The sudden apparent blind selection of replacement capacity for the CAESAR 155mm howitzer in Denmark after the donation to Ukraine does not make sense. Denmark is forming a medium heavy infantry brigade and in NATO planning we are to deliver a heavy infantry brigade by 2032. 1/6
The French CAESAR system, which is an excellent wheel-based long range artillery system as witnessed in Ukraine, was selected due to specifications developed after our mechanized brigade capacity was dropped (2004) and prior to the decision to - partly - re-build the capacity 2/6
The specifications were developed prior to June 2012 when the army operated out-of-area in Iraq/Afghanistan and needed a deployable system. In December 2014 the Israeli system ATMOS from Elbit actually won, but due to political issues ATMOS was dropped in favour of CAESAR. 3/6
Now, apparently, the top of defence and defence acquisition, has decided to go back to ATMOS to replace CAESAR without acknowledging the fundamental changes in operational environment since 2014, selection of artillery in partner countries and not least NATO requirements. 4/6
A NATO heavy infantry brigade requires tracked, armoured self-propelled howitzers just like 4 btns of tanks and armoured infantry with IFVs for firepower, field mobility and protection. This means that it does not make sense to equip the brigade with wheel-based artillery. 5/6
The ONLY correct decision will be to STOP the process and start using current requirements for brigade artillery. This does not imply that CAESAR or ATMOS cannot be used for a other brigades or for divisonal artillery if we get such in the new defence review. (#Coldwar photo) 6/6
#OTD 9 April 1940
Colonel Bennike, commander of the 🇩🇰Danish 4th Regiment refused to follow the order to surrender. To him the only correct decision was to go to Elsinore and board ships to transport his men to Helsingborg, 🇸🇪Sweden to continue the fight against the Germans 1/5
He had issued orders to march to Elsinore, but both due to some officers questioning his orders and other delays, only half of the 11th Battalion made it to the ships and was transported to Helsingborg
(Photo from Elsinore 9 April 1940) 2/5
At Helsingborg the much baffled Swedes was “invaded” by a colonel who was not to give up the fight against Germans. As it happened Sweden had not mobilised and large parts of Southern Sweden was largely undefended, which meant the Danes was a surprising but welcome addition 3/5
🧵Trump's "NATO death" speech: Even if my conclusion in the below analysis about scenarios for war with Russia in combination of US withdrawal from Europe was ominous, I had not expected it to go potentially straight to the most negative outcome. 1/11 olfi.dk/2024/02/01/dan…
The baseline assumption is a war with Russia 2-5 years following the end of a war in Ukraine or the old assumption of a 10-year warning in combination with a US withdrawal from Europe. It would either be "Trump" swift or gradual due to e.g. a strategic shift to the Pacific. 2/11
The first worst case scenario is a war from 2027 in combination with immediate US withdrawal from 2025 to 2029 following a Trump election. This will leave no time to replace US capabilities and even basic Danish capabilities for Article 5 will not be ready perhaps save F-35. 3/11
The Danish Army has a critical deficit of contract soldiers and cannot sustain combat capability at brigade or battalion-level according to the Deputy Commander of the Danish Army, Brigadier Lyhne. As I see it, besides the critical lack 1/6
of soldiers, the structure of the army after decades of reductions is the main reason. Today, even if there are 2 brigades on paper, only the 1st is supposedly to become a combat ready formation. With only 3 combat battalions, the brigade cannot sustain prolonged periods of 2/6
deployment of a battalion on a 6 month rotation basis. The 2nd Brigade consists of one armoured (providing tanks for the 1st Brigade), one recon and one light infantry battalion, and can only partly support deployments. This is in contrast to the earlier structure of 3/6
🧵 The Leopard 1A5 is - as I have been arguing since April 2022 - a fine addition to the Ukrainian tank fleet and matches older Ts while also being able to act as infantry support. @CorporalFrisk has a fine analysis below + 4 tweets on my idea development from April 22 to now 1/5
The initial idea was generated back in April 2022 when the initial request from Ukraine and discussions with KMW and FFG emerged, but had no political support in Germany stopped the process. 2/5
In September, I launched the idea to have a Danish acquisition of the ex-Danish Leopard 1A5DK, which got wide distribution and support - also outside the twitter world ;-) (even if the numbers were wrong - should have been 99 - we used to have 230) 3/5
19 ex-Danish Piranha IIIH APCs are being delivered to Moldova by Germany as part of a military support package from Germany.
Thread 1/4 army.md/?lng=2&action=…
Denmark announced in April 2022 it would donate between a number of Piranha III to Ukraine (about 20-25 APCs), but this was blocked by Switzerland in June 2022 2/4 srf.ch/news/schweiz/w…
Denmark originally had 92 Piranha IIIC (incl 16 ambulance and 4 signals) and 22 Piranha IIIH (all infantry APC). The Piranha III were extensively used in Iraq and Afghanistan and has now been replaced by Piranha V in the Danish Army. (P: L.Holst and O. Andreasen, DK defence) 3/4
A thread with my analysis of the situation: The grain export agreement between UN, Russia and Ukraine brokered by Turkey will reportedly consist of four main elements and will be dependent on four preconditions: 1/8
The 4 main elements of the agreement’s practical implementation
1) Commercial vessels enroute Ukrainian ports will be inspected by a joint coordination centre in Istanbul, containing representatives from the UN, (Ukraine, Russia) & Turkey to check they do not carry weapons
2/8
2) Turkish, Ukrainian and UN staff will monitor the loading of grain into vessels in Ukrainian ports.
3) Ukrainian pilot vessels will guide commercial vessels transporting the grain through pre-planned routes in the Black Sea 3/8