Turkey looked to be heading toward trouble in the summer of 2022: it was selling reserves to cover a growing current account deficit.
But Erdogan pulled a rabbit or two out of the hat in the H2 2022; reserves are now rising even with the persistent external deficit.
1/x
To be sure, Turkey's balance of payments doesn't look healthy --
There hasn't been any real demand for Turkey's government debt for a while (especially the TL bonds, but recent FX issue largely offset earlier maturities)
2/
And the banks understandable don't want to rollover costly long-term (often 1 year + 1 day) loans -- they have more domestic deposits than they need in any case.
3/
So the current account deficit hasn't been financed by relatively more stable long-term flows --
4/
Rather the bulk of the inflow -- setting "errors" aside -- has come from potentially risky short-term deposits (and a reduction in the banks' external liquidity buffer, which is part of the "net" deposit flow)
5/
Zooming in a bit, the recent rebound in reserves has mostly come from:
-- the Rosatom loan (the yellow bar)
-- CBRT swaps + cross border deposits (from geopolitical friends of Turkey)
-- renewed Eurobond issuance (some likely to Turkish banks)
6/
But the CBRT's reserves have been increasing faster than its external debt -- there isn't any imminent risk that Turkey is going to run out.
(of course, having $70b in reserves/ $20b in illiquid currencies isn't great if you have $30b or so in external debt)
7/
The November reverse increase though was a bit bigger than can be explained by the eurobond issue.
As this chart illustrates Turkey's banks also ran down their stock of offshore deposits (more than covering external debt repayment)
(Chart sums flows to infer stocks)
8/
Turkey still isn't in a great place. I wouldn't want to manage an economy when the central banks net fx position is negative by any measure. And the end December reserves dipped a bit.
But Ergogan's geo-financial strategy has bought Turkey a bit of time.
9/9
p.s. the chart above nets out illiquid reserves from the swaps with Qatar and the UAE to try to estimate liquid reserve assets. I also netted out the PBOC swap as I am not sure that the CBRT's CNY are usable, but I don't have a strong view on that specific adjustment.
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One important caveat: the word "protectionists" is sometimes thrown around a bit too easily when describing the new US (and EU) production subsidies.
Straight up subsidies are actually allowed by the WTO -- & the big chip manufacturers in Asia already get them
2/x
The OECD's big report on the semiconductor industry back in 2019 for example documents significant historical (and current) support for TSMC and Samsung from their home governments.
Wonder if the market will ultimately conclude that Asia's fx intervention in the summer and fall of 2022 worked?
Yen is now at 130, the won has rebounded to 1250, the baht is rising on China's reopening...
And there were no significant fx sales in either November or December
Full data for 2022 isn't yet available (need to wait for end-January). But counting hidden intervention, emerging Asia sold $200-250b in reserves in 22. Add $60b for Japan: total fx sales will be around $300b, which is actually modest v Asia's stock of reserves.
China is the outlier -- if you go by its balance of payments data it actually is on track to add $100b to its reserves in 2022.
Of course, China's data is at odds with itself (BoP v PBOC balance sheet) and the state banks were active at times.
1) Inflation differentials had pushed Egypt's currency up in real terms; 2) The domestic fx market hasn't been clearing (imports are not being paid, fx rationing resulted in a // exchange rate)
He is right -- with China pulling back from policy lending & the rise in US interest rates limiting market finance, the Fund's concessional window has become a critical resource for Africa.
I have long thought the IMF could have done more to help middle income countries manage the Pandemic shock. But there is no doubt that the IMF stepped up its lending to low income countries in a big way in 2020 ...
In fact, between its concessional lending and the 2021 SDR allocation, the Fund really did play a big role in maintaining net flows to Africa -- something it should get more credit for.
The US trade deficit shrank in November, even with the dollar's 2022 strength.
The inventory cycle tied to COVID trumped the initial impact of exchange rate moves (which play out with long and variable lags)
1/x
There is no mystery behind the fall in the trade deficit -- US goods demand fell back to earth after it soared in the first quarter of 22. demand for core manufactures (ex industrial supplies and ag) is now back to its levels in the fall of 2021.
2/x
After consumer good imports stabilized in September and October, I had thought the inventory cycle might have run its course -- and that consumer good imports might stabilize at levels above the pre-pandemic trend --
The global balance of payments has to add up (at least in theory).
But it it is still surprising how well the surplus of East Asia and main oil exporters lines up with the deficits of the US and few others --
(excluding the EU actually makes everything line up better)
Another way to see the fit -- the same data, with the sign reversed for the main current account deficit economies right now (the US, the UK, India and Turkey)
a) obviously this simplifies a bit by focusing on economies outside of the EU with large surpluses/ deficits
b) I have a theory for why everything fits better when the EU and Switzerland are excluded ...