Will Schryver Profile picture
Geopolitics - History, Empires, and War - Macroeconomics and Markets - Music - Photography English / Italiano
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May 6 6 tweets 2 min read
Short 🧵

Many commenters have suggested that Prigozhin's excoriation of Russian leadership (and regular army) will serve to demoralize the remainder of Russian forces fighting in Ukraine.

This is, I am convinced, a conclusion entirely misconceived.

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The host of Russian regulars is, I am strongly persuaded, heartily sick and tired of hearing the popular narrative of Wagner “winning the war for Russia” and Prigozhin’s frequent unwarranted monopolization of quasi-exclusive credit for Russian successes in this war.

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May 5 4 tweets 1 min read
Short 🧵

In my view, there is effectively zero possibility the Ukrainians can sustain a credible offensive against Russian forces, and when it fails, the Russians will then move to seize the remainder of the four oblasts that have already approved referenda to join Russia.

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In fact, as I have repeatedly argued since February 27, 2022, the Russians are almost certain to reclaim all of historical Novorossiya to the Danube – likely including Transnistria.

And there will be little the AFU will be able to do to impede them.

2/ Image
May 3 14 tweets 10 min read
@Jimmyjude13 🧵Russia Has Been Winning This War All Along — And Winning it Big

I've written extensively on this question since it became apparent the Russians had eviscerated the original AFU by late spring 2022.

One of my earliest articles explains in detail:

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imetatronink.substack.com/p/destroying-m… @Jimmyjude13 A few weeks after I published that seminal blog post, the legendary USMC general, Paul K. Van Riper (with a few others) published in the Marine Corps Gazette a highly controversial analysis of the war which affirmed most of what I had written in July.

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imetatronink.substack.com/p/a-former-us-…
Apr 19 24 tweets 4 min read
🧵Ukraine War Update

Once it became clear the Russians had no intention to launch a winter offensive, I’ve steadily come to believe they concluded no later than summer 2022 that they must prioritize preparations to face a possible direct NATO intervention in this war.

1/23 I am increasingly persuaded the introduction of the American “wunderwaffen” (M-777 and HIMARS) has overridingly influenced Russian prosecution of this war – not on account of these particular systems’ battlefield efficacy – but by what they symbolized:

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Apr 13 8 tweets 2 min read
🧵Nothing As It Seems

It appears the madness in the empire’s star chambers has been cranked to 11, and they have gone and royally beclowned themselves with this “document leak” PSYOP.

And make no mistake, a PSYOP is precisely what we are dealing with here.

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Not only is it inarguably a PSYOP, but it is one that must have been conceived at the highest levels of the ruling junta.

How do we know this?

BECAUSE THE REACTION OF ALL THE EMPIRE’S POWER APPARATUS HAS BEEN TIGHTLY COORDINATED AND CAREFULLY SCRIPTED!

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Apr 11 4 tweets 2 min read
Short🧵

The always-excellent Big Serge (@witte_sergei) presents his take on the "leaked" Ukraine War order of battle documents.

I cannot yet bring myself to accept his overarching conclusions regarding them.

But his analysis is still a must-read.

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bigserge.substack.com/p/russo-ukrain… I personally find it inconceivable that the Pentagon is *truly* relying upon OSINT and other such dubious intelligence.

But that doesn’t mean they don’t have some reason to give the impression that is true as part of a misinformation gambit.

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Apr 9 6 tweets 2 min read
Short 🧵

It is increasingly obvious the empire's military "brain trust" understands it lacks the wherewithal to fight Russia in Ukraine.

I worry they may believe the big problem is they can't bring to bear the allegedly awesome power of the US Navy.

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imetatronink.substack.com/p/the-united-s… They know carrier groups operating in the Baltic, Mediterranean, or Black seas would be acutely vulnerable to Russian strengths.

Nor is a fight against Iran a plausible alternative. The Persian Gulf would be a death trap.

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imetatronink.substack.com/p/lessons-neve…
Mar 25 5 tweets 2 min read
Left alone to get gigantic
Hard huge and haunted
A generation so much dumber than its parents
Came crashing through the window

Mar 24 4 tweets 1 min read
Short🧵

I've been following the news emerging out of Syria. All that seems certain at this point is that something "bigger than usual" has happened, and there are some US casualties.

There is talk of several dozen "rocket" strikes, which suggests a locally based attack.

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The question now is how the US will respond. They don’t have sufficient ground forces in the region to engage in any sort of “punitive” counterinsurgency action. So, as per usual, it will be airstrikes. But against whom, and where?

Syria?

Iraq?

Iran?!

2/
Feb 23 4 tweets 1 min read
Short 🧵

My brief commentary on the Wagner PMC/RF MoD tempest in a teapot:

I am strongly inclined to believe it is Russian maskirovka designed to lure the AFU to pump more forces into the closing jaws of the Bakhmut cauldron.

