threat to AFU northern flank should not be dismissed. 24/

“V. DUVANKA” tactical group: PREVENTS AFU advance on Yahidne-V.Duvanka-Pokrovske axis. HOLDS Kobylka riverline. COUNTER-ATTACKS on Yahidne-Kyslivka-Kotlyarivka axis.
PREVENTS AFU free and secure use of HW P07. 25/

Loss of Kyslivka and Kotlyarivka on HW P07 were significant setbacks for RuAF forces in this sector. Villages were bitterly fought over and RuAF continues to launch attacks in order to recapture them. 26/

4th Guards Tank Division and its subordinate units are deployed north of Svatove in two tactical groups: “N.Duvanka” and “Khomivka” 27/

4th GTD divisional groups likely intentions and tasks are:
PREVENT AFU from threatening the major supply road P66 from Troistke to Svatove.
4th GTD DRAWS AFU to attrition battles along HW P07 28/

4th GTD:
PREVENTS AFU from threatening major supply road P66 from Troitske to Svatove
DRAWS AFU to attrition battles along HW P07
GUARDS 144th GMRDs northern flank and prevents isolation of Svatove from the north. 29/

4th GTD: PREPARES Armoured reserve of single tank regiment in the divisional rear for future offensive actions. This would most likely be the 26th TR / 47th GTD which at the moment is waiting new tanks for two of its battalions. 30/

Tactical Group “N. Duvanka”:
HOLDS favourable defensive positions along the rail line between HW P07 and Volodymyrivka.
PREVENTS AFU from advancing past Kobulka river line.
PREVENTS AFU from disrupting supply and communications along the P66 road. 31/

SUPPORTS the “V.Duvanka” and “Khomivka” groups with their counter-attack efforts.
DENIES AFU the use of HW P07 for attacks towards Svatove. 32/

Tactical Group “Khomivka”:
HOLDS favourable defensive positions along the rail line between HW P07 and volodymyrivka
PREVENTS AFU from disrupting supply and communications along the P66 road. 33/

Tactical Group “Khomivka”:
COUNTER-ATTACKS along Kuzemivka-Novoselivske-Berestove axis
and along Kryvoshyivka - Stelmakhivka axis
DENIES AFU the use of HW P07 for attacks towards Svatove 34/

Khomivka group has been involved in near non-stop fighting around the villages of Kuzemivka and Novoselivske, latter which seems to have changed hand multiple times. It is this area that AFU advance in N. Luhansk front has been particularly checked, 35/

forcing AFU on the defensive after their offensive momentum ran out of steam following Kharkiv and Lyman offensives. RuAF forces have a particularly advantageous reverse slope defensive positions along HW P07. 36/

144th Guards Motor Rifle Division is most likely the Division responsible for defence of Svatove with two tactical groups: “Svatove” and “Novomykilske”. 37/

144th GMRD:
HOLDS Favourable defensible terrain west of Svatove.
ANCHORS the central section of N. Luhansk front.
DRAWS AFU to attrition battles along HW P07
PREPARES reserves in the divisional rear to replace depleted frontline elements 38/

“Svatove” Tactical Group:
PREVENTS AFU from approaching Svatove.
HOLDS Zherebets river line from Dzherelne to Kovalivka.
HOLDS intersection of HW P07 and P66 road west of Svatove. 37/

COUNTER-ATTACKS along P07 towards Stelmakhvka and RESTORES the defence line along Zherebets from Stelmakhvka to Drzherelne. 38/

"Novomykilske" Tactical Group:
PREVENTS AFU from approaching Svatove from south-west.
HOLDS Zherebets riverline from Kovalivka to Novovodyane.
PREVENTS AFU from disrupting communication along the P66 road.
COUNTER-ATTACKS towards Makiivka. 39/

THREATENS AFU Flank on Makiivka-Ploshanka axis.
SUPPORTS "Krasnorichensk" group from north. 40/

3rd Motor Rifle Division is most likely responsible for the defence of Kreminna and the southern portion of the Svatove-Kreminna line in general. 3rd MRD sector is divided in three tactical groups: “Krasnorichenske”, “Chervonopopivka” and “Kreminna” 41/

3rd MRD:
HOLDS Favourable defensible terrain west of Krasna river.
ANCHORS the southern shoulder of N. Luhansk front.
RESTORES defences from Ploshanka to Chervonopopivka. 42/

3rd MRD PREPARES an armoured reserve in form of full tank regiment for future offensive actions.
PREPARES to retake and restore defences along Zherebets riverline. 43/

"Krasnorichenske" Tactical Group:
PREVENTS AFU advances towards Krasna river line.
and any efforts to bypass Kreminna from north. 44/

HOLDS favourable defensive terrain west of Krasna river.
RESTORES defenses along the ravine running from Ploshanka to Chervonopopivka.
PREPARES to threaten the flank of AFU salient north of Kreminna. 45/

"Chervonopopivka" Tactical Group:
RESTORES CONTROL over Chervonopopivka.
PREVENTS AFU from disrupting communications along P66 road.
RETAKES the important heights west of Chervonopopivka. 46/

"Kreminna" Tactical Group:
PREVENTS AFU from flanking N.Luhansk front from the south.
HOLDS important communication and transit hub of Kreminna.
HOLDS Favourable defensive terrain west and north-west of Kreminna. 47/

ANCHORS N. Luhansk fronts southern shoulder.
THREATENS the southern flank of AFU salient north-west of Kreminna.
RESTORES Control over Dibrova and
PREVENTS AFU Infiltration of woodlands south-west of Kreminna. 48/

Fighting around Chervonopopivka and the western heights held by the AFU salient has been particularly intense as of late, as RuAF seeks to restore control over the town and retake the heights that grant AFU observation over Chervonopopivka and P66. 49/

The sizeable tank reserve gathering in the 3rd MRD rear is of particular concern and we may see in the near future renewed attempts at flanking the AFU salient and restoration of Zherebets defensive line. 50/

So far AFU has managed to stubbornly hold on to their gains north of Kreminna and north-west of Svatove. However RuAF clearly continues to reinforce the N.Luhansk front and may in general be in preparation of larger offensive actions in the near future. 51/

Any future prospects for AFU to retake northern Luhansk seem slim with the current correlation of forces. RuAF has successfully stabilized the front after the disasters of Kharkiv counteroffensive and the bloody battles of Lyman. 52/

International efforts to rearm and aid Ukraine must increase significantly to offset the losses suffered so far and to build up significant offensive capable reserves. However, I will conclude this frontline analysis at this point. 53/53

If you wish to check my previous threads on N. Luhansk front, I will link them after this post. They are mostly in Finnish, but the translator should work well enough.

https://twitter.com/Inkvisiit/status/1582701483039940608

from 19.10.2022

Note the dramatic increase in RuAF troop densities across the front.

And the original analysis of the probable RuAF defensive plan in the aftermath of Kharkiv counteroffensive:

https://twitter.com/Inkvisiit/status/1571921774136156161

Finally special thanks to @emilkastehelmi @EerikMatero @J_JHelin (and others) whom I have recently teamed up with in order to pool our collective resources and knowledge.