From an M&A practitioner perspective, I can't help but to think there will be a newfound appreciation for the level of complexity involved in consummating these specific types of transactions in today's environment
Let me explain...🧵
Talks of a wave of "VC-backed consolidation" over the next 12-18 months have been pervasive in various Valley circles recently, and manifesting in the form of:
🤝 Buyers using '21 valuations opportunistically as "M&A currency"
🤝 "Roll-ups of last resort" for subscale players
There have been a number of "private-to-private" all-stock (or majority stock) combinations that have been consummated before
Two "success stories" that come to mind are 1) Seamless + Grubhub and 2) Elance + oDesk (now $UPWK)
But these deals have enormous underlying complexity
After the Seamless Grubhub tie up in '13 @bgurley wrote a nice piece about 3 sets of challenges that permeate "private-private" M&A deals:
1⃣ Structural
2⃣ People
3⃣ Investor / founder mindset
All non mutually exclusive issues exacerbated by idiosyncratic "valuation conundrum"
To state the obvious: you get a daily "report card" in the public markets with a definitive view on "absolute value"
Absent a construct to facilitate discovery of "absolute value", it's VERY hard to determine "relative value" in the private markets (see Grubhub-Seamless case)
"Relative value" is the framework for determining how the "absolute value of one company compares to another
In a stock-for-stock deal, this underpins the deal's "exchange ratio" (i.e. the # of shares a buyer issues to the seller for each share they own) and ownership split
Public-to-public "all stock" mergers (like $CLDR + $HDP) marketing points denote the core elements:
"Deal Terms: Each [Target] share will be exchanges for [X] [Buyer] shares"
"Esotericism" in "public-to-public" "all-stock" mergers is *typically* ill-received but private markets are unbridled with respect to "form of consideration"
Buyers can get creative here in issuing common or preferred (existing or new w/ rights, ratchets, warrants etc) or both
From a seller's perspective...
The "relative value" calculus & exchange ratio should account for the potential inequity or "cramming" by the preferred stack (i.e. investors) onto common holders (i.e. management) driven by the triggering of "goodies" like liquidation preferences
From a buyer's perspective...
The "relative value" calculus & exchange ratio should account for existence of any antidilution provisions in their own capital structure that could be triggered as a result of issuing "cheaper" capital to a seller by virtue of "self-devaluing"
Ultimately, the components of relative value underpinning the exchange ratio can obfuscate the incentive alignment and "upside participation" that is shared between the various classes of investors (i.e. management & investors) between and within buyers and sellers respectively
Furthermore, it's worth reiterating a key existential & fundamental point
Given lack of "value discovery", private stock is effectively an option predicated on a "strike" of a qualifying exit
As a seller, by swapping stock you are effectively relinquishing control of your exit
As such, there is a strong perception that only sellers without any options (absent a strong incentive or participation) would participate in a private-to-private company stock swap merger (as is seen in opportunistic acquires made by larger buyers)
But it's not always the case
In a true merger, the people and governance structure should more or less be commensurate with the pro forma ownership underpinned by the discussion around "relative value" &contribution to ensure that the right balance of incentive alignment, control & motivations are guarded
These go right when:
1⃣ "Us vs them" thinking swapped for "partnership mentality"
2⃣ Realities of structural complexity are embraced, not dismissed
3⃣ Combined model & synergies trump individual contribution
4⃣ Relative value perceived to be more critical than absolute value
The term "hostile takeover" begets images of "raiders" dawning two-toned collared shirt & suspender combos, screaming into phones in a cigar-smoke-clouded mahogany rooms filled with dot matrix printer tear-sheets...
But, $EMR showed that companies too can also "go hostile"🧵
So yesterday, $EMR announced *a proposal* to acquire $NATI for $53.00 a share (~$7.6bn and 32% premium to last close)
$NATI is a $1.7bn electronic T&M business with 70% GMS, 35K customers across diverse end markets
Deal would advance $EMR's global automation focus & strategy
Why go "hostile"?
Well, in short, if as a buyer you're getting stonewalled by management & their Board, you can put the target "in play" by going directly to shareholders
$EMR made many attempts to engage with $NATI in private dating to 5/22 with no constructive engagement
Takeaways:
🤔Focus on "how it works" (rationale + mechanics)
🤔Ask yourself: "what do I get or give here?"
Example: how the $10bn $ADBE stock part of Figma deal *technically* works
Takeaway #2: "Read Between the Lines"
🤔Stop and ask "why did they do this?"
🤔Stop and ask "where's the risk?"
Examples (all co-dependent variables)
1⃣Deal Closing (i.e. why close on X date)
2⃣Termination (i.e. who's at risk of not closing)
3⃣Others (i.e. "go shop" in PE deals)