1/25
There were lots of talks before Christmas about possible new 🇷🇺 offensive next year. Even the 🇺🇦leadership commented and warned about the possibility. Few thoughts about that.
Currently 🇷🇺 is on defence, building fortifications and pushing reservists to man these positions.
There were lots of talks before Christmas about possible new 🇷🇺 offensive next year. Even the 🇺🇦leadership commented and warned about the possibility. Few thoughts about that.
Currently 🇷🇺 is on defence, building fortifications and pushing reservists to man these positions.
2/25
🇷🇺 local counterattacks especially in Bakhmut continue, but they are mostly senseless slaughter of own manpower with small achievements.
For political reasons Putin probably wants to move from defence to offense as soon as 🇷🇺 has reinforced its forces.
🇷🇺 local counterattacks especially in Bakhmut continue, but they are mostly senseless slaughter of own manpower with small achievements.
For political reasons Putin probably wants to move from defence to offense as soon as 🇷🇺 has reinforced its forces.
3/25
Being in defence against Ukraine is humiliating to Putin and eats the domestic support for the war. Plus there is a threat of new 🇺🇦 offensives.
But building offensive capability takes time. 🇷🇺 has limited capability to train and equip reservists to fill up the units in 🇺🇦.
Being in defence against Ukraine is humiliating to Putin and eats the domestic support for the war. Plus there is a threat of new 🇺🇦 offensives.
But building offensive capability takes time. 🇷🇺 has limited capability to train and equip reservists to fill up the units in 🇺🇦.
4/25
To create totally new forces is even more difficult since there is lack of heavy equipment and trained officers to lead new formations. That´s why the small 🇷🇺 contingent in Belarus is trained by Belarusian officers and they may even be equipped with Belarusian equipment.
To create totally new forces is even more difficult since there is lack of heavy equipment and trained officers to lead new formations. That´s why the small 🇷🇺 contingent in Belarus is trained by Belarusian officers and they may even be equipped with Belarusian equipment.
5/25
Nevertheless, whether the forces are ready or not, 🇷🇺will probably move to offensive next year. Not necessarily in mid-winter since the build up is still ongoing. But maybe on spring. That gives Russia 3-4 months to mobilise and train more reservists and get needed material
Nevertheless, whether the forces are ready or not, 🇷🇺will probably move to offensive next year. Not necessarily in mid-winter since the build up is still ongoing. But maybe on spring. That gives Russia 3-4 months to mobilise and train more reservists and get needed material
6/25
Where would Russia attack? Attacking from Belarus to Kiev is tempting, but difficult due to challenging terrain and 🇺🇦 preparations. North-Eastern 🇺🇦 is logistically challenging due to long distances. If it didn´t work last winter, it won´t probably work 2023 either.
Where would Russia attack? Attacking from Belarus to Kiev is tempting, but difficult due to challenging terrain and 🇺🇦 preparations. North-Eastern 🇺🇦 is logistically challenging due to long distances. If it didn´t work last winter, it won´t probably work 2023 either.
7/25
In Herson direction Dniepr is probably impossible to cross now that the Ukrainians are ready. Plus, as long as the Kerch railroad bridge is inoperable, the logistic support to Herson direction goes through vulnerable LOC´s in Southern Ukraine.
In Herson direction Dniepr is probably impossible to cross now that the Ukrainians are ready. Plus, as long as the Kerch railroad bridge is inoperable, the logistic support to Herson direction goes through vulnerable LOC´s in Southern Ukraine.
8/25
🇷🇺 has majority of its forces in Donbass and the logistic support is easier to arrange in that direction.
The layered Ukrainian defences would be difficult to breach, and it would mean great losses, but Russians seem sometimes like to reinforce failures.
🇷🇺 has majority of its forces in Donbass and the logistic support is easier to arrange in that direction.
The layered Ukrainian defences would be difficult to breach, and it would mean great losses, but Russians seem sometimes like to reinforce failures.
9/25
Zaporizzja direction is possible. The logistics are easier to arrange and safeguard, and attack there would dimmish the danger of 🇺🇦 cutting the land connection to Crimea.
