Volodymyr Dacenko Profile picture
Jan 23, 2023 25 tweets 6 min read Read on X
How Russia's tactics have changed since the beginning of the war - 4 strategies of the Russian command 1/
#russianlosses #Russiawar #UkraineRussiaWar ImageImage
Phase I - Blitzkrieg
Initially, the Ru attack was planned as a large-scale rapid operation from the air, land and water. It was planned in 4 acts:
Act 1: A large-scale missile attack was supposed to suppress the Ukrainian air defense system and create chaos in defense management
Act 2: The main role was planned for amphibious operations. Which were to quickly capture key objects and capture government buildings in the main cities - Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa
Ru planned to use hundreds of helicopters, at least 18 large Il-76 planes and a naval landing force
4/ To capture Kyiv, it was planned to land several hundred paratroopers on 24 Mi-8 transport helicopters accompanied by 10 Mi-24, Ka-52 combat helicopters and 12 fighter jets in Gostomel (airfield north of Kyiv).
5/ Next, Gostomel was to become a base to receive large Il-76 transport planes carrying the main forces of the amphibious operation. In a matter of hours, Russian troops were to break into Kyiv and seize the main administrative buildings mil.in.ua/uk/news/rosiya…
6/ Act 3: Large convoys of armored vehicles were to block off key cities from support and suppress resistance.
It is obvious that the landing party itself would not be able to hold its position for a long time. Huge columns of armored vehicles went to support them.
7/ Armored troops were supposed to blockade all major cities, set up checkpoints and cut logistical routes to support the Ukrainian army. Cleaning of cities and suppression of public actions was to be ensured by the Russian Guard, which marched in the same echelon as the tanks.
8/ Act 4: Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the East.
The main Ukrainian forces (according to the Kremlin's plan) were to remain blocked in the east of Ukraine. The "LDNR" troops were to distract them with numerous attacks.
9/ In a few days, the Ukrainian defense was to lose combat capability. She was supposed to be paralyzed and cut off from her supply. And the Ukrainian government was planned to be destroyed or forced to accept capitulation.
10/ To say that this plan is completely wrong and has not worked anywhere is wrong. It worked in the south, where air defense was the weakest and there was a lack of coordination of the actions of Ukrainian units. In particular, this tactic made it possible to capture Kherson.
11The UА military says that it was not possible to build the defense of Kherson because the Ru landing force seized bridges and other key logistics facilities in the Kherson region in the early hours. UА troops had to make their way to the right bank in order not to be surrounded
12/ In the north it turned out to be a failure. The main reason is 2 factors: preservation of anti-aircraft defense capability and local resistance.
The local resistance of Ukrainian cities in the north managed to isolate significant Russian troops without fuel and ammunition.
13/ Despite massive aerial bombardment and artillery shelling, such cities as Chernihiv, Pryluky, Putivl, Glukhiv, etc. were not captured by Russia. Without them, Russia lost the chance to block Kyiv.
14/ I described the tactics of the first days of the Russians in more detail here: forbes.ua/war-in-ukraine…
15/ Рhase II - tank breakthrough Image
16/ In April and May, the Ru change their tactics. They regroup and switch to classic Soviet warfare. Massive artillery fire. After that, the BTG carry out a concentrated attack, trying to break through the defense line and create a bridgehead for the development of the attack.
17/ This tactic is very reminiscent of World War II. But in conditions where the enemy can see you from drones and satellites, any large armored column becomes an easy target for artillery.
18/ The last attack in this style was carried out near Bilogorivka in May. When fording the river, the Russians lost up to 100 units of armored vehicles. After that, Russia did not carry out such attacks again
19/ Phase III - probing the defense
Since June, Russia has mostly attacked in small groups (several tanks and BMPs). Marines and VDV forces are more often involved in such attacks. Their task was not to break through the defense line, but to find a weak spot in the defense. Image
20/ This tactic is most successful in the direction of Popasnaya and Lysychansk. Where the Russians manage to relatively quickly conquer a significant territory, taking advantage of the disadvantageous position of the UA.
