(1) Another needless delay: The station mngr. immediately reported there was a person down in the roadway on Track 1 at 9:26 pm. Somehow--once again--there was a problem & the appropriate & needed Metro rescue assignment wasn't sent for 11 minutes--approx. 9:37 pm. (more) #wmata
(2) @dcfireems was initially dispatched for a cardiac arrest call at 9:30 pm. It took the officer of Engine 4 to read through the dispatch computer notes along with a little delay getting @wmata's fire liaison on the radio before the correct assignment was dispatched. (more)
(3) Why is it key to promptly get the correct fire & EMS units going? Because @dcfireems needs the special equipment to operate safely on the tracks. The difference between a patient being on the platform or in the roadway is huge. (more)
(4) I don't have enough info to say if this was a fault of @wmata or @OUC_DC or both. With the historic lack of transparency at both agencies we may never learn exactly what happened from either. Maybe @MetrorailSafety can learn why the info wasn't relayed &/or acted on. (more)
(5) As we saw on the football field in Cincinnati, mins & secs count for survival after cardiac arrest. When a person's on a subway track, virtually everything has to be in their favor for survival. Tonight, it wasn't. Let's hope, despite that, there's a positive outcome. (more)
(6) The mishandling of rail emergency coordination between @wmata & @OUC_DC is well documented thanks to @NSTB & @MetrorailSafety investigations &, quite frankly, my reporting. Here's what's not well documented: Area leaders caring enough to make fixing this a priority.
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(1) Prediction: Many political leaders & some of the public will largely forget Fort Totten 2009, L'enfant Plaza 2015, the series of @wmata worker deaths along with how enormously close we came to disaster with Arlington Cemetery 2021. (more)
(2) They will at least partially buy into Paul Smedberg's claim @wmataGM can't do this job if he has to put safety first. That's because Clarke is seen as the new @wmata savior & there's no higher priority than getting trains back to running more frequently. (more)
(3) They will forget the lives lost & all the reasons @MetrorailSafety exists. They will forget that @wmata almost never does the right thing when it comes to safety or even learn from its mistakes. They will ignore #wmata's consistent lack of candor. (more)
(1) Why is it that key messages between @wmata & @OUC_DC during rail emergencies either don't get relayed or properly acted upon? You must listen to the radio traffic from last night's fatal cardiac arrest at U Street to fully appreciate how the basics get screwed up. (more)
(2) LISTEN: In 3 messages on 2 radio channels between 9:26 & 9:29 pm the U St. station manager made clear someone was down in the track bed. They were in the middle of Track 1. Trains were stopped immediately & there was absolute clarity on where the person was located. (more)
(3) LISTEN: At 9:30 pm @OUC_DC/DC 911 dispatched a cardiac arrest "on the platform" at U St. No mention the person was actually on the tracks. This is crucial information that should have prompted a response of 9 units instead of 3, so the track can be accessed safely. (more)
(1) New: This @OUC_DC failure is a bit of inside baseball but is important. Yesterday, it took 5 minutes to send help requested by Engine 27 for a natural gas line break on Benning Rd. When help was sent, 2 different dispatchers somehow announced 2 different assignments. (more)
(2) Listen: At 12:26 pm, Engine 27 reported a high pressure gas line rupture & needed the call upgraded to a box alarm. There was a good prompt by the dispatcher asking Engine 27 if he wanted a "hazmat box". (more)
(3) Listen: But it wasn't until 12:32 that the extra units were dispatched. As is standard, the assignment was voiced on the dispatch & fireground channels. On the fireground channel, 18 units were dispatched. (more)
(1) NEW: Once again, DC 911 failed to effectively use the technology DC residents paid for to confirm an address. They missed the location of a car crash by almost 3 miles & lost 12 minutes, even though the correct information was available to them. (more)
(2) At 3:58 Tuesday morning, DC 911 dispatched @dcfireems Engine 10 & Ambulance 3 to 12th St. & Maryland Ave. in Northeast for a crash. (more)
(3) At 4:06 am, Engine 10 reported they found nothing at 12th & Maryland in Northeast and asked the dispatcher to check back with the person who called 911. (more)
(1) @AlexInWard6, put your experience to work. Cop reports a fire at 708 Kennedy St. NW with people behind a locked door. What to you do?
a. Immediately dispatch DC Fire & EMS
b. Wait 4 mins. until the stressed cop trying to make rescues confirms it's a building fire. (more)
(2) This was the story that brought me off the bench. It wasn't just that mistakes were made. It was the unbelievable excuses offered to the press & DC Council by @OUC_DC director Karima Holmes & @MayorBowser ordering an outside investigation for every agency but OUC. (more)
(3) To fully understand how absurd & tragic this all is please do yourself a favor & read this article & listen to the entire testimony. (more) thedcline.org/2020/08/18/dav…
(1) NEW: A @dcfireems battalion chief spotted this fire yesterday & called it in via the radio. But he had a very difficult time getting @OUC_DC to dispatch the call. It took more than 3 minutes. Very similar to the tragic 708 Kennedy St NW. First, your history lesson. (more)
(2) Watch: It took 4 mins to dispatch @dcfireems to a @DCPoliceDept officer desperately calling for help for 2 people trapped in the burning Kennedy St home in 2019. One of numerous excuses by @OUC_DC's Karima Holmes was that getting such calls by radio was extremely rare. (more)
(3) It was absurd then & is now for anyone to accept that a major city 911 center has more difficulty handling a report of a fire coming in by radio than by a 911 call. So, let's dissect what went wrong yesterday to better understand why @OUC_DC still can't get this right. (more)