1/ A THREAD: As 2022 draws to a close, a few words about how technology helped shape and influence the war in Ukraine – specifically, the impact of commercial quadcopters.
2/ Ukraine led this charge as Russia invaded in February 2022, scoring some major successes in key battles against Russian forces, with quadcopters providing crucial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to long-range artillery and MLRS systems.
3/ This capacity enabled Ukraine to better organize and position its forces to meet the invading Russian military. cnet.com/news/ukraine-i…
4/ The pinnacle of this tactic is a Chinese-made DJI Mavic quadcopter – easy to procure, easy to fly/ navigate, it became absolutely indispensable for ISR, target spotting, artillery correction and combat missions like “kamikaze attacks”, dropping small bombs and grenades.
5/ Ukrainian military forces have greater flexibility and independence in making decision based on the data from these quadcopters, a key capability that enabled them to faster react to Russian movements, maneuvers and force-positioning. This is still the case now.
6/ But the Russian military and its allies likewise incorporated the DJI and other quadcopters like Autel into their tactics and force structure. DNR militia expanded its drone training center in 2022 to teach drone operators that fly Mavics and other models.
7/ Ukraine has done the same, constantly training its soldiers with the help of the industry, ICT and other volunteers to make their quadcopters more lethal and effective. rferl.org/a/ukraine-dron…
8/ Russian forces have done the same, with the DNR drone center leading the way, along with other significant volunteer-based efforts like "Dronnitsa." The goal: make quadcopter use organic, train the operators and trainers who can quickly teach others how to use such technology.
9/ Today, drone-delivered videos are comm on social medial, with lots of content coming from quadcopters. Videos of attacks, tracking the soldiers and vehicles, of strike and bombings are in inseparable part of the Ukraine war narrative, told by Ukrainians and Russians alike.
10/ These DJI and Autel (and other) quadcopters have become so successful when paired with artillery that a Russian top general called DJI Mavic a true symbol of modern warfare, elevating artillery to the pedestal not seen since WW1.
11/ But these commercial products are vulnerable to military-grade countermeasures like electronic warfare, signals interference and different-caliber weapons. Both sides acknowledged that such countermeasures can have a powerful detrimental effect on quadcopter ops.
12/ This led to measures to counter these tactics - building different flight concepts, manipulating software and disengaging from the aeroscope. Ukraine and Russian efforts include hackathons to come up with the best ways to pilot such UAVs in a severely contested environment.
13/ What's in store for Mavic and other quadcopters in 2023? More widespread use, better integration of quadcopters and their operators into combined arms formations and units, and more widespread pilot training. npr.org/2022/08/22/111…
14/ Additional evolution includes building on current group quadcopter use to scaling it up to swarm ops, enabled by machine learning algorithms that recognize targets on the ground. vox.com/2022/9/21/2335…
15/ The DJI will finally see the semblance of competition as Ukrainian and Russian domestic efforts include investing in mass-scale production capacity to deliver thousands of small UAVs and quadcopters to the front. eastrussia.ru/news/drony-dly…
16/ For Russia, the continue dependence on many Chinese-made components will remain a feature in 2023. “Got it on AliExpress” will remain relevant, as customers will look for ready quadcopters solutions and components at online and physical marketplaces. ria.ru/20221201/dron-…
17/ In 2022, Telegram-based informational awareness and fundraising reached unprecedented levels, allowing volunteers to donate specific equipment, materiel and even raise funds for specific drones.
18/ As the Russian military seeks to retrain its mobilized force, it will push quadcopter use down to the tactical levels for more advanced tactical ISR. For both sides, targeting the other’s quadcopter operations left-of-launch and during/post- launch will remain a key tactic.
19/ Bottom line - the small quadcopter showed its utility in 2022 and we will see its use become more professionalized by both sides.
