Thread by @MarkGaleotti

Putin's decision to appoint Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov as new overall commander of Ukraine op is significant. A quick thread 1/

Is it a demotion for former joint commander Surovikin? Implicitly, yes, of course - even if being framed simply as a response to the increased 'status' of the op. 2/

What did Surovikin do wrong? Nothing, really (in context - this is not about his morality...). Yes, there were all kinds of reversals, including the recent Makiivka strike, but there is a limit to what one new commander can do in 3 months 3/

But Putin doesn't necessarily understand this (remember: no military experience and a court full of sycophants) nor care. 4/

For Gerasimov (who were were being assured was out of favour and about to be sacked... or who was Putin's right hand man...) it is a kind of demotion, or at least the most poisoned of chalices. It's now on him, and I suspect Putin has unrealistic expectations again 5/

It has been pretty clear that there will be spring offensives - that's what the 150,000 mobiks not thrown into the fight are being held for. 150k fresh troops, however poor quality, will make a difference, but not, I suspect enough for Putin 6/

There may well be some advances, but nothing decisive (and the Ukrainians themselves will be looking to a spring offensive). In many ways, I don't think Moscow's strategy hinges anyway on battlefield victory - it's more about politics 7/

In other words, demonstrating to the West that Russia is in this for the long haul, and hoping that we will lose the will and unity to continue to support Kyiv. (I think Putin will be disappointed, but he *has* to believe this - it's his only real shot at some kind of victory) 8/

So what does this actually mean? (a) Confirmation, if we needed it, that there will be serious offensives coming, and that even Putin recognises that poor coordination has been an issue (though can even Gerasimov truly command Wagner + Kadyrovtsy?) 9/

(b) Gerasimov is hanging by a thread. I don't think this is intended to create a pretext to sack him as the war is too important and Putin can sack who he wants. But he needs some kind of win or a career ends in ignominy. This may well suggest some kinds of escalation 10/

Not the nuclear option, but more mobilisation or, arguably more militarily logical but politically dangerous, also deploying conscripts. They are better trained and equipped than most mobiks! 11/

(c) Putin doesn't understand/care about his officer corps. If you keep appointing, rotating, burning your (relative) stars, setting unrealistic expectations, arbitrarily demoting them, that's not going to win loyalty 12/

Here and now, I don't see that as a crucial issue, but as with the anger and demoralisation of the Rosgvardiya (because they feel they were used as cannonfodder), it's one of those issues which may bite Putin in a real crisis. 13/end

Oh, and obligatory PS: NO, THERE IS NO GERASIMOV DOCTRINE! ;)