Wherever the attack will be, there will be several diversionary attacks to bind down 🇺🇦 reserves.
Zaporizzja direction is possible. The logistics are easier to arrange and safeguard, and attack there would dimmish the danger of 🇺🇦 cutting the land connection to Crimea.
Wherever the attack will be, there will be several diversionary attacks to bind down 🇺🇦 reserves.
10/25
How would 🇷🇺 attack? Using Battalion Battle Groups didn´t work too well last winter. Russians weren´t able to support BG´s with artillery, air defence and logistics in a fluid battlefield. Single BG´s couldn´t secure their flanks they were vulnerable to 🇺🇦 counter-attacks.
How would 🇷🇺 attack? Using Battalion Battle Groups didn´t work too well last winter. Russians weren´t able to support BG´s with artillery, air defence and logistics in a fluid battlefield. Single BG´s couldn´t secure their flanks they were vulnerable to 🇺🇦 counter-attacks.
11/25
In Donbass offensive last summer, the BG´s turned out to be too weak to exploit possible breakthroughs on 🇺🇦 lines, giving Ukrainians chances to throw Russians back with counter-attacks. However the Russians have learned from their mistakes.
In Donbass offensive last summer, the BG´s turned out to be too weak to exploit possible breakthroughs on 🇺🇦 lines, giving Ukrainians chances to throw Russians back with counter-attacks. However the Russians have learned from their mistakes.
12/25
🇷🇺 seem to operate now in bigger forces. Often 3-5 BG´s are combined under one Brigade/Regimental Command which is supported by strong artillery group and several BG´s in reserve. In offensive, Russian Army uses sometimes a second echelon to exploit success.
🇷🇺 seem to operate now in bigger forces. Often 3-5 BG´s are combined under one Brigade/Regimental Command which is supported by strong artillery group and several BG´s in reserve. In offensive, Russian Army uses sometimes a second echelon to exploit success.
13/25
But that is probably not enough. Major offensive that could break through 🇺🇦 lines to operational depth threatening to encircle larger group of Ukrainian forces, is not easy to achieve. 🇷🇺 tried that several times last summer, but failed every time.
But that is probably not enough. Major offensive that could break through 🇺🇦 lines to operational depth threatening to encircle larger group of Ukrainian forces, is not easy to achieve. 🇷🇺 tried that several times last summer, but failed every time.
14/25
First, to make a breakthrough 🇷🇺needs to concentrate lots of artillery and ammunition to support the attacks. 🇷🇺couldn´t breach the 🇺🇦lines without massive artillery support even when they still had the “professional” Army. With badly trained reservist it´s not any easier.
First, to make a breakthrough 🇷🇺needs to concentrate lots of artillery and ammunition to support the attacks. 🇷🇺couldn´t breach the 🇺🇦lines without massive artillery support even when they still had the “professional” Army. With badly trained reservist it´s not any easier.
15/25
Concentrating artillery that without being spotted is difficult. And 🇺🇦has shown its talent in hitting 🇷🇺logistics, LOC´s and ammunition depots with deep fires. 🇷🇺 has learned to disperse their logistics, but getting the needed artillery support will still be difficult.
Concentrating artillery that without being spotted is difficult. And 🇺🇦has shown its talent in hitting 🇷🇺logistics, LOC´s and ammunition depots with deep fires. 🇷🇺 has learned to disperse their logistics, but getting the needed artillery support will still be difficult.
16/25
🇷🇺 can probably use massed infantry to gain a breakthrough, which would naturally mean big losses when facing steadily improving 🇺🇦 infantry and artillery. Losses won´t stop 🇷🇺 military leadership, but achieving a major win requires much more than just breaching the line.
🇷🇺 can probably use massed infantry to gain a breakthrough, which would naturally mean big losses when facing steadily improving 🇺🇦 infantry and artillery. Losses won´t stop 🇷🇺 military leadership, but achieving a major win requires much more than just breaching the line.
17/25
In order to threaten the 🇺🇦 defences, 🇷🇺 would need to break through layered 🇺🇦 defence lines to depth of tens of kilometres and then develop that to a major breakthrough by throwing in armoured reserves that would continue to 🇺🇦 rear areas.
