The bar chart from @JayinKyiv below is simply of Ukrainian MoD killed Russian claims.
Wounded in addition to the dead are functions of prompt medical care & medical evacuation logistics. Late 20th century combat casualty ratios are ~4 wounded for every death.
Casualty🧵
1/
Wounded in addition to the dead are functions of prompt medical care & medical evacuation logistics. Late 20th century combat casualty ratios are ~4 wounded for every death.
Casualty🧵
1/
https://twitter.com/JayinKyiv/status/1609255735824719880
I've gone out of my way to try and educate people on Twitter that you simply cannot use such 'standard ratios' in looking at Russian Army combat dead to wounded casualty ratios.
See my 'thread of casualty threads' at this tweet:
2/
See my 'thread of casualty threads' at this tweet:
https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1589425581112033281
2/
My current casualty ratio for the Russian Army over all in Ukraine is two dead for every three wounded across the entire front.
Mobiks & Wagner penal troops have much lower levels of medical care & worse dead to wounded casualty ratios.
3/
Mobiks & Wagner penal troops have much lower levels of medical care & worse dead to wounded casualty ratios.
3/
Before the war kicked off in Feb 2022, I started thinking this Russian ratio would be typical 1:10 dead to wounded ratio of a medium intensity artillery heavy static war - somewhat like 1953 Korea - for the Russian Army
4/
4/
https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1490432382872260615
The late static phases of the Korean war saw US Army & Marine infantry in deep entrenchments with the 1st generation anti-artillery fragment body armor.
This made a huge statistical difference in the casualty ratio as body armor prevented a lot of fatal fragment wounds.
4/
This made a huge statistical difference in the casualty ratio as body armor prevented a lot of fatal fragment wounds.
4/
That pre-war estimate of mine proved to be *WILDLY* incorrect. I was assuming the Russians had modern mechanized logistics to buff their medical care.
Everyone in the West, most especially it's 3-letter intelligence agencies I relied on, had been wrong on that for 80 years.
5/
Everyone in the West, most especially it's 3-letter intelligence agencies I relied on, had been wrong on that for 80 years.
5/
Then by early March 2022, after a closer look at Russian Army medical logistics, I lowered my estimate for the dead to wounded ratio to 1 death to three wounded.
Russian medical logistics have greatly decayed in the almost eight months since then.
6/
Russian medical logistics have greatly decayed in the almost eight months since then.
6/
https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1501390422660325376
My current casualty ratio for the Russian Army over all in Ukraine is 2 dead for every 3 wounded.
This was based on the leaked from Belarus hospital casualty figures of March 2022
It was taking about 40 hours to get Russian wounded to a hospital
7/
This was based on the leaked from Belarus hospital casualty figures of March 2022
It was taking about 40 hours to get Russian wounded to a hospital
7/
https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1506430410389176323
The general destruction of Russian tactical truck fleet has made things much worse.
Some OSINT evaluations of Russian casevac cellphone calls and battlefield videos show places like Bakhmut may be as low as a 1:1 dead/wounded ratio.
8/
Some OSINT evaluations of Russian casevac cellphone calls and battlefield videos show places like Bakhmut may be as low as a 1:1 dead/wounded ratio.
8/
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1596581211807576064
Some Ukrainian military officials have been talking about a 1 death to 1.3 wounded ratio since the 19 September 2022 Russian mobilization.
The context I read through Google translations didn't make it clear where, how widely and over what time period his ratio was...
9/
The context I read through Google translations didn't make it clear where, how widely and over what time period his ratio was...
9/
...so I am sticking to my two combat deaths to every three combat casualties ratio absent further Russian medical data leaks.
The thing that has been missing from casualty estimates since the Russian mobilization started is non-combat casualties.
10/
The thing that has been missing from casualty estimates since the Russian mobilization started is non-combat casualties.
10/
Late September 2022 to date is trench foot weather.
Good waterproof boots, clean dry socks and hard core NCO's enforcing good foot hygiene are the prerequisites for -NOT- losing thousands of troops to trench foot.
11/
Good waterproof boots, clean dry socks and hard core NCO's enforcing good foot hygiene are the prerequisites for -NOT- losing thousands of troops to trench foot.
11/
This US Army WW2 Green book medical history link (at page 138 in the text) regarding how badly US Army leadership failed in preventing trench foot in November/December 1944 & and frostbite injury in January 1945 due...
12/
achh.army.mil/history/book-w…
12/
achh.army.mil/history/book-w…
...to poor clothing, training, and discipline.
This utter leadership failure by General Eisenhower and other ETO senior commanders like Bradley, Hodges, Simpson & Patton nearly caused General Marshall's to lose his "90 division gamble" at the strategic level for a lack...
13/
This utter leadership failure by General Eisenhower and other ETO senior commanders like Bradley, Hodges, Simpson & Patton nearly caused General Marshall's to lose his "90 division gamble" at the strategic level for a lack...
