Dara Massicot Profile picture
Jan 11 15 tweets 5 min read
Today Shoygu and Gerasimov demoted Surovikin, and put Gerasimov in charge of the operation in Ukraine, demoting their most competent senior commander and replacing him with an incompetent one. This is a story that has it all: infighting, power struggles, jealousy /1
It’s hard to argue that Surovikin was demoted for cause. As commander, a "fixer" - he consolidated positions, used resources better, had Putin's ear, is popular among the troops, milbloggers, Kadryov, Wagner/mercenaries, got a lot of attention./2
Surovikin has not made strategy blunders on the battlefield like so many other Russian generals have. I do not believe MOD’s rationale that it is to generate greater resources. They may need more resources, but such a step is unnecessary. On what grounds was he demoted? /3
Putin appeared to be getting more realistic assessments from Surovikin, a change from when he was getting some other version of events from Shoygu-Gerasimov early on. /4 ft.com/content/fb6115…
Contrast with Gerasimov and Shoygu’s command record for this war: it’s a flunk. They flunked it. They signed off on a secret plan, multiple bad assumptions, didn't tell the majority of their troops. led to big casualties and a partially broken force /5 nytimes.com/interactive/20…
Under Shoygu and Gerasimov’s command, a large percentage of the Ground Forces and Airborne forces (equipment and personnel) were destroyed. Thousands of both are gone. This leadership is so negligent that it should have been grounds for dismissal in any normal system.. /6
..But they are loyal to Putin and the system so they were kept on. Gerasimov and Shoygu for months now have been sidelined from the main command of the operation. As criticism of them mounted from some quarters. /7
Who can claim their leadership is competent after one year of this war? But, they are experienced players in Moscow. With this change, I view this as a power struggle that has resolved in favor of Shoygu/Gerasimov. So, where does this go from here? /8
With Gerasimov in charge, if this is indeed permanent, I think the possibly of the Russians asking their tired force to do something that it cannot handle rises exponentially. Gerasimov didn't push back in Feb 2022 and won't do it now. IDK if that is good or bad for Ukraine. /9
This move also puts pressure on Prigozhin and others who don't trust the MOD leaders anymore. Or they get in line quickly. Wagner has been hurling major insults at the MOD leadership lately. /10. businessinsider.com/wagner-group-p…
I view this news like Shoygu's speech announcing the return of more divisions. Seniors in Moscow are clingingly fiercely to the status quo and also soviet past. Important to keep in mind that they default to looking inwards and backwards even when it leds them to poor outcomes/11
@WarintheFuture has an interesting look at Russian forces under Surovikin here. Let's see what Russian forces retain of these strategies, or if they try something else. /12 foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia…
(And, as it turns out, the MOD Telegram was being shady a few weeks ago.) 12/
TL:DR: Russians demoted their "fixer" commander in favor of Gerasimov, who last year agreed to and oversaw a debacle invasion plan that resulted in the partial destruction of their army. What? /END

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More from @MassDara

Jan 12
Palace intrigue aside about yesterday’s Russia leadership news, there are a few issues of intent that remain concerning: the shifting tone of messaging on a long struggle,the possibility of creeping state mobilization to support the war, expanding commands to match bigger tasks…
Russia’s capabilities (manpower and materiel) are a limiting factor for their war in Ukraine—for now. It seems that their intent remains unchanged and the Kremlin seems willing to make more sacrifices. (/2)
I’m watching to see what other command changes take place. The changes (having CGS run the war) is not typical for how they managed previous recent conflicts, but these are unusual times. Interference at top levels is common, direct command is less common. /3
Read 5 tweets
Jan 8
Russia’s Makiivka response gets worse. MOD claimed it destroyed two dorms and killed 600 Ukrainian personnel as retaliation. Scenes from Kramatorsk suggest both strikes missed. first video: calm inspection of a crater..(/1)
And the second location in Kramatorsk— more calm inspections. These are not scenes of mass casualties (/2) reuters.com/world/europe/m…
Russian CEP missed two buildings… one by <10 meters or so and the other by quite a lot. And it seems like Russian intel was either wrong, not timely, or it’s just something that the MOD is saying to go along with their retaliation story (/3)
Read 4 tweets
Dec 29, 2022
Exactly one year ago, I started writing this for @DefenseOne on the urgent need to help Ukraine survive air strikes and need for air defenses. I felt frustrated and helpless to stop the coming war and suffering. defenseone.com/ideas/2022/01/…
I wrote that Ukraine needed help riding out the first waves of strikes, which we now know they received. I also wrote they urgently needed air defense systems- a complicated process that needed months to implement. Those systems only stated to reach Ukraine this fall. /2
Today there is another Russian missile launch on Ukrainian infrastructure. Russia can crank out missiles (even if at reduced capacity) to launch at Ukraine. Ukraine will struggle to rebuild like this. Western SAMs help but the number of systems and coverage are limited. /3
Read 4 tweets
Dec 21, 2022
Shoygu and Putin provided some updates in a regularly scheduled MOD speech, the MOD Collegium. Shoygu signals changes to the Russian military's force structure are coming. Text below, and some initial reactions /1
telegra.ph/Tezisy-vystupl…
Some changes make sense, and others arguably go backwards in time and suggest the General Staff is not learning the right lessons from the war at this point in time. Let's go through the changes in order from "that makes sense" to "??????" /2
1: with Sweden and Finland joining NATO, the Western Military District will revert back into the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts – like before 2010, as well as an Army Corps HQ in Karelia. This makes sense with NATO expansion, so this change checks out /3
Read 23 tweets
Dec 19, 2022
There's so much to absorb in this new NYT story on Russia's invasion plans, it’s well worth the time to read and take it all in. I contributed a little to it. I’d like to do a deep dive on a few things that stand out to me from Russian planning materials (/1)
Big picture: as we’ve known since early days, the Russian high command kept much hidden from its troops and key stakeholders. OPSEC to the point of absurdity. I don’t know how else to describe it other than negligence bordering on contempt for their own personnel. (/2)
Today let's deep dive on this Russian planning table for day 1 of the war (which came to the NYT via Ukraine's GUR intelligence service). These units belong to the 76th Guards Air Assault Division - one of Russia's most elite units. Most subordinate units of 76th are listed. /3
Read 9 tweets
Dec 14, 2022
Below is an account from a Russian defector who served in the 64th Brigade (Bucha) from February - September. Details shared are consistent with what is known more broadly. This story is worth a close read. I share some reflections below. (/1)
cnn.com/2022/12/13/eur….
This solider recalls that his unit, the 64th Brigade, on the way to Kyiv in February had "a direct command to murder" those who were divulging Russian positions regardless if they were military or civilians. In his telling if they had a cell phone they could be shot... (/2)
..suggesting not only a lack of discipline (the solider confirms his unit - the 64th, had no discipline), but also that an order was allegedly given by the command and understood by soldiers to mean targeting civilians with lethal force (/3).
Read 15 tweets

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