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I believe “Wagner PMC” is and always has been acting hand-in-glove with the Russian Ministry of Defense. I do not believe the “Wagner PMC” is what its popular image would suggest. More than likely it is a “shell company”, so to speak, for official Russian policy.

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Feb 15 12 tweets 3 min read
🧵Thread Revisit

I’m on a Twitter hiatus in recent days to gather my thoughts without distraction. But I was reminded of this thread this afternoon and thought it worth revisiting.

Original post linked here; several of my replies further below.

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Feb 10 8 tweets 2 min read
Short🧵

This article correctly underscores the potency of air-denial tactics in a 21st century great power or near-peer conflict.

But it devolves into utter nonsense propaganda when it speaks of AFU air successes in Ukraine.

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warontherocks.com/2023/02/the-so… Not only has AFU air defense been woefully crippled since the early days of this war, but its offensive air power has been effectively nonexistent.

The original inventory of Ukrainian Air Force fighter and attack aircraft is long-since destroyed.

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Feb 3 9 tweets 3 min read
Music 🧵

I pledged to publish a new article today.

I won't.

I've worked on it all day long. It became more ambitious than I first planned. Maybe tomorrow.

For now I'm taking a break with some of my all-time favorite guitar soloists.

Johnny Hickman:
Terry Kath:

Jan 22 9 tweets 9 min read
@oloos878787 @SydneyFreedberg @HuntClancy @siberiancattt Response🧵

Iraq 1991 was all about seizing post-Soviet strategic dominance (and permanent bases) in the Gulf region; securing the petrodollar system, and greatly weakening the no-longer-useful Iraqi army the empire supported to fight against Iran.

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@oloos878787 @SydneyFreedberg @HuntClancy @siberiancattt Iraq 2003 was about: 1) ostentatiously employing an iron fist against even more potent emerging threats to the global dollar system – in particular Iraq’s gambit to sell its oil for Euros and gold; 2) menace and contain a greatly strengthening Iran.

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Jan 21 12 tweets 6 min read
@SydneyFreedberg Response🧵

That's a pretty mediocre strawman construction.

In any case, I never suggested the US/NATO are "dangerous" -- except to themselves and Ukraine.

NATO built its Mother of All Proxy Armies in Ukraine to harm Russia, which has responded by destroying it.

1/12 Image @SydneyFreedberg The original, very formidable AFU was wrecked by July. The second, much smaller and more poorly equipped NATO/AFU hybrid army has now been wrecked, necessitating this current attempt to cobble together a third, which will be substantially weaker than the previous two.

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Jan 13 16 tweets 4 min read
What’s Next?🧵

The always impressive @witte_sergei treated us to a great thread yesterday, wherein he discusses the possibilities for the soon-to-come Russian winter offensive. I highly recommend it.

I also continue to contemplate these questions.

1/16
One unknown is the actual number of combat effectives (and accompanying equipment) Russia has in the theater at this time – and their current disposition.

My approximation would be ~500k currently uncommitted combat-capable troops in fully equipped battalions.

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Jan 12 18 tweets 4 min read
Response 🧵

It was I that characterized Peter Zeihan as a clueless #EmpirePropagandist clown.

In any case, as I read your posts, it is evident to me that your perspective on this war has been substantially informed by the very same species of propaganda Zeihan echoes.

1/18 The western intel propaganda psyop that commenced before the conflict went hot in early 2022 has effectively inverted the truth of what has actually occurred. And its overriding success has been predicated upon establishing fallacious parameters for interpreting events.

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Jan 1 8 tweets 3 min read
🧵Auld Lang Syne

In honor of the momentous year of 2022 grinding to a halt not with a bang, but a whimper, and in light of my having become a somewhat reluctant blogger and small-time internet influencer, I present my top five blog posts of 2022.

1/ My criteria is entirely subjective. It represents the short list of those essays I personally feel had the most important things to say. I also believe they all remain pertinent, and will continue to do so into the future.

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Dec 31, 2022 5 tweets 1 min read
Short 🧵

So Putin and Xi had a video conference.

Apparently it was all very cozy.

Against all the naïve predictions of the dopes who believed Russia/China could never be more than a strained marriage of convenience, there appears to be A LOT of romance in the relationship.

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Sure, it may not last long, compared to some marriages.

But I predict it lasts at least a decade, and probably much more.

The US State Department is not pleased. It has issued “warnings” to the two lovers.

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Dec 21, 2022 9 tweets 2 min read
Short 🧵

I’ve been talking about the Russian build up of forces in Belarus since October. Now this build up is being noted by many western media sources and military analysts. This *may* suggest a decreasing likelihood of a Russian counter-offensive south from Belarus.

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Indeed, many of the Russian-friendly analysts whom I respect are dubious of a “big arrow” Russian offensive out of Belarus. And it’s difficult to dismiss their sound logic.

That said, I think it is worthwhile to revisit Soviet strategy from WW2.

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