Thread by @AlexGabuev

🧵🇨🇳🇷🇺
Does China distance itself from Russia because of war against Ukraine? A terrific @FT piece helps to understand how Beijing wants its policy towards Moscow to be seen in Western capitals. Spoiler alert: the real policy might be very different. Let me help to unpack it. 1/

This excellent piece in @FT by @JKynge, @sunyu1117, Liu Xinning, @HenryJFoy, @rwmcmorrow is well worth your time. Bottom line: after securing his third term, Xi does a course correction on foreign policy and tries to win back friends in Europe. 2/ ft.com/content/e59203…

This includes efforts to distance China from Russia (or at least tell the West that Beijing is doing so), because 🇨🇳 leadership sees that China's reluctance to criticize the Kremlin and join Western sanctions is viewed in Europe as tacit support for Putin's brutal war effort. 3/

"Several 🇨🇳 officials in private conversations with the @FT strove to put clear daylight between Beijing and Moscow on the issue of 🇺🇦 — a message that has been repeated to some 🇪🇺 diplomats." “Putin is crazy,” says one 🇨🇳 official, who declined to be identified. 4/

Other 🇨🇳 talking points on Russia policy include:
1) Putin didn't tell Xi about his plans to invade 🇺🇦 during 2/4 summit in Beijing, and thus an idea still so popular in the West that Putin must have told Xi something because of "no limits partnership" is wrong. 5/

2) Demotion of vice-minister Le Yucheng 乐玉成, @MFA_China's top 🇷🇺 expert, happened because he was held responsible for the intelligence failure on 🇷🇺 invasion. In 2023 he was a likely successor to Wang Yi as head of MFA, but the job went to 🇨🇳ambo in 🇺🇸 @AmbQinGang instead. 6/

3) China is willing to use the closeness of its relationship with Moscow to restrain Putin from resorting to the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, and readouts of Xi's meetings with @Bundeskanzler, @POTUS, @EmmanuelMacron attest to that (in 🇩🇪,🇺🇸,🇫🇷 versions though, not 🇨🇳) 7/

4) Finally, "🇨🇳 now perceives a likelihood that 🇷🇺 will fail to prevail against 🇺🇦 and emerge from the conflict a “minor power”, much diminished economically and diplomatically on the world stage." Thus 🇪🇺 should think that China will prioritize ties with EU over ties with 🇷🇺 8/

Let's look at the merit and novelty of these 🇨🇳 talking points before trying to unpack what China's actual policy towards Russia is now, nearly a year into horrors of this war, and why Chinese diplomats want to spin it the way they do in talking to 🇪🇺 audiences. 9/

The "Putin is crazy" quote shouldn't shock as it reflects a pretty widespread attitude towards Putin's impulsiveness and emotionality among many 🇨🇳 officials including people working on 🇷🇺 in MFA, MSS, NDRC, MofCom, expert community at least since 2014 annexation of Crimea 10/

This attitude builds on a degree of disrespect towards Russia that's common among some members of 🇨🇳 elite ("🇷🇺 was USSR 苏联大哥, but now it's a third world country with nukes run by crooks"). But to think that this attitude dictates Beijing's policy towards 🇷🇺 is a mistake. 11/

Chinese sources of @FT are right when they say Putin didn't tell Xi anything, and China was not aware of the invasion. Well. He didn't tell his PM and governor of the Central Bank. Why would he tell a foreign leader? "Partnership without limits" are just words... 12/

... that some observers and officials in the West have taken much more serious than the Chinese and the Russians, who are pretty cynical about those pompous phrases. The most significant proof that 🇨🇳 was not aware of 🇷🇺 plans was failure to evacuate 🇨🇳citizens before the war 13/

As for Le Yucheng's demotion, it looks like an attempt to put blame on someone who was hardly in charge given his rank and MFA's low role in managing the relationship with and intelligence on Russia. 🇨🇳 system simply got Putin wrong - like many other governments, by the way 14/

