In 2000, I was commanding 3/2 Armored Brigade (Arrowhead!), when I received new orders to be prepared to field a new organization with new equipment.
Our Brigade would become the 1st Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), then later the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) 2/
While the Abrams tank is named for GEN Creighton Abrams (hero of the Battle of the Bulge), and the Bradley is name after GEN Omar Bradley, the Stryker is named after two Medal of Honor winners - PFC Stuart Stryker (World War II) & SPC4 Robert Stryker (Vietnam) 3/
GEN Shinseki, a personal hero & one of my mentors, drove the fielding (that's him in a suit in this picture).
His idea: have an air deployable unit that generated great battlefield intelligence w/ vehicles that could bring lots of infantryman to the fight..quickly & quietly.4/
Influencing a bunch of tankers to give up their Abrams for a lightly armored "infantry bus" was tough.But they soon learned the power of intel-driven operations.
The Stryker proved their value in combat in Iraq & Afghanistan with even Special Operators wanting these vehicles. 5/
THEY ARE NOT A TANK!
They are lightly armored, and have either a .50 cal machine gun, a grenade launcher, or a 30mm cannon (w a lot of guys in back).
They are quick & quiet.
Our Division had a Brigade of Strykers in Iraq, they performed extremely well. 6/
There is also a Stryker with a 105mm gun (smaller and less powerful than an Abrams or Leopard 120mm).It's good infantry support.
The cannon has had some problems & I'm not sure if the Mobile Gun System (MGS or AGS) will be part of the package to Ukraine. We'll see. 7/
The wheels of the Stryker are better than tracked vehicles for roads;the down side is they get stuck...a lot. They're usually much easier to recover out of mud than a stuck tank.
Soldiers say they are easier to maintain, fix & keep running...& they use much less fuel.8/
The Friday package will likely include more Bradleys, which have more armor, a stronger gun & anti-tank missiles (TOWs).
Ukrainians are training now at Grafenwoehr & Hohenfels, Germany (@7thATC)
A combination of these vehicles, HIMARS, M777, & additional T-72 (or other tanks) in the hands of a trained Ukrainian army will make a HUGE difference for offensive operations.
Looking forward to hearing confirmation...and news of what other @nato nations are providing. 10/10
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A few thoughts on what occurred in two different conflicts yesterday...the use of "killer pagers" by Israel and Ukraine's attack on the large ammo cache at Toropets military base 300+ miles inside Russia.
A short 🧵 1/12
First, the pagers.
In this article (gifted) from the @nytimes, the author claims there "no clear strategy" for this coordinated attack.
I disagree. Having used electronic & signals countermeasures in Iraq, the strategy is clear. 2/
Terrorist organizations - unlike conventional militaries who have encrypted signal capabilities - must find ways to communiate. It is important to continue to disrupt & counter this ability.
In Iraq, terrorist use of cell phones allowed US and ISF to glean valuable information & disrupt their networks. 3/
On a daily basis during my time in command of Army forces in Europe, every day the intelligence "black book" would provide more information on Putin's Russia attempts at malign influence against the west...and especially against the US.
Today, the @TheJusticeDept has taken action...but because of current divisions in the US, many Americans will have questions.
So let's talk about it...
A thread 🧵 1/12
During my service in Europe, I saw intelligence on:
-Rusian acts of sabotage within allied governments
-The creation of "frozen conflicts" w/in the territorial integrity of nations (including Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia/Azerbaijan, two of the three Baltic countries, and the Balkans)
-the stoking & support of migration & human trafficking
-malicious cyber activities against whole of governments (most egregious example was Estonia)
-disinformation campaigns and election interference
-attempted and successful assassinations on foreign soil. 2/
In my last year of command of @USArmyEURAF (that was 2012), the Russian television station @RT_com asked me to do an interview, as we had just conducted an exercise with the Russian Army and I had invited the Chief of the Russian Ground Forces Col-Gen Chirkin to a conference. 3/
Woke up to several texts from journalists asking my thoughts on "West Point dropping duty, honor, country from their motto?" and one wrote "does this mean the Academy has gone 'woke'?"
My first thought: "let me get a cup of coffee before addressing this craziness."
A 🧵 1/9
This week, graduates received a letter from LTG Steve Gilland -the Superintendent (the USMA college president)- of @WestPoint_USMA informing of changes in the MISSION STATEMENT (NOT the motto).
The letter specifically said the MOTTO "Duty, Honor, Country" has NOT changed. 2/
Now, I know LTG Gilland well. He's a great soldier, terrific leader, and a common-sense guy.
As any leader - general or business CEO - knows, you have to continuously assess and analyze your mission statement.
In fact, I teach this to MBA students in leadership classes. 3/
Many of you have heard me say this multiple times with respect to the war in Ukraine.
Now we'll start seeing the same in Gaza with JLTOTS pronounced "Jay-Lots" for the media).
A 🧵 1/9
"Logistics determine the art of the possible."
Many of you have heard me say this multiple times with respect to the war in Ukraine.
Now we'll start seeing the same in Gaza with JLTOTS pronounced "Jay-Lots" for the media).
A 🧵 1/9
Airdropped humanitarian aid is precise and speedy, but it's limited in it's capability and capacity for certain kinds and large amounts of supplies. It's also relatively expensive.After you deploy expensive parachutes and GPS devices into the area, it's hard to get them back! 3/
On 24 Feb 2022, I scribbled some thoughts about what I believed were Putin's strategic objectives in invading Ukraine (see chart).
In the 1st 18 months of the conflict, Ukraines' action, NATO collaboration & US support caused him to fail.
We're at an inflection point. A 🧵1/
Addressing each: 1. Zelenskyy is still strong 2. Ukraine's army is still fighting 3. Ukraine's population is resilient 4. Ru does not control the Black sea ports 5. The west - especially the US - has returned to being divided, and NATO may now take fewer risks. 2/
Putin now knows that Ukraine's continued capability will - for the short term - continue to require support from the west.
So he is pulling out all stops, w/ mobilizations (over 400k new (untrained) soldiers as "meat" for attacks), a ramped up industrial base, & oppression. 3/