Putin's decision to appoint Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov as new overall commander of Ukraine op is significant. A quick thread 1/
Is it a demotion for former joint commander Surovikin? Implicitly, yes, of course - even if being framed simply as a response to the increased 'status' of the op. 2/
What did Surovikin do wrong? Nothing, really (in context - this is not about his morality...). Yes, there were all kinds of reversals, including the recent Makiivka strike, but there is a limit to what one new commander can do in 3 months 3/
But Putin doesn't necessarily understand this (remember: no military experience and a court full of sycophants) nor care. 4/
For Gerasimov (who were were being assured was out of favour and about to be sacked... or who was Putin's right hand man...) it is a kind of demotion, or at least the most poisoned of chalices. It's now on him, and I suspect Putin has unrealistic expectations again 5/
It has been pretty clear that there will be spring offensives - that's what the 150,000 mobiks not thrown into the fight are being held for. 150k fresh troops, however poor quality, will make a difference, but not, I suspect enough for Putin 6/
There may well be some advances, but nothing decisive (and the Ukrainians themselves will be looking to a spring offensive). In many ways, I don't think Moscow's strategy hinges anyway on battlefield victory - it's more about politics 7/
In other words, demonstrating to the West that Russia is in this for the long haul, and hoping that we will lose the will and unity to continue to support Kyiv. (I think Putin will be disappointed, but he *has* to believe this - it's his only real shot at some kind of victory) 8/
So what does this actually mean? (a) Confirmation, if we needed it, that there will be serious offensives coming, and that even Putin recognises that poor coordination has been an issue (though can even Gerasimov truly command Wagner + Kadyrovtsy?) 9/
(b) Gerasimov is hanging by a thread. I don't think this is intended to create a pretext to sack him as the war is too important and Putin can sack who he wants. But he needs some kind of win or a career ends in ignominy. This may well suggest some kinds of escalation 10/
Not the nuclear option, but more mobilisation or, arguably more militarily logical but politically dangerous, also deploying conscripts. They are better trained and equipped than most mobiks! 11/
(c) Putin doesn't understand/care about his officer corps. If you keep appointing, rotating, burning your (relative) stars, setting unrealistic expectations, arbitrarily demoting them, that's not going to win loyalty 12/
Here and now, I don't see that as a crucial issue, but as with the anger and demoralisation of the Rosgvardiya (because they feel they were used as cannonfodder), it's one of those issues which may bite Putin in a real crisis. 13/end
Oh, and obligatory PS: NO, THERE IS NO GERASIMOV DOCTRINE! ;)
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Cranking up the Murder Machine?
There has been a steadily-escalating Russian covert ops campaign in Europe over the past year, but the latest news of an assassination plot seems to represent something of a big deal. A thread 1/ thetimes.com/world/europe/a…
In short, the claim is that Moscow had plans to kill Armin Papperger, head of the German arms firm Rheinmetall, along with other senior figures in the European defence-industrial complex 2/ edition.cnn.com/2024/07/11/pol…
A necessary caveat first: this is just what we are being told, and as regards apparent sabotage attacks already happening, not every incident is a Russian plot (just as Ukrainians are not behind every fire in Russia, for all Russian paranoiacs and Kyiv super-boosters claim) 3/
Just a reminder: the 5th Service, the Operational Info & International Relations Service, has other duties but especially runs agents in ex-Soviet countries and as such was meant to have a massive network in Ukraine, that largely failed to materialise in 2022 2/ rusi.org/explore-our-re…
First of all, despite the reporting, I don’t actually think this is ‘punishment’ for his failures around the start of the Ukraine war. Revenge may be a dish best served cold, but 28 months later seems a tad too cold 3/
Rather depressing that new Defence Minister Belousov is sporting a uniform now for Security Council, even if he has the silver stars of a civil servant, not gold of a general. Performative dress does matter though – a short thread 1/
Until Shoigu, civilian defence ministers wore suits – even Sergei Ivanov, who as a former FSB general did have the legit right to go uniformed. Apart from just being less tacky, it also symbolised civilian control of the military 2/
Shoigu is something of a master of spin (to terrible effect considering how far he fooled Putin as to the state of the Russian military), and his decision to affect a uniform was done for reasons 3/
Nikolai Patrushev becomes a Presidential Aide
We were all wondering where he would go - this is an interesting move, sideways and a little downward, but the exact angle of that downward slide remains to be seen. A few thoughts... 1/ meduza.io/en/news/2024/0…
The position of Presidential Aide (henceforth PrA) is an ambiguous one. It doesn't mean the person who fetches Putin's tea and arranges his pencils (unless that's what Putin wants done!), so much as once of his general purpose henchmen 2/
Former Education Minister Fursenko, for example, seems to spend most of time deputising for his boss at a university event here, a science festival there. He's more a teleoperated factotum than demonstrating any substantive role. 3/
At great threat to my mental wellbeing, another dip into today’s Russian press around the Crocus City terrorist attack. A thread. 1/
The high-circulation Argumenty i Fakty (incidentally where Patrushev most often gives his interviews) has no doubts, as shown by this front page. Islamic State? No, it was the Collective West and their Ukrainian puppets 2/
FSB director Bortnikov has no doubts the terrorists were headed to Ukraine: “And I’ll tell you a little secret: on the other side they wanted to greet them as heroes.” 3/
Reading today's government newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta in many ways illustrates the key dynamics around the Crocus terrorist attack. A short thread 1/
We have Putin's remote (in every sense) meeting, at which he reluctantly admits jihadists committed the attack but repeats his claim that it connects to "a whole series of attempts by those who have been fighting our country since 2014 at the hands of the neo-Nazi Kyiv regime" 2/
Insulting, inaccurate and tone deaf, but that's Putin these days. Glancing at social media, the 'jihadists+Ukrainian' scenario isn't landing well 3/ rg.ru/2024/03/25/kto…