In Japan the average age of business owners has risen to ~62 & approximately 60% of businesses have no succession plan & some owners are thus giving away their businesses & land for free. nytimes.com/2023/01/03/bus…
As a result of the demographic crisis Japan's trade ministry projected in 2019 that by 2025, around 630,000 profitable businesses could close, costing the Japanese economy $165 billion & up to 6.5 million jobs.
When looking at these massive numbers it is important to remember that the situation is likely to be even worse in China, Korea & Taiwan. Even Italy's demographic situation is not entirely different from that of Japan. The consequences for the global economy will be dire.
If you extrapolate this globally to similar aging societies, this would lead to more than $1 trillion in economic losses, and tens of millions of jobs lost worldwide.
We are on the precipice of some truly monumentally destabilizing events, which will be led by demographic decline. The topic does not get nearly the amount of attention it deserves.
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This is the message I most want to convey. The demographic ultra low fertility transition (in Japan, Korea, China, Italy, Spain, Taiwan, etc) will have incredible global economic consequences for decades. This will impact almost everyone.
How may the global economy continue growth against these headwinds? Here are some approaches elites may sadly use:1st, legalize almost everything,Prostitution,Drugs, Gambling & other vices.This will bring in enormous government revenue (at the cost of virtue but they don't care).
2nd: Opening up all remaining semi closed economies, by force if necessary. No major economy will be allowed to be partially cut off from global financial markets. Meaning Egypt,Burma,Iran,Ethiopia,Pakistan etc will have to be made to more or less fully open up to global capital.
Oped columnist Peter Coy wrote a piece a few months ago on how many demographic experts & analysts were wrong in their contention that the conventional threat from Russia had diminished because of its relatively low birthrate & high death rate. nytimes.com/2022/03/23/opi…
Apparently even former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (who has a doctorate in Russian & Soviet history) asserted that “adverse demographic trends in Russia will likely keep conventional forces in check.”.
Demographer Jennifer Sciubba argues that policymakers and others should recalibrate their expectations of the relationship between aging and national security & look closer at the power transition theory.
The "dying bear" narrative surrounding Russian demographics is overplayed. It ignores the fact that Russia used pronatalist policies to foster a major demographic comeback from 2008-2016. This cohort gives RU a realistic chance of avoiding catastrophic decline in the 2030s&2040s.
The 1990s were demographically disastrous for Russia. That much is true and the very small cohort from 1993-2006 is resulting in much of the dramatically lower number of births we are seeing in Russia now. Births plummeted from 2.16M in 1989 to just 1.2M a decade later.
However, in the 2000s the Russian government made a demographic turnaround a major priority. This timing was crucial as the mid 2000s to 2010s was when the last big Russia birth cohort, that saw ~2.3M births on average (1980-1988), entered prime childbearing years.
Let's take a brief look at the horrible, no good, fertility destroying 996 working culture. While it is primarily practiced in the PRC you can also see evidence of it in Taiwan, Korea and other East Asian countries.
996 gets its name from the practice of some companies to encourage (or in some cases require) employees to work from 9:00 am to 21:00, 6 days a week; i.e a 72 hours work week. 996 culture obviously leaves little room for anything else in life besides work.
Such overwork has been blamed in several high profile deaths and in Taiwan has long been a problem (with up to 50 workers dying from overwork in 2011). bbc.com/news/world-asi… With cases still continuing to this day. taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4273063
Wanted to take a brief look at regional variations in TFR in Iran between 2000 and 2018. Specifically which provinces and ethnicities have stood out from national trends and which provinces have changed the most over time.
Let’s start in 2000. That year national Iranian TFR was already well below replacement at 2.02. Tehran city had the lowest TFR(1.3) Sistan & Baluchestan the highest at 4.1. Iranian Kurdistan’s TFR was below the national average & Khuzestan(with its heavy Arab minority)was above.
Qom (known as the “Religious Capital Of Iran”) also had a TFR well above the national average. Most of Iranian Azerbaijan(comprising the three northwestern Iranian provinces of West Azerbaijan,East Azerbaijan & Ardabil)largely mirrored the natl average with West Azerbaijan above.
The largest cohort in Chinese history (born 1963-1972) is starting to enter retirement. 268,935,000 people were born in the PRC during those years. This massive retirement wave will have significant ramifications for major economies all over the world.
The cohort entering the workforce to gradually replace these retirees exiting it (those born between 2001 and 2010) numbers only 161,280,000. So there is obviously a yawning gap between those retiring and those becoming first time workers.
The following ten year cohort (born 2011-2020) is marginally bigger at 169,230,000 and is largely replacing a much smaller cohort (born 1973-1982) numbering 199,084,000.