Shoygu and Putin provided some updates in a regularly scheduled MOD speech, the MOD Collegium. Shoygu signals changes to the Russian military's force structure are coming. Text below, and some initial reactions /1 telegra.ph/Tezisy-vystupl…
Some changes make sense, and others arguably go backwards in time and suggest the General Staff is not learning the right lessons from the war at this point in time. Let's go through the changes in order from "that makes sense" to "??????" /2
1: with Sweden and Finland joining NATO, the Western Military District will revert back into the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts – like before 2010, as well as an Army Corps HQ in Karelia. This makes sense with NATO expansion, so this change checks out /3
2: Putin tells Shoygu he will have no funding restrictions and “the country and the government are providing everything that the army asks for” but for the ‘special military operation’ but there’s a catch: Shoygu has to fix the problems, to include mobilization. /4
If there is anything the last decade and war in Ukraine have shown, Sergey Kuzhegetovich Shoygu is the definitely the wrong person to give a lot of money to and ask to fix the military's problems. He is loyal to Putin so there's that. /5
3: Create three new vehicle repair and maintenance facilities. This makes sense. Shoygu then throws his predecessor under the bus about that, instead of acknowledging that he’s been in his job for ten years and had ample time to fix it himself /6
4: Conscription ages changes from 18-27 to 21-30. This is an odd shift. I don’t think it’s related to demographics, unless so many in that 18-21 age group fled Russia in 2022 leaving them in an unexpected bind. I’ll need more time to think this through. /7
5: 3 new divisions will be created in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Makes sense..but how? From units already deployed there, pulling from strategic reserve of older equipment, moving units from other mil districts, or just not filling them? /8
6: uh-oh more divisions: convert 7 Ground Forces brigades into divisions , continuing a slow process of rollbacks from the “New Look” reforms. They’ve been doing this slowly for 10 years. The problem is this: they need more people and more equipment to make these units larger /9
7: more divisions! coastal defense brigades to be converted into divisions. need more people and equipment, both are in short supply. /10
8: divisions again - the VDV will form two additional air assault divisions. the VDV in 2022 is so severely degraded it will be a struggle to return to prewar levels in the year ahead, but they want to increase it. That will be hard /11
7: raise contract servicemen numbers to 695,000 of a planned 1.5 million military billets. These numbers may be a goal, but they aren’t realistic, given their casualties, resignations, and what I presume must be recruiting and retention problems for contractniki /12
8: Shoygu says in 2023 the Russian military will “continue the special military operation until the tasks are fully completed.” open-ended. /13
What do I take away from this speech? At a workshop this summer, I noted we should not assume the General Staff will learn the correct lessons from the war. Wrong lessons could include a regeneration plan cooked up by parochial interests, and Arbat generals in the General Staff
The wrong lessons I thought at that time would be things like, letting the Ground Forces continue to dominate all discussions, creating more divisions, more conscripts to recreate something vaguely Soviet…/14
..instead of understanding the correct lessons for what went wrong – like excessive secrecy and letting the intel services plan the war, poor use of the VKS, and insufficient enablers for precision munitions, and commanders so toxic as to undermine combat capabilities /15
To me, this speech is a sign the General Staff is learning the wrong lessons and parochial interests are taking over in many ways. Many have hated brigades since they were announced in 2009. /16
The General Staff concludes they need larger units for high intensity war, and the brigade and BTG do not suit their needs. Part of that is true – the BTG was not designed for this kind of war. /17
The Russian military was purposefully redesigned in 2009 away from the kind of war it is fighting in 2022 but they didn't fix the force design before the war they chose to launch. /18 warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-bu…
With nearly half of the Russian Ground Forces estimated to be wounded and killed in 2022, and a major percentage of their active duty armored equipment destroyed (30-50%), they announce they need more soldiers and larger units. /19
Increases also to tactical aviation: three air divisions, 8 bomber regiments, 1 fighter regiment, six army aviation (helos) brigades. Each Ground Forces combined arms army will have mixed aviation division/brigade of 80-100 helos. /20
