1/ A THREAD: As 2022 draws to a close, a few words about how technology helped shape and influence the war in Ukraine – specifically, the impact of commercial quadcopters.
2/ Ukraine led this charge as Russia invaded in February 2022, scoring some major successes in key battles against Russian forces, with quadcopters providing crucial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to long-range artillery and MLRS systems.
3/ This capacity enabled Ukraine to better organize and position its forces to meet the invading Russian military. cnet.com/news/ukraine-i…
4/ The pinnacle of this tactic is a Chinese-made DJI Mavic quadcopter – easy to procure, easy to fly/ navigate, it became absolutely indispensable for ISR, target spotting, artillery correction and combat missions like “kamikaze attacks”, dropping small bombs and grenades.
5/ Ukrainian military forces have greater flexibility and independence in making decision based on the data from these quadcopters, a key capability that enabled them to faster react to Russian movements, maneuvers and force-positioning. This is still the case now.
6/ But the Russian military and its allies likewise incorporated the DJI and other quadcopters like Autel into their tactics and force structure. DNR militia expanded its drone training center in 2022 to teach drone operators that fly Mavics and other models.
7/ Ukraine has done the same, constantly training its soldiers with the help of the industry, ICT and other volunteers to make their quadcopters more lethal and effective. rferl.org/a/ukraine-dron…
8/ Russian forces have done the same, with the DNR drone center leading the way, along with other significant volunteer-based efforts like "Dronnitsa." The goal: make quadcopter use organic, train the operators and trainers who can quickly teach others how to use such technology.
9/ Today, drone-delivered videos are comm on social medial, with lots of content coming from quadcopters. Videos of attacks, tracking the soldiers and vehicles, of strike and bombings are in inseparable part of the Ukraine war narrative, told by Ukrainians and Russians alike.
10/ These DJI and Autel (and other) quadcopters have become so successful when paired with artillery that a Russian top general called DJI Mavic a true symbol of modern warfare, elevating artillery to the pedestal not seen since WW1.
11/ But these commercial products are vulnerable to military-grade countermeasures like electronic warfare, signals interference and different-caliber weapons. Both sides acknowledged that such countermeasures can have a powerful detrimental effect on quadcopter ops.
12/ This led to measures to counter these tactics - building different flight concepts, manipulating software and disengaging from the aeroscope. Ukraine and Russian efforts include hackathons to come up with the best ways to pilot such UAVs in a severely contested environment.
13/ What's in store for Mavic and other quadcopters in 2023? More widespread use, better integration of quadcopters and their operators into combined arms formations and units, and more widespread pilot training. npr.org/2022/08/22/111…
14/ Additional evolution includes building on current group quadcopter use to scaling it up to swarm ops, enabled by machine learning algorithms that recognize targets on the ground. vox.com/2022/9/21/2335…
15/ The DJI will finally see the semblance of competition as Ukrainian and Russian domestic efforts include investing in mass-scale production capacity to deliver thousands of small UAVs and quadcopters to the front. eastrussia.ru/news/drony-dly…
16/ For Russia, the continue dependence on many Chinese-made components will remain a feature in 2023. “Got it on AliExpress” will remain relevant, as customers will look for ready quadcopters solutions and components at online and physical marketplaces. ria.ru/20221201/dron-…
17/ In 2022, Telegram-based informational awareness and fundraising reached unprecedented levels, allowing volunteers to donate specific equipment, materiel and even raise funds for specific drones.
18/ As the Russian military seeks to retrain its mobilized force, it will push quadcopter use down to the tactical levels for more advanced tactical ISR. For both sides, targeting the other’s quadcopter operations left-of-launch and during/post- launch will remain a key tactic.
19/ Bottom line - the small quadcopter showed its utility in 2022 and we will see its use become more professionalized by both sides.
20/ Questions for next year: Will national industries finally find a substitute to DJI drones in combat? Can these small quadcopters be battle-hardened to withstand countermeasures? Can their operations become more sophisticated with new technology like AI? Stay tuned…
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1/ QUICK TAKE on the lagging Russian military education that is behind the current combat trends in Ukraine, from a Rus military commentator: "I attended a lecture at one of the military training centers in the Samara region, and excuse my French..." t.me/voickokipchaka…
2/ "...dear teachers of this center, but I have never heard so much nonsense from anyone. Of course, out of respect for their shoulder straps, I tried to smooth things over, but it got to the point where the lecturer said that 75% of all tactical targets were hit by "artillery".
