Russia's strategy previously appeared to hope that Western aid would dissipate over time. It now seems that Russia is girding itself for a long war even with continued aid to Ukraine. Thus, Western aid shouldn't just be focused on helping Ukraine sustain the war, but to win it.
Tanks and APCs/IFVs will be critical for Kyiv to retake the rest of its territory, but they may not be enough. Kyiv needs to have superior combined arms capability to breakthrough prepared defensive positions. Hopefully, this change in thinking will extend to other capabilities.
Russia's leadership clearly believes it will win this war and has a greater ability to sustain it. Putin's rule doesn't appear to be particularly threatened, so this war will very likely be decided on the battlefield and Ukraine needs to have superior capabilities.
There is little reason to believe there are prospects for negotiations as long as the Kremlin believes the military situation favors it, which it clearly does right now. Strengthening Ukrainian military capabilities (equipment and training) is the best option for ending this war.
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Interesting news. Sladkov confirms that the commander of the VDV Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky was replaced by Lieutenant General Oleg Makarevich. It appears this change is associated with Gerasimov taking command of the war. t.me/Sladkov_plus/7… vk.com/wall-200391_30…
A number of Telegram channels claimed this occurred a week ago, but Sladkov is a more credible source. Teplinsky appears to have been successful as the VDV commander, and he is popular among Russian channels, so this doesn't appear to be a performance-related change. 2/
In comparison, Makarevich is a career ground forces officer who also commanded the Russia Navy's Coastal Troops, but, notably, he never served in the VDV. Sladkov says he is the most unsuitable choice. He did not have a previous command role in the war. 3/ bloknot.ru/obshhestvo/uni…
Sergei Shoigu also held a meeting to discuss increasing the size of the military to 1.5 million. Changes include creating Moscow and Leningrad military districts, an army corps in Karelia, three motorized rifle divisions, and 2 VDV air assault divisions. tvzvezda.ru/news/202311711…
He said that Russia would also stand up self-sufficient group of forces in the illegally annexed areas of Ukraine. He said 7 motorized rifle brigades in the Northern Fleet, Western, Central, and Eastern military districts would be upgraded to divisions. 2/ function.mil.ru/news_page/coun…
These changes are supposed to occur from 2023-2026. He also mentioned focusing on recruiting contract soldiers, and improving and increasing the number of training facilities. 3/
Sergei Shoigu paid a visit to the Eastern Group of Forces HQ. The video confirms that Rustam Muradov is still the East commander, and we have the first official confirmation that Lieutenant General Evgeny Nikiforov is the West commander. tvzvezda.ru/news/202311772…
Screenshots of Muradov and Nikiforov. The video also showed archive footage of Shoigu inspecting living quarters and trenches (likely not anywhere near the front), something Prigozhin has been doing and publicizing recently. 2/
Seeing people suggest that Russia hasn't used ballistic missiles in this war but that isn't accurate. Russia used Iskander-M systems very actively in the beginning (including from Belarus), which can launch 9M723 quasi-ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, as well as Tochka-U.
The Iskander-M is a very important system for the Russian Ground Forces and is typically an army-level asset. The deployment of Iskander-M systems from Central Military District's 448th Missile Brigade in the spring of 2021 and movement in October was a key warning sign. 2/
The 9M723 quasi-ballistic missile is supposed to have a unique flight trajectory in the terminal phase that makes it difficult to intercept (and it also discards decoys). It is notable if Russia is using them again, but it doesn't signal a change in Russian strategy. 3/
The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Valery Gerasimov is taking over as the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. His deputies will be Surovikin, Army General Oleg Salyukov, and Colonel General Alexey Kim. t.me/mod_russia/233…
Salyukov is the commander of the Russian Ground Forces and Kim is its deputy commander. This appears to be a quite significant change. Not clear if this means Surovikin will be in charge of Russian Air Force operations or if the force groupings will remain the same.
I don't think this is because Surovikin is viewed as a failure. Certainly possible that this was driven by political reasons. As the unified commander in Ukraine, Surovikin was becoming very powerful and was likely bypassing Shoigu/Gerasimov when talking to Putin.
Viktor Murakhovsky, Rybar and Ilya Kramnik posted about Russia's artillery ammo issues. They suggest Russia produces/refurbishes 300k rounds per year (and had 2.6 million tons in storage in 2013) but was often firing 100k over the span of a couple of days. t.me/Viktor_Murakho…
Rybar gave a lower production figure, and said Russia started emptying warehouses with its expenditure rates but waited too long to ramp up production (and blamed former Minister Serdyukov for hurting VPK enterprises). Murakhovksy says they need millions of rounds per year. 2/
Kramnik suggests, to produce sufficient quantities of shells for this expenditure rate, they would need a general mobilization of the economy, and Rybar questions whether they have enough specialists and that they would need to use civilian factories to produce the ammo. 3/