A reminder: for quite some time before the war Team Biden tried to work with 🇨🇳 through @AmbQinGang, as @ewong reported in @nytimes, sharing intel about upcoming 🇷🇺 invasion of 🇺🇦 (@CIA was super protective of sources&methods for obvious reasons) /15 nytimes.com/2022/02/25/us/…

And then... "After one diplomatic exchange in December, U.S. officials got intelligence showing Beijing had shared the information with Moscow, telling 🇷🇺 that 🇺🇸 was trying to sow discord." Not sure this could have happened without a nod from Xi or at least Yang Jiechi. 16/

As for 🇨🇳 claims that Beijing works behind the scenes to convince Putin to seek peaceful resolution or at least not use nukes in 🇺🇦 if he feels that he is losing the war and it might be the end of his regime and him... we don't have any evidence that China actually does it. 17/

On the record, even in readouts of Western leaders' meetings with Xi, the Chinese leader doesn't go beyond banalities like "sky is blue, peace is better than war, nuclear weapons are terrifying and shouldn't be used." Neither do other Chinese officials. 18/

As for view in Beijing that Moscow will emerge from this war weakened, truth is that a weakened 🇷🇺 will be dependent on 🇨🇳, and it will be an asset in Beijing's quest for regional and global power. Look for some nuance in this @ForeignAffairs piece 19/ foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-n…

Russia's economic and tech dependency on China is growing day by day, and so is 🇨🇳 leverage. @JKynge and I have talked about it back in March, just 30 days into this ugly war, and unfortunately, major takeaways from this conversation remain relevant. 20/ ft.com/video/bec85cd0…

For the quantitative metrics of 🇨🇳🇷🇺, we see an across-the-board growth in 2022: more trade, more military exercises, more deals in RMB etc. I've summed it up in this thread. There is nothing to suggest that China changes course on Russia. 21/

https://twitter.com/AlexGabuev/status/1606359767894540288?s=20&t=AegnN10bOFI2NDmoRq7gGQ

In fact, Beijing's strategy on Russia was pretty consistent long before 2/24. It's about deepening engagement on China's terms while managing Western red lines carefully. My colleague @EvanFeigenbaum got it explained on the day the war started. 22/ carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/24/chi…

China knows that its problems with the West are not rooted in Xi's bromance with Putin, but in issues like 🇨🇳🇺🇸 rivalry, Taiwan, tech etc. Even if Xi drops Putin under the bus, ties with the U.S. will not structurally improve absent China's fundamental change to 🇺🇸 liking 23/

However, 🇪🇺 is somewhat different. Having survived crash course in decoupling from 🇷🇺, major EU economies don't want to go that road with China, at least for now. Amid fears of recession in eurozone, 🇩🇪🇫🇷🇮🇹 leaders rush to Beijing to secure market access, new deals etc. 24/

This gives 🇨🇳 a slight opening to drive a wedge between 🇺🇸 and 🇪🇺, capitalizing on other disputes between them, and delay cementation of anti-China tech coalition led by the U.S. thus buying Beijing the precious time of having access to European tech&money&markets 25/

In order to create additional reasons for 🇪🇺 leaders to go to China and strike deals there, Beijing is using the 🇷🇺🇺🇦 card. It wants to create an impression that with a little bit of accommodation of 🇨🇳 by Europe, China is actually willing to do more to restrain Putin. 26/

And it seems to be working! @Bundeskanzler went to China in November, declining @EmmanuelMacron's idea to go together in order to speak in one 🇪🇺 voice. Berlin then framed the trip as effort to bring China on board addressing 🇷🇺 aggression against 🇺🇦. 27/ reuters.com/world/europe/g…

Now @EmmanuelMacron & @GiorgiaMeloni will follow this pattern, and Beijing's subtle hints that it might be ready to put pressure on Putin help to frame these trips not as self-interested steps that affects Transatlantic unity on 🇨🇳, but as part of a noble cause of helping 🇺🇦 28/

Bottom line: it's clear why Beijing wants to portray itself distancing from Moscow, and why 🇨🇳 officials are ready to talk about it. Facts and figures, however, don't suggest there is any real U-turn of Chinese policy towards Russia. Штош. 29/END ft.com/content/e59203…