Unwin divided societies into four categories based on their rites rather than their beliefs: zoistic, manistic, deistic, and rationalistic.
He placed rationalistic at the highest position on the scale based on the greater control of rationalistic societies over their environments, and ordered the others with reference to that. His ranking goes zoistic < manistic < deistic < rationalistic.
Unwin's whole goal was to try to figure out the effect of sexual opportunity and a society. To that end, he classified modes of sex relation into seven categories, with no pre-nuptial chastity as the least rigorous and absolute monogamy as the most.
The primary output he was concerned with was what he called "social energy", that is "the power of reason, the power of creation, and the power of reflecting upon itself." He refers to refinement of this energy as human entropy.
He distinguishes between "expansive" and "productive" social energy. Expansive energy is more common and easier to attain then productive energy, and always precedes it. Rationalistic societies are the only ones that display productive energy.
There is a perfect correspondence between sexual restrictions, cultural category, and social energy. The more restrictions, the higher the category and the more energy displayed.
There are two caveats: first, it is the past and present relations of a society that matter; not merely the present. It takes 3 generations to see the full effects of a change. Second, different stratums of society can be at different levels; any change will be uneven.
The sexual opportunity of women matters more than that of men; restrictions on men do not matter except for distinguishing absolutely monogamous and polygamous societies. Unwin thinks this is because of the importance of women to early upbringing; I have a different explanation.
Only societies with women reared in absolutely monogamous society for several generations attain the rationalistic state. In general, abs. monogamous societies display great energy, and most energetic societies begin as abs. monogamous. This is lost when abs. monogamy is lost.
The manner in which absolute monogamy is lost is the same in every case. Female emancipation => replacement of absolute with modified monogamy => (usually) abandonment of pre-nuptial chastity => decline and disappearance of social energy.
Unwin thinks that the association of female emancipation with the destruction of absolute monogamy is a coincidence, and the two can be combined. He even advocates this to those who wish to display social energy for greater periods of time. I disagree (reasons in the review).
Some of the more interesting pieces of evidence below: women were emancipated in Anglo-Saxon England by the 11th century; an 11th century Anglo-Saxon wife had more rights than her early 20th century English equivalent.
In Rome, dominance of society shifted according to the most stringent stratum, since not all of society shifted at once. Patricians => patricians/plebeans => mostly plebeans => provincials => Christians.
Historically speaking, there is no such thing as Christian marriage. Pauline principles lead to absolute monogamy, but many Christian societies have been less stringent. In particular, Eastern Orthodox has typically been less stringent then the Western Church.
Some accounts likely to be interested:
@Known2Cali4nia - Family Structure Maximalist
@CovfefeAnon - WQ
@TheWorthyHouse - Extremely relevant to your concept of human flourishing, which is nearly equivalent to "social energy"
Athenian pederasty did not appear until absolute monogamy broke down, when the Athenian golden age was breaking down.
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Employers hiring people and then training them in the specific skills they require has declined as a hiring model for decades, in favor of a hiring market where employers look for people who already have those skills.
In the training/internal labor markets model, a company struggling to find specific skills will train promising entry-level employees. In the hiring market model, they can raise wages or otherwise improve conditions. In both, they can also substitute technology for labor.
Neither a hiring market nor training model for matching jobs to seekers is compatible with "skill shortages" as a concept, which implicitly assumes skills are fixed and once people with those skills run out employers can do nothing (except through immigration or schooling).
"Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico" (TR Fehrenbach, 1973/1995) thread of threads. Mesoamerican civilization was horrifying and very backwards by Old World standards, but unique.
Excerpts from TR Fehrenbach's "Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico" (1995). The PRI had massively expanded higher education. These universities were entirely 'free'/self-governing and became locuses of left-wing organizing.
In 1968, security forces fired upon a massive student demonstration/riot against the Olympic Games.
By 1970 Mexico had made enormous progress; the national income increased sixfold while the death rate dropped by half. But Mexico was still struggling with foreign-exchange; the govt pursued import-substitution to improve balance-of-payments.
Thread with excerpts from the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) section of TR Fehrenbach's "Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico" (1995). Calles created the PNR in 1929 to institutionalize the govt and Revolution, creating a Mexican party-state.
The Calles/Obregon governments were corrupt, but never succumbed to paranoia; there was no equivalent to the Soviet or Chinese liquidations of class enemies, the press was free, and the average Mexican had nothing to fear from the govt (Red Terror against the Church aside).
Roughly 19M acres were redistributed through 1933; most land remained with latifundios. But the new latifundios were not like the old ones, they were commercial enterprises rather than social systems. The clerics, army, and latifundistas were all tamed by Calles/Obregon.
Thread with excerpts from TR Fehrenbach's "Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico" (1995), on post-Revolutionary Mexico. To justify land reform, the revolutionaries revived the principle that expropriation was justifiable if the national interests demanded it.
The Constitutionalists defeated the Villistas in battle and assassinated the leader of the last revolutionary faction, Zapata, by treachery.
Carranza, the erstwhile leader of the victorious Constitutionalists, dug his own grave by trying to promote someone other than Obregon to the presidency after him; he was forced to flee the capital, run down, and murdered.
Excerpts from TR Fehrenbach's "Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico" (1973). The Porfiriato gave Mexico a generation of stability and development for the first time since independence. This left Mexico overdue for another civil war: the Mexican Revolution.
One problem was that the Porfirian school system had created a large, literate middle structure (not class). These educated mestizos became dissatisfied due to lack of opportunity; growth was rapid but not rapid enough to absorb them all.
The Revolution kicked off in 1910, when Diaz announced he'd won reelection with 99% of the vote. This kicked off an insurgency in Chihuahua, in the mestizo, frontier north.