A really interesting story in @CNN US sources say that Russian artillery fire is now far lower than this summer. As much as 75% lower. edition.cnn.com/2023/01/10/pol…
US and Ukraine have slightly different estimates, but regardless, Russian artillery fire is way down. In the US view, the Russians are down to firing 5000 shells a day 'on average', which would actually means Russia is firing fewer than Ukraine some days.
Seems to be a confluence of factors. RUssian stockpiles were not nearly as large as we were led to believe, those stockpiles were inefficiently stored, and Ukrainian attacks on Russian stockpiles/logistics--all have taken a toll.
If Russian fire really is this low, reinforces how counterproductive their continuing assaults on Soledar and Bakhmut are. They would be putting a great deal of their declining artillery strength into attacking towns of no strategic importance. kyivindependent.com/national/russi…
This would leave them precious little to try and disrupt Ukrainian attempts to organize their next offensive--which should be a Russian priority (but is seemingly not).
Also, strong quote from @general_ben about the ludicrousness of the escalation debate. Points out that only a few months ago giving Stingers was being said to be escalatory by some.
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Whenever people talk about Russia having staying power to win the war, remember that the Nordics and Eastern European states also have great staying power and are determined that Ukraine win. See @TobiasBillstrom
As he points out, there has been a great misunderstanding of how to understand power and military power before the war, which led few people to understand how the war would develop. I, using my earlier research, tried to reframe the war to show Ukraine had distinct advantages.
What he points out is that people never understood Ukrainian power, because they never calculated how Ukrainian soft power could be used to supplement its own rather modest productive base. In doing this, Ukraine shows how limited Russian power really is.
There has been a consistent uptick in the last few days, both in what is being supplied to Ukraine militarily and how Ukraine’s victory is the goal. Think we can say there is growing consensus in NATO countries that Ukraine can win this war outright
You might say we are in phase 4 of military assessment of this war.
Phase 1: Russian shock and awe! Kyiv falls in a week. Phase 2: My God, Ukraine might hold out. Phase 3: Can Ukraine actually push Russia back? Phase 4. Ukraine has a really effective military, it can win.
OK everyone, just sent out the promised substack (2nd part) which discusses why those who overstate the Soviet Contribution to victory in WWII would end up arguing that RUssia was stronger today than it clearly has shown itself to be. phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/misunderstan…
Got the impetus for this from a few places, including this exchange with @paulkrugman
This is a very important set of reflections by @paulkrugman on how to judge the air war taking place over Ukraine (and yes was pleased to see my research mentioned in the thread.
To understand the value of a campaign towards achieving a victory or not, it’s vital that you know the resources expensed by each side. If you see campaigns where one side exerts huge material efforts and the other counters cheaply, that’s a real problem for the ‘huge’ side.
Which brings up the air war over Ukraine. We don’t know what Ukrainian systems are being used where; but what Ukraine doesn’t want to do is use very expensive anti air systems to take out cheap Iranian drones. That’s a loser in the long run as there can be many more cheap drones
Dear @nytimes I do appreciate you taking quotes directly from my substack (flattered a little). Next time, though, you can supply the link so people can access it themselves in full. phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/thinking-ahe…
Some seem to be reading this wrongly. It’s not a dig, it’s a polite request. I’m happy they are using my analysis, just for myself (and many others) who are working hard providing analysis, it matters if our links are included. It’s not profit, my substack is free.
Just wanted to thank @nytimes for adding the link. I really appreciate the quick response--and even though I have not always agreed with the NYT's analysis, I'm an online subscriber and recommend it widely. Thanks! nytimes.com/live/2023/01/0…