But these plans - bigger units more people --don’t make a lot of sense for Russia’s new reality. With losses of personnel, equipment, and a loss of trust more broadly, they will struggle to make these plans a reality. /21
TL:DR: these plans are not based on Russia's reality and a lot of folks on the Arbat have a little too much Soviet nostalgia and can't face what has happened on their watch. /end
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There's so much to absorb in this new NYT story on Russia's invasion plans, it’s well worth the time to read and take it all in. I contributed a little to it. I’d like to do a deep dive on a few things that stand out to me from Russian planning materials (/1)
Big picture: as we’ve known since early days, the Russian high command kept much hidden from its troops and key stakeholders. OPSEC to the point of absurdity. I don’t know how else to describe it other than negligence bordering on contempt for their own personnel. (/2)
Today let's deep dive on this Russian planning table for day 1 of the war (which came to the NYT via Ukraine's GUR intelligence service). These units belong to the 76th Guards Air Assault Division - one of Russia's most elite units. Most subordinate units of 76th are listed. /3
Below is an account from a Russian defector who served in the 64th Brigade (Bucha) from February - September. Details shared are consistent with what is known more broadly. This story is worth a close read. I share some reflections below. (/1) cnn.com/2022/12/13/eur….
This solider recalls that his unit, the 64th Brigade, on the way to Kyiv in February had "a direct command to murder" those who were divulging Russian positions regardless if they were military or civilians. In his telling if they had a cell phone they could be shot... (/2)
..suggesting not only a lack of discipline (the solider confirms his unit - the 64th, had no discipline), but also that an order was allegedly given by the command and understood by soldiers to mean targeting civilians with lethal force (/3).
First up: appraisal of the operation under Surovikin’s command, Russia’s transition to the defensive, and the strategy underpinning their strikes on Ukraine’s electrical grid. (/1)
I've observed some differences in the operation since Surovikin was appointed overall commander – mostly a steadier hand. Surovikin is many things, he is not incompetent. He’s probably the most competent commander Russia has put in place so far (/2)
When Surovikin took over in October, the Kharkiv front collapsed, Russia had just ordered mobilization, some Russian officials were considering nuclear use, With too many objectives and too many broken units, the front was in trouble /3) nytimes.com/2022/11/02/us/…
The Kremlin is aware of growing frustration among military and mobilized families. It is attempting to relieve some of this pressure in a typical managed way, by meeting with some families and preferred groups, while excluding others. (/1)
Since mobilization was declared, there is growing agitation among family and draftees, as some make complaints and videos. The old ways (bribes, hiding, going to the conflict zone to get their soldier) are coming back too. Not in large numbers, but the trend is going up (/2)
The Kremlin, I assume, is scared of unauthorized demonstrations like an “Immortal Regiment” of KIA from the war, or a large protest against service conditions. Imagine if those families came forward tighter—the imagery/ power of collective bargaining.Yet, doesn’t work that way…
10 months ago, I wrote that Ukraine urgently needed air defenses and help surviving Russian missile and air strikes. Some of these methods were implemented (relocation/dispersal and information sharing) while provision of air defense systems has lagged. (/1)
Since writing, more is known on the extent of secrecy, technical problems, planning, and BDA shortcomings in the VKS for an operation of this size. Nor did Russia follow its strategy or planning principles when committing ground forces so early when VKS had not achieved tasks.
Ukraine’s IADs have been effective at blunting some of this, despite the attacks. Yet they do not have have infinite interceptor missiles or TELs and getting more is hard. There are inventory challenges & production issues with western systems too. csis.org/analysis/can-u…
Looks like Russian forces made efforts to destroy their equipment in Kherson as part of a controlled retreat. Especially types that couldn’t make it across the river for whatever reason, or advanced kit. Thread below that I’ll add to as I see examples (/1)
This Zoopark counter battery radar looks like it was stripped/disabled on the way out. Note the stripped and fried electrical panels, tread destruction on the side, and lack of burned foliage one would expect if it was a large explosion (/2).