In order to threaten the 🇺🇦 defences, 🇷🇺 would need to break through layered 🇺🇦 defence lines to depth of tens of kilometres and then develop that to a major breakthrough by throwing in armoured reserves that would continue to 🇺🇦 rear areas.
18/25
This means that the whole support system (artillery, ENG, C2, AD, EW, logistics) would need to follow the attack and support the armoured forces in a fluid and constantly changing battlefield while under 🇺🇦 fires. 🇷🇺Air Force would also need to support the Army closely.
This means that the whole support system (artillery, ENG, C2, AD, EW, logistics) would need to follow the attack and support the armoured forces in a fluid and constantly changing battlefield while under 🇺🇦 fires. 🇷🇺Air Force would also need to support the Army closely.
19/25
All this is something that 🇷🇺 hasn´t mastered yet. And 🇷🇺 hasn´t been able to practise and train for this during the war. The whole training effort seems to go to train basics to the reservists, not to train modern Combined Arms operations to large formations.
All this is something that 🇷🇺 hasn´t mastered yet. And 🇷🇺 hasn´t been able to practise and train for this during the war. The whole training effort seems to go to train basics to the reservists, not to train modern Combined Arms operations to large formations.
20/25
And deeper 🇷🇺 would manouvre, the longer vulnerable flanks there would be, tying lots of forces to protect them. And that wouldn´t still prevent 🇺🇦 from engaging 🇷🇺 supporting systems from better flanking positions with long range fires.
And deeper 🇷🇺 would manouvre, the longer vulnerable flanks there would be, tying lots of forces to protect them. And that wouldn´t still prevent 🇺🇦 from engaging 🇷🇺 supporting systems from better flanking positions with long range fires.
21/25
And if nothing else, the lack of logistic support would stop the 🇷🇺 offensive. Western experts estimated before February, that 🇷🇺 Army can attack max 150 km from where the railroads end. And this turned out to be quite accurate estimate.
And if nothing else, the lack of logistic support would stop the 🇷🇺 offensive. Western experts estimated before February, that 🇷🇺 Army can attack max 150 km from where the railroads end. And this turned out to be quite accurate estimate.
22/25
🇷🇺 don´t seem to be able to support its forces even in defensive positions adequately. Supporting a deep operation demanding massive materiel support deep into 🇺🇦 rear is probably impossible to already depleted 🇷🇺 Army logistics that has lost lots of wheeled vehicles.
🇷🇺 don´t seem to be able to support its forces even in defensive positions adequately. Supporting a deep operation demanding massive materiel support deep into 🇺🇦 rear is probably impossible to already depleted 🇷🇺 Army logistics that has lost lots of wheeled vehicles.
23/25
Ukrainians are also aware of the threat and are forming new reserves. Thanks to the Western Intel support it is very difficult for 🇷🇺 to achieve a surprise, thought they are normally pretty good in deception and shouldn´t be taken lightly.
Ukrainians are also aware of the threat and are forming new reserves. Thanks to the Western Intel support it is very difficult for 🇷🇺 to achieve a surprise, thought they are normally pretty good in deception and shouldn´t be taken lightly.
24/25
It is possible that 🇷🇺 will start an offensive next year. They could even gain some ground by sacrificing lots of reservist.
However, I doubt that they could conduct an large scale offensive that could threaten Ukraine´s defence seriously and change the course of the war.
It is possible that 🇷🇺 will start an offensive next year. They could even gain some ground by sacrificing lots of reservist.
However, I doubt that they could conduct an large scale offensive that could threaten Ukraine´s defence seriously and change the course of the war.
25/25
Ukrainians have shown that they are quite skilful in operations, and they are probably much better in fighting a manoeuvre fight in deep area.
Russians learn all the time, but they are probably not ready for demanding offensive operations this fast.
Ukrainians have shown that they are quite skilful in operations, and they are probably much better in fighting a manoeuvre fight in deep area.
Russians learn all the time, but they are probably not ready for demanding offensive operations this fast.
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