This is going to be an extended 🧵on consequences of Russian casualty rates on its culture and what it means for Russo-Ukrainian War termination.
What was notable about the 2014-to-2015 Donbass War/ATO was that more Russian troops were killed than the total number of...
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What was notable about the 2014-to-2015 Donbass War/ATO was that more Russian troops were killed than the total number of...
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...Ukrainian civilians and AFU personnel killed by the Russians.
That is statistically unusual (see below), although the civilian vs. AFU deaths in the current war follow a similar pattern to other conflicts.
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That is statistically unusual (see below), although the civilian vs. AFU deaths in the current war follow a similar pattern to other conflicts.
https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1525284580160425985
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A lot of Russia's losses appear to reflect the past pattern of the 1990's Chechnya campaigns, with AFU soldiers & Ukrainian government officials commenting on Russian tactics being based on Chechnya.
See:
Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya
globalsecurity.org/military/libra…
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See:
Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya
globalsecurity.org/military/libra…
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There is a historical pattern here along these lines, see:
10 Epic Russian Military Disasters - Listverse
listverse.com/2014/02/02/10-…
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10 Epic Russian Military Disasters - Listverse
listverse.com/2014/02/02/10-…
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Some argued (those in the West who paid attention at all) after the 2015-2015 fighting along the lines that "The Russians cannot be a threat if they are so incompetent."
[Those who didn't pay attention, reasons, or were busy feeding their superiors all the "Russia ...
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[Those who didn't pay attention, reasons, or were busy feeding their superiors all the "Russia ...
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...is 10 feet tall" bulls—t they wanted to hear very carefully ignored this debate.]
The opposite was true for two reasons:
a) Russians are accustomed to taking heavy combat losses and the political blowback is much smaller than would be seen in any Western nation;
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The opposite was true for two reasons:
a) Russians are accustomed to taking heavy combat losses and the political blowback is much smaller than would be seen in any Western nation;
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b) The high combat loss rates deplete the aggregated experience pool in the Russian military, dumbing it down, and making it more likely to take foolish risks, and offer bad assessments to the nation's political leaders;
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The realities of (a) and (b) have been observed repeatedly in the current Ukrainian war, and given the losses sustained in middle ranking and junior officers in the campaign, the propensity to blind optimism and the tendency to starting fights that sane people would not...
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...start, this will obviously continue for decades.
The punchline is that the culture of yes men surrounding the leader, the general insensitivity to combat losses, and the depletion of talent and expertise will make the Russians MORE prone to starting fights they...
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The punchline is that the culture of yes men surrounding the leader, the general insensitivity to combat losses, and the depletion of talent and expertise will make the Russians MORE prone to starting fights they...
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...cannot win for the foreseeable future.
Put differently, the last and current Ukrainian wars have made the Russians much more dangerous than they were before the current war.
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Put differently, the last and current Ukrainian wars have made the Russians much more dangerous than they were before the current war.
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We are literally seeing the dystopian 2006 American science fiction comedy movie Idiocracy rise, take form and dominate in the real-life Russian Army & Moscow elites.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idiocracy
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en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idiocracy
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There is no basis in reality, given the dysgenic effect of Russian Army leadership casualties on Moscow elites, to expect the Russians. When they are expelled from within Ukraine's 1991 borders, will stop fighting.
There are two historical examples that apply here.
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There are two historical examples that apply here.
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The 1st is the 'Korean War Stalemate Period' of July 1951 – July 1953 where North Korea plus its Chinese & Russian simply refused to stop fighting after Seoul was recaptured for the 2nd time and the UN forces stopped at the pre-war demilitarize zone.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Wa…
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en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Wa…
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The 2nd, more recent example, is the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milošević after the Operation Allied Force.
Serbia after its forced withdrawal from Kosovo is a much more accurate model for Russia - sullen, bitter, resentful, hateful and angry.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_bomb…
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Serbia after its forced withdrawal from Kosovo is a much more accurate model for Russia - sullen, bitter, resentful, hateful and angry.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_bomb…
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Head of the Ukrainian GUR military intelligence MGen Budanov contends that once the Russian land force is ejected from Ukraine. The Russians will continue shooting anything and everything they can shoot across the border, from mortars up to...
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unian.ua/war/viyna-ukra…
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unian.ua/war/viyna-ukra…
...supersonic cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, warstocks permitting.
What the West needs to do is prepare for this reality and equip Ukraine with ABMs, lots of suitable SAMs, C-RAM systems for border areas, and lots of fighter jets.
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What the West needs to do is prepare for this reality and equip Ukraine with ABMs, lots of suitable SAMs, C-RAM systems for border areas, and lots of fighter jets.
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The problem is the geniuses in Washington DC, Berlin and Paris who drove Western security policy into a Russo-Ukrainian War ditch by ignoring subject matter experts like General Deptula, Professor Stephen Blank and Philip Kaber on arming Ukraine with M-1 Abrams, M-2 Bradley's
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...and F-16's between 2015 and 24 Feb 2022 in order to PREVENT A WAR.
These same 'policy experts' now believe, for no good reasons I can think of, that Russia will after its defeat magically transform to a Western style polity & behave like a good globalist thereafter.
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These same 'policy experts' now believe, for no good reasons I can think of, that Russia will after its defeat magically transform to a Western style polity & behave like a good globalist thereafter.
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This is why Poland, Finland, & the Baltics are arming themselves to the teeth now, even though the Russian military has been gutted in Ukraine.
They understand Russia, even if the geniuses driving Western policy in Wash. DC, Berlin & Paris "know better."
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They understand Russia, even if the geniuses driving Western policy in Wash. DC, Berlin & Paris "know better."
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Putin needs Russia to be in a permanent state of siege like during the Stalin/Khrushchev eras - mother Russia surrounded by baying Nazis along its borders eager for conquest of Russia's untold riches whatever you imagine them to be.
This propaganda trope has worked ever...
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This propaganda trope has worked ever...
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...since the skirmishes with the Teutonic knights and will continue to be used for domestic political reasons.
We outside Russia are no more than theatrical props in a grandiose domestic theatre play about Russia under siege.
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We outside Russia are no more than theatrical props in a grandiose domestic theatre play about Russia under siege.
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Oleksii Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council has made a good point.
If Russia wants to become an anti-Western North Korean type client colony of China.
There is nothing any Westerner can do to change that fact.
22/22
pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/…
If Russia wants to become an anti-Western North Korean type client colony of China.
There is nothing any Westerner can do to change that fact.
22/22
pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/…
@threadreaderapp unroll please
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