3/ "Let me remind you, for those who have forgotten: this is the fourth year of the special military operation (Russian name for its invasion of Ukraine), and this war is unlike any other. Now, for your information, 70% of the targets are hit by drones."
1/ Rus state media reports that the Sukhoi Design Bureau (that built S-70 Okhotnik UCAV) is "actively developing eight distinct UAV types. Next step in tactical aviation is transitioning from viewing it as a mere collection of individual high-tech aircraft to developing integrated aviation systems." tass.com/defense/2015511
2/ Okhotnik took years to go through testing and evaluation, and was shot down by Russia's own forces in 2024 when it went out of control over Ukraine. It was not seen in Ukraine combat, is expensive and in very few numbers, and would likely not survive Ukrainian air defenses.
3/ More form Sukhoi: "...countering multi-layered air defense systems with manned aircraft alone has become prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the focus is shifting toward a network of functional complexes, each designed to address specific targets and tasks."
1/ THREAD: On September 6-7, 2025, the fourth annual "DRONNITSA" meet-up took place in Russia's Novgorod region, organized by KCPN (Coordination Center for Assistance to Novorossiya) and Ushkuynik Enterprise (that builds KVN fiber-optic drones), with assistance from Novgorod region government. t.me/dronnitsa/554
2/ This year, the event theme was "learning from mistakes" - what the larger Russian volunteer and start up community learned after years of assisting the Rus military and what gaps still remain. See this link for previous DRONNITSA threads.
3/ A key figure in organizing this event is Aleksei Chadaev, who head "Ushkyunik" Enterprise and is one of the key figures in the Russian tech volunteer space (below). His co-organizer is Aleksandr Lyubimov who is involved with KCPN.
1/QUCK TAKE: Rus commentators on the impact of FPV strikes on Ukrainian logistics: "Until recently, the Slavyansk-Izyum section of the highway was considered relatively safe for enemy movement. Drone strikes here were extremely rare and episodic. Now the situation has changed." t.me/VictoryDrones/…
2/ "Today, systematic work of FPV crews has been noted in this direction, and the result is immediately visible. From a military point of view, this is a turning point. FPV drones allow firing at a range of up to 25-30 km, which makes it possible to strike a target even before it enters the immediate frontline zone."
3/ "This effectively transfers the section of the highway to the category of "partial fire control". The change in tactics is obvious: the enemy can no longer use the road as a guaranteed safe supply route; columns are forced to split into small groups..."
1/ QUICK TAKE: Russia's Aleksei Chadaev, co-founder of the annual "Dronnitsa" meet up that will take place on Sept 6-7, and a key figure behind the "KVN" fiber-optic drone, on some of his own lessons and mistakes as a tech volunteer and developer - summary below: t.me/chadayevru/4072
2/ "The most difficult development for me (since 2022) is the demand to pour new wine ("military innovations") into old wineskins ("development institutes", aka "venture model"). In short, it did not turn out very well. Two main reasons behind this failure are..."
3/ "One: "techno-feudalism" (the unwillingness of everyone, from garage developers to a large industrial complex) to create a common space for technology exchange and Two: a procedural model where the key factor is the desire of budget managers to insure any risks associated with the management of state money."
Russian DefMin Belousov at the latest Miliary Commission meeting: "Starting this September, three military academies will begin training military personnel in 11 new specialties, including in the use of UAVs and robotic systems." t.me/tass_agency/33…
"We have significantly increased the volume of deliveries of tactical UAVs to the troops. This has certainly had a positive impact on the course of military operations. It is necessary to complete the work on creating an effective system for providing UAV troops with logistics and repairs."
"It is also necessary to increase the pace of training UAV operator crews and speed up the implementation of the necessary organizational and staffing measures. We have supplied the troop groups with effective electronic warfare systems, including "trench" (tactical) ones."