1/ I haven't written about the Svatove-Kreminna axis because the fog of war is thick. Now that πΊπ¦ is knocking on Kreminna's door, we're getting clarity. Here's a short 𧡠explaining what's going on, & why it's a big deal.
2/ The first thing to understand is that this war is all about logistics. Ukraine's strategy has been to interdict GLOCs (ground lines of communication, aka supply lines), until π·πΊ is forced to retreat or die. That applies to Kharkiv too. It was only possible because of Kherson.
3/ Most people look at Google maps and wonder why Ukraine doesn't so things that seem obvious. The reason is usually because they're looking at the wrong map. @BruckenRuski tracks bridges & other infrastructure on the second map in his bio. Follow him if you don't already.
4/ You CANNOT understand what's happening on the ground unless you take bridges, waterways, rail lines, and other critical infrastructure into account.
Why is π·πΊ hammering Bakhmut) aside from the mines)? To try to force Ukraine to redeploy from Svatove-Kreminna axis to Bakhmut
5/ Why is Ukraine throwing everything into Svatove-Kreminna despite devastating casualties in Bakhmut? Because taking Svatove & Kreminna is a game changer. Let me explain why. (Hint: It's all about logistics.)
6/ Before the Kharkiv counter-offensive, there were 3 main GLOCs to supply the front around Lysychans'k and Severodonetsk. They were Kup'yans'k, Svatove, and Starobil's'k. Svatove & Starobil's'k were also used to repair damaged equipment.
7/ During the Kharkiv offensive, Ukraine captured Kup'yans'k. That forced Russia to retreat from Izyum, because there wasn't a way to supply it. (Izyum was supplied by roads from Kup'yans'k, by the way, not rail).
8/ The next logical target was Svatove. There are some indications that Ukraine *almost* routed them past Svatove into Starobil's'k, but Ukraine had to stop and consolidate their gains. That gave Russia an opportunity to setup a new defensive line west of Svatove.
9/ Ukraine has been hammering that defensive line ever since, all the way from Kup'yans'k down to Svatove & Kreminna. They haven't broken through yet, but they did put Svatove under fire control almost immediately. That has left Starobil's'k as the primary way to resupply π·πΊ
10/ When Ukraine captures Svatove and Kreminna, it will give them a foothold to put Starobil's'k under fire control. (Technically it's within range of HIMARS now, but they can't just drive them to the front line.)
11/ Once that happens, Ukraine has options. They could move east to take Starobil's'k, or they could hammer that GLOC into oblivion like they did at Kherson, while attacking another section of the line.
12/ I don't know which option they'll choose, but either way, if they capture Svatove & Kreminna soon then they'll be in an excellent place to consolidate gains and weaken Russia's supply lines while they prepare for a spring offensive.
13/ One other point: Today, @Suriyakmaps reported Ukrehas made gains north / northeast of Bilohorivka in Luhansk. If confirmed, it means Ukraine is now advancing up both banks of the Siversky Donetsk River. On the north, they're threatening Kreminna with encirclement.
14/ On the south (if they continue to advance) they put Russia in the position of having their backs forced against both banks of the river. That's a terrible tactical situation, and would almost certainly result in Russia retreating from one or both banks.
/end π§΅
"Ukrehas" should have been "Ukraine." Damn you autocorrect.
1/ I agree. Here's how I feel about Abrams, F-16s, and everything else Ukraine has requested. There are people far more qualified than me to discuss the technicalities. The problem is, they disagree. So I say, let Ukraine be the tie breaker. Here's why. (a short π§΅)
2/ Most of the arguments I see against providing advanced weapons boil down to two things: Logistics (including maintenance) and training. I do not think either of those arguments carry any weight.
3/ First, look at the side of logistics that involves moving equipment from A to B for maintenence, repair, and relocation. I put two screenshots in the next tweet. The first shows Russia's logistical situation. The second shows Ukraine's.
1/ This thread π really took off, so I want to address a few points people have raised. They are: 1) why doesn't πΊπ¦ go for Troits'ke; 2) is the π·πΊ offensive at Bakhmut really designed to pull πΊπ¦ troops away from Svatove-Kreminna; 3) what about other supply lines into Luhansk? π§΅
2/ At face value, Troits'ke seems like a better objective than Svatove, because it would cut the GLOC to Starobil's'k and, as a side effect, Svatove. I think πΊπ¦would have loved to do it, but there a few reasons it wasn't feasible.
3/ First, π·πΊ seems to have put up a stiffer resistance in Kup'yans'k east of the Oskil. RUMINT said they were routed on the east side, but the reality seems to be they that they held long enough to slow πΊπ¦ down and setup defenses to the east.
1/6 I swear, @mccaffreyr3 is the only retired high ranking general & commentator who understands what Ukraine needs to defeat Russia and accepts that they have the capability (& logistics) to do it. He's like a breath of fresh air in the information space.
2/6 He recognized what should have been obvious to everyone: A limited response caused by fear of escalation was a terrible mistake. And he's been proven right. Sure, Ukraine is winning the war, but at what cost? "Well over" 100k casualties according to Gen. Milley.
3/6 And those figures were from about 2 months ago...and it's just the military. How many civilians have died or been subjected to torture, rape, and other war crimes. Am I the only one who remembers the stories of Russians raping moms to death in front of their young children?
1/5 Really good ISW update today. It confirms much of what I said over the last 2 days about Prigozhin, Gerasimov, the VDV's deployment to Svatove, etc. However, what's most interesting is they think Russia's attack on Bakhmut has culminated.
2/5 I don't have enough knowledge of the situation on the ground to make an educated guess about π·πΊ's remaining combat power around Bakhmut, but I think it's likely that π·πΊ has had to redeploy units to Svatove-Kreminna. The situation there seems to be deteriorating for π·πΊ.
3/5 A couple of days ago I speculated (and I know I'll take flak for this) that Ukraine might have decided to do a tactical withdrawal from Soledar in order to relieve pressure on Bakhmut. I still think that's a possibility. The situation isn't as clear as Twitter seems to think.
8/ I think that failing to understand that is the biggest mistake most analysts made. Most of them, including strategists I respect, couldn't accept the idea of an entire population--40+ million people--giving the finger to Putin and fighting until the end, no matter the cost.
9/ They didn't envision a fight where mothers knocked down drones with jars of tomatoes, civilian systems (IIRC the DMV was one) were repurposed to ID Russian troop movements, or tanks and "elite" troops were destroyed by fleets of hobby drones dropping grenades on their head.
10/ So, a critical opportunity was missed. If NATO had gone all in with support in March, there's a good possibility Russia never would have gained such a foothold in the east. Concerns about escalation and logistics were IMHO excuses for not acting quickly enough.