13/
...of infantry replacements.
MacArthur's 6th & 8th Armies in the various Philippines campaigns received only 5,000 total replacements from January through June 1945 because the ETO suffered 46,000 cold injuries fall/winter 1944-45.
US Army ETO leadership was responsible.
14/
MacArthur's 6th & 8th Armies in the various Philippines campaigns received only 5,000 total replacements from January through June 1945 because the ETO suffered 46,000 cold injuries fall/winter 1944-45.
US Army ETO leadership was responsible.
14/
See the damning AMEDD quote:
"The reduction of trench foot is believed to involve the following controllable factors in order of significance as listed below:
a. Discipline in care of feet.
b. Footgear and clothing.
c. Rotation of troops (short and long term).
15/
"The reduction of trench foot is believed to involve the following controllable factors in order of significance as listed below:
a. Discipline in care of feet.
b. Footgear and clothing.
c. Rotation of troops (short and long term).
15/
Of those three previously listed US Army leadership failures of the Fall-Winter of 1944-1945, which do you think apply to Russian Mobik & Wagner penal troops?
My check mark is besides "All of the above."
16/
My check mark is besides "All of the above."
16/
The Russian Army has no NCO corps. And the Mobiks & Wagner penal troops are worse off leadership wise than the pre-war 'contract troops.'
So that's 'a.'
The whole reason for Russian mobilization is a lack of infantry to rotate units, so that's 'c.'
17/
So that's 'a.'
The whole reason for Russian mobilization is a lack of infantry to rotate units, so that's 'c.'
17/
As for 'b.' the one consistent in Russian Army performance is the consistent stealing & reselling of items like cold weather clothing & boots from Russian Army stocks.
Russian Mobiks are the most numerous victims of these Russian institutional failures.
18/
Russian Mobiks are the most numerous victims of these Russian institutional failures.
18/
In the far less corrupt & better supplied US Army of WW2 there were not enough combat boots:
"Shortages prevented replacement of shoes originally fitted, and repairs were slow. When the first trenchfoot outbreak occurred, many of the men had only a single pair of shoes,
19/
"Shortages prevented replacement of shoes originally fitted, and repairs were slow. When the first trenchfoot outbreak occurred, many of the men had only a single pair of shoes,
19/
...and some were still wearing the ones issued to them before D-day."
And US Army replacements then, like Russian Mobiks today, were the biggest victims of lack of boots & cold injury prevention training.
20/
And US Army replacements then, like Russian Mobiks today, were the biggest victims of lack of boots & cold injury prevention training.
20/
And there is no way on G-ds Green Earth that Russian officers give even this US Army 1944-1945 level of inadequate cold weather injury prevention leadership & discipline for Mobiks in Ukraine.
20/
20/
Across the entire US Army Western front in Nov-Dec 1944 there were 23,000 trench foot casualties. Again, text from AMEDD:
"For the week ending 25 November, for every 100 battle casualties evacuated from the Third U. S. Army, 60 soldiers were evacuated for cold injury."
21/
"For the week ending 25 November, for every 100 battle casualties evacuated from the Third U. S. Army, 60 soldiers were evacuated for cold injury."
21/
@JayinKyiv chart shows ~4,000 Russian KIA in the last week.
Assuming the 2 to 3 KIA/WIA ratio holds, that's 10,000 battle casualties.
Assuming Patton's 3rd Army 60% cold injury ratio is representative of the 2022 Russian Army...that is another 6,000 Russian cold injuries
22/
Assuming the 2 to 3 KIA/WIA ratio holds, that's 10,000 battle casualties.
Assuming Patton's 3rd Army 60% cold injury ratio is representative of the 2022 Russian Army...that is another 6,000 Russian cold injuries
22/
So, we are back to some relatively easy ratios, assuming that WW2 US Army cold weather injury performance in the Fall and Winter of 1944 -1945 are representative of current 2022 Russian Army performance.
For every 5 battle casualties, Russia can be suffering as many as 3
23/
For every 5 battle casualties, Russia can be suffering as many as 3
23/
...cold injuries.
Even if you assume Russia is performing 50% better than Patton's 3rd Army in Nov 1944.
The Russians are suffering 2 non-battle cold injuries like trench foot for every 5 battle casualty.
24/
Even if you assume Russia is performing 50% better than Patton's 3rd Army in Nov 1944.
The Russians are suffering 2 non-battle cold injuries like trench foot for every 5 battle casualty.
24/
This underlines in fire the reason Russia's Putin Regime called for another round of mass mobilization.
It desperately needs new Mobiks to replace the current levy of Mobiks.😱😱😱
25/25 End
It desperately needs new Mobiks to replace the current levy of Mobiks.😱😱😱
25/25 End
@threadreaderapp unroll please.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