20/ Questions for next year: Will national industries finally find a substitute to DJI drones in combat? Can these small quadcopters be battle-hardened to withstand countermeasures? Can their operations become more sophisticated with new technology like AI? Stay tuned…
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1/ QUICK TAKE by a Russian mil blogger on retaking the Kursk region and Sudzha, and the role of UAVs and drones in "isolating the battlefield". The TG post is obviously subjective, so usual caveats apply - translation in this short thread below. t.me/rusengineer/67…
2/ "Our troops began moving towards the village of Novenkoye. And then video footage appeared from the Sumy-Sudzha highway, with a bunch of burnt (Ukr) equipment. Then the information field exploded with Operation Truba... The heroic actions of our soldiers made it possible to significantly influence the resilience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces."
3/ "Thus, to summarize, it can be said that the Russian army has mastered a tactical technique of "isolating the battlefield" by modern means in modern conditions. With the help of drones, the supply of the Ukrainian Forces was cut off, and they had no options but to retreat."
1/ THREAD on recent Russian assault tactics - assault teams now bring FPVs with them to launch at the shortest distance possible at targets: "To achieve an effect similar to suppression by artillery fire (almost continuous explosions on the defending enemy's position)..." t.me/unfair_advanta…
2/ "...preventing them from emerging from cover to fire at the attackers), the following method that has become standard for many is used: Assault infantry, moving to the initial position to carry out an attack, lays out on the ground (roofs of buildings, roads) their FPV drones and turns them on."
3/ "The drones are laid out in places that are most appropriate from the point of view of subsequent support for the attack. This allows the drone takeoff sites to be brought closer to the enemy's position, which reduces their flight time."
1/ THREAD: A Russian mil blogger on tracking fiber-optic cable back to drone operators to take our UAV crews: "The Ukr tracks our UAV crew operating on fiber-optics by the light and reflection of the fiber optic cable. There is a video and it's not clear if they hit the crew." t.me/filatovcorr/46…
2/ "In any case, an analog FPV kamikaze is flying (at their position), which means there must be video interception systems. At least to warn of danger. In their videos, the Ukrainian Forces admit that the Russians have few video interception systems."
3/ "Video 2. Our soldiers film fiber optic threads in the field, demonstrating the number of arrivals of this type of UAV. The first video, from the enemy side, confirms my hypothesis that a fiber optic drone can be tracked by the thread it leaves behind, just as I once tracked an enemy ATGM near Avdiivka." t.me/filatovcorr/46…
1/ QUICK TAKE from a Russian mil blogger on the importance of domestic microelectronics and "military IT" that Russian generals still don't get: "It is important to understand that technical progress today is driven..." t.me/filatovcorr/46…
2/ "...not only by the military mega-corporations, but also by the small civilian sector... Or rather, the rapidly growing microelectronics sector. Civilian electronics can carry so much computing power with relatively low energy consumption, that if you..."
3/ "...write target recognition and capture systems, you can "rivet" as many of these systems in the garage as you like. And a projectile from an RPG or flamethrower screwed to a civilian FPV is equal in power to the ATGM, only much more maneuverable."
1/ QUICK THREAD - an account of the Ukrainian UGV-UAV combined assault on Russian positions in December 2024: "The mission itself involved complex logistics and communications requirements. No drone swarm technology was used..." counteroffensive.news/p/the-first-ev…
2/ "...which meant that each individual drone was piloted by an individual pilot. Less than 100 soldiers were involved in the operation, including pilots, logisticians, planners and support staff – all to launch an assault of around 30 drones."
3/ "About a half a dozen kamikaze and machine-gun-mounted ground drones were used. Also involved in the assault were several FPVs, including one with a mounted assault rifle. Large quadcopter drones dropped munitions..."
1/ QUICK TAKE from a Russian military blogger on counter-UAV issues/problems: "The general principles of armed struggle have not really changed much - in this case the functionality of classical manned frontline aviation has largely "migrated" to small unmanned aircraft systems.
2/ "The organization of a systemic struggle for dominance in the "lower skies" in our current circumstances obviously stumbles not only on the significant shortage of normal material resources and trained human resources (although, of course, this factor plays a huge role)."
3/ "Perhaps I'm wrong, but I don't see that the very need to organize such a struggle has been clearly reflected by the (Rus) military leadership. Accordingly, there is no clearly defined task for its organization with an understanding and development of ways to accomplish this task."