Thread by @DAlperovitch

My thoughts on nuclear escalation risk with Russia🧵

I don’t disagree with @james_acton32 that the risk of nuclear use by Russia hasn’t gone away

Although I do believe it has diminished significantly, in part because US has been remarkably successful in getting China to signal to the Kremlin that nuclear escalation is unacceptable

https://twitter.com/james_acton32/status/1616096289279574018

There is a lot of focus in the escalation debate about where Putin’s redlines might lie. And certainly that’s very important to try to ascertain, albeit very difficult since he has every incentive to exaggerate and obfuscate them to discourage our assistance to Ukraine

But one critical element of escalation analysis is getting very little attention.

And that is the process (I.e. how and how quickly) by which Ukraine and the West ramp up their operations and aid. I believe that matters as much as the end state, if not more so

One example of this is military aid. Ukraine is understandably very frustrated by (what they see as) the slow pace of Western weapons supplies, which has undoubtedly increased their casualties and slowed offensive action

And it has taken the West almost 11 months to move from their initial supplies of what was characterized as “defensive” weapons (and, in the case of some European countries, only non-lethal aid like helmets) to tanks, IFVs and longer range artillery

The decision to provide HIMARS was in May. HARM missiles to take out Russian air defenses were provided in July. Patriot air defenses were announced in December…

And fighter jets, Leopard tanks and ATACMS still remain off the table as of right now

But now imagine a scenario where all of these weapons systems had been provided/announced all at once at the end of Feb - when Russia invaded.

That would have been highly escalatory and probably would have forced Putin into a retaliatory response

So slow rolling these weapons to Ukraine over many months, while frustrating and no doubt resulting in much devastating and tragic loss of life, has very likely helped avoid a broader Russia-NATO conflict

I believe, similarly, a slow Ukrainian encroachment on Crimea would make it difficult for Putin to justify nuclear or even non-nuclear escalation with the West - to both Russians and “friends” in China

That could take place as an increased monthslong campaign of deep strike targeting of Russian bases and logistics to/on the peninsula that could make large Russian force deployment there unsustainable over time, along with increased SOF/partisan attacks to weaken Russian resolve

Retaking Crimea could take a very long time and will undoubtedly be very difficult but with a determined, slow and careful campaign it could very well be doable and avoid a Russia-West escalation that many people rightly fear and want to avoid

But anytime you are dealing with a nuclear power run by a reckless dictator who, increasingly, has put himself in a position where his back is up against the wall - that risk is never zero

But I do believe the WH and our NATO allies deserve a lot of credit for thoughtfully managing the escalation risk by carefully and slowly walking up the escalatory ladder without triggering a covert or overt retaliation from Moscow. Let’s hope they continue getting it right!

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