It was I that characterized Peter Zeihan as a clueless #EmpirePropagandist clown.
In any case, as I read your posts, it is evident to me that your perspective on this war has been substantially informed by the very same species of propaganda Zeihan echoes.
The western intel propaganda psyop that commenced before the conflict went hot in early 2022 has effectively inverted the truth of what has actually occurred. And its overriding success has been predicated upon establishing fallacious parameters for interpreting events.
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Foremost among those fallacious interpretive parameters has been the degree to which the conquest and retention of territory has been established as THE measure of military success. In relation to this, I strongly recommend my analysis from early July:
Some weeks after I posted that essay, the legendary US Marine General Paul K. Van Riper published an absolutely essential affirming analysis in the Marine Corps Gazette. It is a MUST-READ in relation to these questions:
I have repeatedly expanded upon these concepts in subsequent blog posts. I continue to emphatically aver that, not only has Russia been “winning” this war from the very beginning – but it has been doing so OVERWHELMINGLY.
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Contrary to the pervasive CIA/MI6 propaganda universally promulgated by state-controlled western media and their endless parade of clueless think-tank monkeys and academicians, the disproportionate casualty ratio of this war is unprecedented in modern times.
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The Russian high command has never once been distracted from its primary objective: TO DESTROY THE UKRAINIAN ARMY.
They have been content, since late August, to receive AFU attacks against well-established Russian defensive lines.
They deliberately ceded real estate to draw AFU forces into costly “counter-attacks” in Kharkov and Kherson oblasts. These attacks steadily diminished in potency from October until mid-December.
AFU offensive potential is now effectively exhausted.
In the past several weeks, the AFU has expended a large proportion of its remaining competent combat capacity in a desperate but futile attempt to retain the Bakhmut/Soledar fortress they had constructed over the course of almost a decade.
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The importance Ukraine attached to the defense of Bakhmut is reflected in the staggering losses they have incurred.
According to even Ukrainian sources, the AFU has, over the past few weeks, suffered at least 20k casualties, including an inordinate number of KIA.
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At least 15 battalions of the best troops and equipment the AFU had left were hastily shifted to Bakhmut from both the northern and southern regions of the line of contact.
They are now shattered.
The strategically positioned fortress is lost.
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During the Battle of Bakhmut, the AFU has outnumbered the attacking Russian forces at least 3 to 1. With only a minority of regular Russian army troops involved, the Wagner PMC and Donbass militia have methodically destroyed numbers far greater than their own.
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Of course, it has been Russian artillery and air power inflicting the vast majority of the damage on Ukrainian troops and equipment. Most AFU casualties never even saw a Russian soldier before they were hit. And those who did found themselves consistently outclassed.
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And because of the very nature of their tactics, and the relentless firepower they can bring to bear, Russian forces have suffered (as I have noted repeatedly) a minor fraction of the casualties they have inflicted.
All assertions to the contrary are demonstrably false.
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Examined with a narrow focus, Russian prosecution of this conflict reveals a few missteps and miscalculations. That is the nature of war. But viewed as a whole, I submit they have attested exceptional strategic discipline and impressive tactical adaptiveness.
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And, at this very moment, as the AFU is more depleted and demoralized than at any prior point, Russian forces are at the peak of their strength, armed with better equipment – and more of it – than at any previous stage of the conflict.
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The original cadre of Ukrainian professional soldiers and virtually all of their equipment are now long gone.
The much smaller and more poorly equipped AFU/NATO hybrid army has been wrecked over the past four months.
A third army cannot be conjured from the ashes.
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Those still in thrall to the myths spawned by this conflict’s peerless propaganda will likely continue, for a time, to cling resolutely to their imaginary war. But no later than the summer solstice, it will have become undeniably evident that it was all just a mirage.
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The always impressive @witte_sergei treated us to a great thread yesterday, wherein he discusses the possibilities for the soon-to-come Russian winter offensive. I highly recommend it.
One unknown is the actual number of combat effectives (and accompanying equipment) Russia has in the theater at this time – and their current disposition.
My approximation would be ~500k currently uncommitted combat-capable troops in fully equipped battalions.
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This ~500k estimation assumes that only about half of the recent mobilization + volunteers (~400k total) is combat-ready today.
In honor of the momentous year of 2022 grinding to a halt not with a bang, but a whimper, and in light of my having become a somewhat reluctant blogger and small-time internet influencer, I present my top five blog posts of 2022.
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My criteria is entirely subjective. It represents the short list of those essays I personally feel had the most important things to say. I also believe they all remain pertinent, and will continue to do so into the future.
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#5 – No Fly Zone
I continue to believe the unprecedented display of air defense prowess by Russia remains arguably the single most underappreciated aspect of this war.
No nation in the world has previously demonstrated this capability.
Against all the naïve predictions of the dopes who believed Russia/China could never be more than a strained marriage of convenience, there appears to be A LOT of romance in the relationship.
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Sure, it may not last long, compared to some marriages.
But I predict it lasts at least a decade, and probably much more.
The US State Department is not pleased. It has issued “warnings” to the two lovers.
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"Beijing claims to be neutral, but its behavior clearly shows that it continues to invest in close ties with Russia," a State Department spokesman said.
They then commanded China to cease further military support for Russia, and to stop defying US sanctions edicts.
I’ve been talking about the Russian build up of forces in Belarus since October. Now this build up is being noted by many western media sources and military analysts. This *may* suggest a decreasing likelihood of a Russian counter-offensive south from Belarus.
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Indeed, many of the Russian-friendly analysts whom I respect are dubious of a “big arrow” Russian offensive out of Belarus. And it’s difficult to dismiss their sound logic.
That said, I think it is worthwhile to revisit Soviet strategy from WW2.
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In the famous and decisive Battle of Kursk – which took place in the vicinity of current operations in this war – the Red Army incorporated an unprecedented amount of “maskirovka” to conceal their intent from the German high command.
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