Thread by @s_hnizdovskyi

My team and I packed in one report the Russian society’s trends in 2022 in relation to the war in Ukraine, mobilization, mental well-being, and attitudes toward their government.

Some revealing insights to uncover the “mysterious Russian soul”⬇️

1. The majority of Russians really support the decision of their government to conduct the war in Ukraine, according to publicly available polls. The level of support varies from 50% to 70%.

However, reframe questions slightly - and the picture changes:

If you reframe questions slightly, you can see on the chart ⬆️ that most of them wouldn’t oppose peace talks if there were any, which suggests they are willing to go where the wind blows.

Additionally, more and more Russians are asking the internet about the end of the war:

2. Despite the support for war we stated above, Russian society is not willing to participate directly in the hostilities.

The huge spike in the number of curse words after the mobilization announcement on social media is quite illustrative (it’s our unusual way to at least somehow measure the real dissatisfaction of the government):

3. Looking at the support graphs for Putin might be one of the most useless ways to understand the state of affairs.

To find out what’s going on, we analyzed online behavior data - the dynamics of the keywords people used to search (“Government” + “lies” or “Putin” + “bastard”):

Looking at the trend lines ⬆️, instead of absolute values, Russians tend to think positively about their government less by the end of the year.

4. OMI found out that the dynamic of the financial situation, not the wealth level itself, is negatively associated with war support. Therefore, every person whose wealth decreases is a potential new war opponent.

5. The mental well-being of Russians has significantly decreased as a result of the war with Ukraine. FOM claims that for 57% of respondents, 2022 was worse than 2021.

The mobilization announcement made a significant addition to their anxiety level:

45% of Russians, however, believe that 2023 will be better for them than 2022.

What is interesting is that those positive expectations are associated primarily with the hopes for the end of the “SMO,” as well as for an increase in income.

So, what can actually explain all the numbers reported above?

In OMI's studies, we saw psychological traits, usually correlated with sympathy towards violence and a belief that Russia is under threat from NATO, don't have much to do with the war support.

In fact, simply firm authoritarian obedience and strong identification with being Russian make them support the "SMO."

Moreover, opposing current events seems more mentally challenging for Russians than supporting them because the opposers feel marginalized.

Do you agree with these investigations? How do you think the situation will turn out in 2023?

Leave your thoughts below

If you enjoy stuff like this and would like to learn more about Russia, authoritarianism, propaganda, and social behavioral change - follow @s_hnizdovskyi for more.

If you are hungry for more details - follow the link to download the full report:
drive.google.com/file/d/1mkGOW9…