Most readers will marvel at the tactics & maneuvers UKRs army and its generals used in the east (Donbas) & the southeast (Kherson) during their Oct/Nov operations.
But there's so much more to be gleaned from this article.
It speaks to the transformation of UKR's Army. 2/
If you've read the piece, read it again with a different view.
UKR generals conducting "rehearsals" (in Germany) with US officials.
Our Army calls those "ROC Drills" for "rehearsal of concept." That's a commander/staff drill to coordinate & synchronize actions in combat. 3/
We practice those rehearsals in training, conduct them during warfare & teach the techniques to others.
You never - NEVER - want to go into a fight not knowing what your teammates are doing.
It's done with small units ...& with large units. In a gym, or in the dirt. 4/
Read what else is implied in the article:
Operations based on finely tuned intelligence.
Our army teaches soldiers "don't feel your way around the battlefield...know what you're going after."
Intel collection, analysis, application is key to "intel-based operations." 5/
Precise targeting!
Don't waste ammunition...use targeting to launch precision ammunitions to hit only important targets.
As a US commander - from Squadron to Division - the commander & staff assessed the "High Value Targets."
Using the loop of Decide-Detect-Deliver-Assess. 6/
As a Division Commander in combat, every Saturday morning we held our "targeting boards" for both kinetic and non-kinetic targets.
What would we strike, and who would we engage in a counterinsurgency operation?
The UA only is worried about striking! 7/
The @washingtonpost article discusses some UKR units going fast (in Donbas) & others going not as fast (in Kherson).
Commander's define that "tempo" and it's determined by the context of the fight.
A mentor once taught me "know when you need to speed up & when to slow down."8/
Finally, all of this come together because of great leadership - from corporals to generals - and courage manifested in individual soldiers.
Ukraine's Army has been trained in these things...the Russian Army has not.
Read this WP article again...it's got a lot of nuance. 9/9
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Today, I RT this @WSJ article on logistics challenges w/in Ukraine.
It generated a bunch of "but what about..." from many who may not understand what goes into decisions related to delivering weapons to allies/partners.
Many suggesting how Ukraine should "keep up the momentum" against the Russians in the NE (Donbas) while continuing to Melitopol (further east from Kherson Oblast).
While certainly desirable, both those efforts will be tough.
Here's why. A brief 🧵 1/18
1st, let's discuss the NE, Donbas.
Since 2014, trench warfare in the Donbas has been prevalent.
The line between the falsely described "people's republics" of Donetsk & Luhansk has become a no-man's land, and Russia's attempt at a "frozen conflict." 2/ washingtonpost.com/world/interact…
Small UKR villages were shelled & extensively mined. Prior to 9/24 there weren't many territorial gains by either side.
Expanding this area was an early (& failed) RU operational objective.
Many of my followers are asking for a new Ukraine thread, but perhaps an AAR is better. 1/
Ukraine is 9 months into this fight. They're at the start of a new phase (Phase IV). Let’s review & then look at what may be ahead.
In this AAR, I’ll include past descriptions, slides I made at different times, news articles…and predict what we may need to watch.
Here goes. 2/
On 2/24 - the first night of the war - I did a twitter 🧵 on what I thought would happen.
That 🧵was based on an assessment of RUF (Russian Force) & Ukrainian Army (UA) & things gleaned from intel reports from my time in command of @USArmyEURAF 3/
But looking at the map in this @nytimes article shows 1) how close the strike is to the Polish border 2) how close the strike is to the Ukrainian town of Lviv 3) while it's not shown on the map, how close the strike is to the Ukrainian military base at Yavoriv, NW of Lviv. 2/
One must also considered 1) RU missiles (even "precision" ones) have shown to be VERY inaccurate 2) Most UKR mid-range air defense is near the front lines (& short range AD would not cause the type explosion shown on film) 3) BDA will revel pieces of whatever hit the ground. 3/
I've had this photo hanging in my office everyday since 2004 as a reminder of what we ask of our military. Let me tell the story in a short 🧵.
It's a picture of a soldier from the 173d Airborne Brigade.
He had just parachuted in on a mission. 1/4
When most see it, they are appalled by the soldier's load. And yes, that's what they carry into combat.
But look closer...
It's hard to see, but he has a comrade right next to him. Soldiers always have "battle buddies" to help them through the tough times. 2/
He looks exhausted. He likely is. But the load is more than physical.
Looking at his face, there's more to his load.
-Is it the mission?
-Is he wondering if he'll live up to expectations of his troopers?
-Is he concerned about his family back home? 3/