Relearning Economics Profile picture
Jan 4, 2023 16 tweets 4 min read Read on X
Loanable Fund vs Endogenous Money.

A short film stylized in an old fashion silent movie-type format and utilizing the #Minsky #systemdynamics software.

Download Minsky for free: sourceforge.net/projects/minsk… (1/16)
Let's start with what you learn in the textbooks and hear on the news. It's the loanable fund's fallacy. (2/16)
The aggregate banking sector is broken into 4 accounts.

1. Reserves (Assets)
2. Customer1 Deposits (Liability)
3. Customer2 Deposits (Liability)
4 Bank Equity (Equity)

Note the initial conditions under each account. (3/16)
Image
Notice all rows must balance to zero, as per the rule of double-entry bookkeeping. The loanable fund's fantasy says customer 1 loans to customer 2. (4/16) Image
Since the bank facilitates this loan, they charge customer 2 interest. (5/16) Image
The bank kindly pays a portion of the interest to customer 1. (6/16) Image
The loan is repaid and the cycle begins all over again. (7/16) Image
Other than being fundamentally flawed as pointed out in the 2014 Bank of England paper titled: "Money Creation in a Modern Economy". (8/16)

The loanable funds model fails to address aggregate demand in the economy via the money creation process. (9/16)
Now let's take a look at how bank loans really work using endogenous money theory. First, we have to add a new account called "Issued Loans". (10/16) Image
The bank issues a loan, but this time it creates an asset under "Issued Loans". At the same time, the bank simultaneously creates a liability by marking up "Customer 1 Deposits". (11/16) Image
As before customer 2 pays interest to the bank for the loan. (12/16) Image
Finally, the loan is paid back to the bank canceling out both the asset and the liability. (13/16) Image
Imagine opening your monthly bank statement and seeing all your money is gone because it was loaned out! That's what neoclassical economists would have you believe with their loanable funds model. (14/16)
This school of thought forces us to reduce (or slow the growth) of the money supply during economic slumps. Thus reducing aggregate demand right when that demand is needed. (15/16)
This also creates an environment where too much lending happens in boom times, causing financial bubbles and system instability. (16/16)

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More from @RelearningEcon

Aug 19
Since 2008, central banks created trillions in reserves through QE.

Textbook logic said this would unleash lending & cause hyperinflation.

It didn’t. Inflation stayed low for over a decade. Why?
🧵1/9 Image
Because reserves don’t flow into the real economy.
They sit at the central bank as electronic balances between banks.

QE swaps bonds for reserves, it doesn’t give households more cash.
🧵2/9
Banks don’t lend reserves to the public.
They lend when they find creditworthy borrowers.

QE didn’t change risk appetite or income growth, so lending didn’t surge.
🧵3/9
Read 9 tweets
Aug 15
Mainstream econ says:
Households save → banks lend savings → firms invest.

Robinson flipped it: investment comes first, savings follow.

Once you see how money & banking work, it’s hard to unsee.
🧵1/10 Image
The Goodwin growth cycle shows it:
Investment drives output & jobs → higher employment boosts wages → rising wages can squeeze profits → investment slows → cycle repeats.

It starts with investment decisions, not household savings.
🧵2/10
So where does the money for investment come from?

Not from a “pool” of prior savings.

Modern banks create credit.

When they lend, they create deposits, new money instantly funding investment.
🧵3/10
Read 10 tweets
Aug 11
Mainstream macro blames crises on public debt or bad policy.

History tells a different story, The biggest crashes follow private debt booms , when households & firms load up on credit faster than incomes grow.
🧵1/8 Image
1929, Japan’s 1990s bust, the 2008 GFC, all preceded by surging private debt-to-GDP.

In each case, public debt rose after the crisis, as governments absorbed the fallout.

Cause and effect are backwards in the textbook story.
🧵2/8
Private debt booms are dangerous because they fuel asset bubbles and fragile balance sheets.

When cashflows falter or rates rise, defaults spike and leverage turns into a chain reaction.
🧵3/8
Read 8 tweets
Aug 7
Fractional reserve banking" still shows up in textbooks, news, and even heterodox debates.

But the concept is dead.

Modern banking doesn’t work that way, and clinging to the term misleads more than it explains.
🧵1/9 Image
Traditionally, it meant banks held a fixed % of deposits in reserve (say 10%) and lent out the rest.

But today?

There are no reserve requirements in countries like the U.S.

Banks aren’t lending most of your money. They aren’t required to hold any.
🧵2/9
Bank lending today is constrained by:
– Capital ratios
– Liquidity rules
– Risk appetite

Banks lend when it’s profitable, not when they have “extra reserves.”

In fact, they don’t lend reserves to the public at all — only to other banks.
🧵3/9
Read 9 tweets
Jul 30
Neoclassical models treat fiscal policy as neutral in the long run, only useful in “crises.”

But this idea rests on flawed assumptions: full employment, crowding out, Ricardian equivalence, and perfect markets.

Let’s unpack why none of these hold.
🧵1/7 Image
Assumption: the economy naturally returns to full employment.

Reality: underemployment, labor market hysteresis, and demand shortfalls are persistent.

When you assume away slack, you assume away the need for fiscal intervention.
🧵2/7
Assumption: government spending crowds out private investment via interest rates.

But when the central bank controls the rate, and firms face uncertain demand, this logic fails.

Spending creates income, not competition for funds.
Read 7 tweets
Jul 28
Mainstream macro relies on rational expectations: agents are assumed to know the model and forecast the future accordingly.

But real economies aren't solved backwards.
The Deep Minsky model throws this out, and models how expectations actually evolve.
🧵1/7 Image
Instead of perfect foresight, Deep Minsky agents adapt using feedback:
-Flows inform future behavior
-Perceived trends shift confidence
-Expectations are path-dependent

This lets the model evolve historically, not jump from equilibrium to equilibrium.
🧵2/7
In Deep Minsky, investment, consumption, and pricing decisions respond to changing financial conditions, not "optimal" plans.

Expectations are formed endogenously, through firm behavior, bank leverage, and wage–price dynamics.
🧵3/7 Image
Read 7 tweets

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