In 2000, I was commanding 3/2 Armored Brigade (Arrowhead!), when I received new orders to be prepared to field a new organization with new equipment.
Our Brigade would become the 1st Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), then later the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) 2/
While the Abrams tank is named for GEN Creighton Abrams (hero of the Battle of the Bulge), and the Bradley is name after GEN Omar Bradley, the Stryker is named after two Medal of Honor winners - PFC Stuart Stryker (World War II) & SPC4 Robert Stryker (Vietnam) 3/
GEN Shinseki, a personal hero & one of my mentors, drove the fielding (that's him in a suit in this picture).
His idea: have an air deployable unit that generated great battlefield intelligence w/ vehicles that could bring lots of infantryman to the fight..quickly & quietly.4/
Influencing a bunch of tankers to give up their Abrams for a lightly armored "infantry bus" was tough.But they soon learned the power of intel-driven operations.
The Stryker proved their value in combat in Iraq & Afghanistan with even Special Operators wanting these vehicles. 5/
THEY ARE NOT A TANK!
They are lightly armored, and have either a .50 cal machine gun, a grenade launcher, or a 30mm cannon (w a lot of guys in back).
They are quick & quiet.
Our Division had a Brigade of Strykers in Iraq, they performed extremely well. 6/
There is also a Stryker with a 105mm gun (smaller and less powerful than an Abrams or Leopard 120mm).It's good infantry support.
The cannon has had some problems & I'm not sure if the Mobile Gun System (MGS or AGS) will be part of the package to Ukraine. We'll see. 7/
The wheels of the Stryker are better than tracked vehicles for roads;the down side is they get stuck...a lot. They're usually much easier to recover out of mud than a stuck tank.
Soldiers say they are easier to maintain, fix & keep running...& they use much less fuel.8/
The Friday package will likely include more Bradleys, which have more armor, a stronger gun & anti-tank missiles (TOWs).
Ukrainians are training now at Grafenwoehr & Hohenfels, Germany (@7thATC)
A combination of these vehicles, HIMARS, M777, & additional T-72 (or other tanks) in the hands of a trained Ukrainian army will make a HUGE difference for offensive operations.
Looking forward to hearing confirmation...and news of what other @nato nations are providing. 10/10
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Military theorists & historians have –in my view, incorrectly- concluded there are 2 types of strategy.
One is annihilation & the other is attrition (or exhaustion).
While these aren’t the *only* strategies, it's helpful to understand them to comprehend Ukraine right now.1/11
A strategy of ANNIHILATION suggests a nation can defeat its enemy by forcing a decision (or series of decisions) by using overwhelming maneuver, effective political & military leadership, and combined actions (like offensive operations, alliances, economics , information, etc).2/
Through history, “battles of annihilation” occurred when a military force is surrounded & defeated & an army is forced to surrender. As a result, the nation no longer resists because it lost its force. (Note: a battle of annihilation isn’t a strategy of annihilation).3/
.@RadioFreeTom nails it again. Yes, it was a big mistake and there must be an investigation & accountability & the govt ought find ways to prevent in the future. But mistakes differ from purposeful actions, lack of remorse, excuses for lying and refusal to return when caught.1/2
I’m going to bet the inquiry into the ones found with @POTUS may show some systemic problems w/ SSO handling as well. That can be fixed. Just admittedly taking govt docs and refusing to return needs to be addressed in a different way.2/2
As a commander, I dealt with improper handling of classified material on numerous occasions. All were investigated. The findings found a range of issues, and punishment also ranged from admonishment to admin action to courts martial. We also learned lessons on fixing processes.
So, I put this information out and 2/3rds if responses are “why didn’t we start giving them this equipment and training them on it earlier?
For those asking those questions, let me reply with a few of my own that might help people consider the implications. 1/9
-How many Ukrainians do you think need training for these kind of operations?
-How many US servicemen will be needed to train them?
-On what specific pieces of equipment?
-since the US doesn’t have warehouses unused military equipment ready to give away, where do we get it? 2/
-What US taxpayer dollars have been allocated for building Ukraine an entire army filled with modern equipment?
-if we take the needed equipment from US military units, what risks are we taking in US national security around the globe? 3/
Most readers will marvel at the tactics & maneuvers UKRs army and its generals used in the east (Donbas) & the southeast (Kherson) during their Oct/Nov operations.
But there's so much more to be gleaned from this article.
It speaks to the transformation of UKR's Army. 2/
If you've read the piece, read it again with a different view.
UKR generals conducting "rehearsals" (in Germany) with US officials.
Our Army calls those "ROC Drills" for "rehearsal of concept." That's a commander/staff drill to coordinate & synchronize actions in combat. 3/
Today, I RT this @WSJ article on logistics challenges w/in Ukraine.
It generated a bunch of "but what about..." from many who may not understand what goes into decisions related to delivering weapons to allies/partners.