Thread by @mk270

Lord Young's analogy between #leasehold enfranchisement and buying out minority shareholders is an apt one.

But of course it's just an analogy ... 1/n

In effect, the freeholder and the leaseholders have shares of two different classes, only one of which can vote ... 2/n

The effect of Right To Manage in the 2002 Commonhold & Leasehold Reform Act was, under the Young analogy, to split the freeholder's share two classes, including Management shares for voting on decisions about running the building, vested in the leaseholders ... 3/n

We observe that many residents' management companies (RMCs) have different classes of shares (or members, where they are limited by guarantee), with different rights ... 4/n

In particular, you find RMCs where there are classes of shareholder/member with rights over certain property, e.g., shared areas, or areas shared only amongst some of the members ... 5/n

Having these different classes can be more flexible than the one-size fits all of an RTM company or Commonhold Association. Nevertheless there is a large cohort of cases where RMCs, RTM or Commonhold do *not* require multiple classes of member ... 6/n

What the Supreme Court did in Firstport v Settlers Court RTM (in early 2022) was, in terms of the Young analogy, to reclassify shares in the notional or actual management company for the state, from voting to non-voting. ... n/n

@threadreaderapp unroll please