The ongoing #Iran_protests reached their three-month anniversary on December 16. CTP and @TheStudyofWar present here visualizations produced from the open-source data to further inform the public discourse on this important moment in Iranian history. criticalthreats.org/analysis/data-…
This movement has seen several significant spikes in protest activity around preplanned dates followed by relative lulls in protest activity.
Protest activity decreased significantly between mid-November and late December following the regime’s harsh crackdown but has not yet stopped despite regime brutality and pressure.
Tehran, Esfahan, Kurdistan, and West Azerbaijan provinces account for nearly 40 percent of observed protest activity.
The remaining provinces fall roughly into two other tranches. The middle tranche includes other major population centers, such as Khorasan Razavi Province, and border regions, where anti-regime sentiment is high and marginalized ethnic populations are concentrated.
Protest activity varies significantly by day of the week and by province.
CTP will continue to update our assessments and data visualizations as the anti-regime movement in Iran continues to evolve. Follow the daily updates produced by CTP and the @TheStudyofWar for more analysis and information.
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Mahas is the group's latest gain in central Somalia this year, where it has recaptured swaths of territory that it lost in 2022.
The group reconnected its territory in central Somalia and southern Somalia in March and recaptured the district capitals Adan Yabal and Moqokori in April and early July, respectively.
CTP warned after the fall of Moqokori that al Shabaab would target Mahas in the "coming days and weeks."
Meanwhile, US forces have been concentrating their counterterrorism efforts on northern Somalia and supporting local Puntland State forces that are fighting IS's Somalia Province.
@USAfricaCommand conducted a rare ground raid that captured the IS Somalia finance emir on July 26.
NEW | An unspecified high-ranking Iranian official cited by Amwaj Media on July 4 reported that Iran plans to resume indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States, but the conditions that Iran will reportedly present would require unspecified guarantees that the US would not strike Iran. 🧵
Such a guarantee would be inconsistent with the Trump administration’s stated position on future strikes on Iran’s facilities. The unspecified Iranian official told Amwaj that Iran is seeking a guarantee in negotiations that the United States will not conduct any additional strikes on Iran.”
European officials are concerned that Iran may try to develop a nuclear weapon to deter future attacks and that Iran may be able to build a weapon in secret unless a nuclear agreement enables the IAEA to resume inspections.
NEW | US and Israeli airstrikes on the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) between June 12 and 24 reportedly destroyed components of Iran’s nuclear program that would be necessary for weaponization. The strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the ENTC, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization. This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb.
Iran may have begun repair operations at the Natanz Enrichment Complex. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 27 shows that Iran has filled in a crater that was formed by US GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs. The imagery shows what appears to be two tents and a truck present at the impact site.
Israeli strikes targeted senior Iranian military and security officials across multiple branches, likely in an effort to degrade Iran’s command and control structure. Iranian media confirmed on June 28 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed 56 Artesh members, including at least three Artesh generals and 16 conscript soldiers. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on June 28 that Israeli strikes killed Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Intelligence Organization Deputy Director Brigadier General Mehdi Nemati. Nemati reportedly fought alongside former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in Iraq and Syria for several years.
US and Israeli airstrikes severely set back Iran’s enrichment capabilities, but Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile poses a long-term threat if Iran chooses to rebuild its nuclear program.
The degradation of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities will temporarily prevent Iran from enriching to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium, though it could do so if it can install surviving centrifuges at a new facility or retains surviving centrifuges at another facility.
It is unclear if Iran retains the know-how or facilities needed to build a weapon after Israel’s decapitation campaign targeting nuclear scientists and the US-Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities.
A top Israeli official said Israel is preparing to resume operations against Iran if necessary. Israel seeks to retain its air superiority over Iranian airspace, prevent reconstruction of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and inhibit Iranian support to members of the Axis of Resistance.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi threatened to conduct retaliatory attacks against a potential Israeli strike.
The Iranian regime continues to take counterintelligence steps that likely reflect the regime’s paranoia about Israeli infiltration.
First Deputy of the Iranian Judiciary Hamzeh Khalili stated on June 27 that the judiciary will pursue Israeli “spies” and called on Iranians to inform the authorities of any dangerous or suspicious activities.
NEW | Malian junta leader Assimi Goïta met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23.
The visit comes amid a spiraling security situation in Mali and across the Sahel that undermines Russia's credibility as an effective partner.🧵
Goïta and Putin signed an agreement on civil nuclear energy cooperation and agreed to increase trade.
The two countries are already close security partners. Thousands of Russian soldiers are in Mali supporting the junta against Salafi-jihadi & separatist rebels. 2/7
The security partnership has largely been a failure, however.
Al Qaeda and IS affiliates in the Sahel have grown stronger since Mali and its Burkinabe and Nigerien neighbors chose Russia as their primary security partner. 3/7
The Kremlin continues to only diplomatically support Iran, showcasing the limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship.
ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being.
Russian officials are attempting to influence conversations about increasing NATO defense spending by misrepresenting Russia's ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia's military capabilities as a defensive reaction to NATO.
Putin also acknowledged his ongoing efforts to empower Russia's internal security services in order to safeguard regime stability and internal security.