21/ But there are many failures. The last one was the storming of Pavlivka (Vuglerdar), which ended with heavy losses for the RF.
22/ In autumn, most of the professional troops of the RF, including marines and landing forces, suffered heavy losses. Many tanks and armored vehicles were also lost. Russia could no longer afford to carry out assaults by VDV and Marines.
23/ Phase IV - assault infantry
In winter, the RU switches to World War I tactics - a lot of infantry and artillery. The Russians are trying to push out the Ukrainian units and occupy their trenches. And then storm the next trenches. Image
24/ This creeping occupation has been going on for 2 months. The Russians lose a lot of infantry. But the assault units actually have no value for the Kremlin. After all, these are mostly prisoners from the "Wagner" group.
25/ They are followed by "cheap" mobilized soldiers, to whom Russia issued old Soviet-era helmets and bulletproof vests. Minimum costs for each soldier. The mobilized must hold the occupied positions and repulse the counterattacks of the UA.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Volodymyr Dacenko

Volodymyr Dacenko Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @Volodymyr_D_

Dec 10
Battle of Pokrovsk
The battle of Pokrov became the biggest battle of this war. But it also became one of the largest battles in history in terms of the number of armored vehicles lost.
1/ Image
2/ In the battles near Pokrovsk, Ru losses are close to the number of the entire Western Military District of the Ru Fed as of 2022, which was being prepared for war with NATO. And this is about 60% of the forces with which Russia planned to seize Ukraine in three days in 2022
3/ In October 2023, Ru defined the offensive on Pokrovsk as the main axis of its offensive campaign. Obviously, Putin is focused on the goal of completely capturing the Donetsk region as the highest priority goal in the coming years. But this offensive led to colossal losses.
Read 15 tweets
Nov 10
Russia is suffering more and more losses trying to look like the side that is winning.
The dynamics of Russian losses indicates the price of the Russian offensive. 1/6 Image
Russia had to go to a colossal increase in its losses in order to continue to look like the winning side. If in 2022 Russian losses amounted to about 200 soldiers per day (killed and wounded), in 2023 - about 500, then in 2024 Ru reached the mark of 1,0 and 1.5K soldiers per day
Russian losses increased 10 times compared to the first months of the war.
Given that the hostilities are taking place in fairly limited territories, the overall losses of the Russians are unprecedented. 3/6
Read 6 tweets
Jun 12
Resources of war
Can Russia sustain this war for years? Here are some calculations to help estimate this.
Thread 1/
@RALee85 @olliecarroll @ragnarbjartur @konrad_muzyka @McFaul @HelloMrBond @SpencerGuard @JominiW Image
2/ Image
Let's start with artillery, which looks the most vulnerable
Standard calculations of the resource of artillery barrels show that at the current rate of firing, Ru needs about 2.5-4К barrels per year. If we add to this direct losses in battles, Ru total need is about 4-5K per year Image
Read 20 tweets
Jun 6
Half a year ago, I joined the procurement reform team of the Ministry of Defense-the Non-Lethal Procurement Agency (DOT)
This is my second "campaign" for reforms in the defense sector after Ukroboronprom in 2019. And here I would like to share some thoughts and my own experience Image
2/ Soviet architecture and corruption are the worst things Ukraine inherited from the USSR. In Soviet times, corruption was the only way to become a wealthy person. Wealth and commerce were prohibited by law, but the desire of people to live better did not disappear anywhere.
3/ For the first twenty years after the collapse of the USSR, Ukrainian society was aware of the problem of corruption, eventually defining it as the main enemy of democracy and the development of the state.
Read 16 tweets
Nov 13, 2023
Struggle for resources
When Ukrainians say that we need more weapons, the West often thinks that it is a sign of ingratitude.
In fact, Ukrainians are grateful, but there is another side - how many weapons your enemy supplies to the front.
This thread will explore this topic 1/ Image
2/ Russia
Many people look down on the Russian army after its defeats in Ukraine in the first year of the war.
But the Russian doctrine is based on the fact that Russia is able to withstand heavy defeats and incredible losses, but not to give up its political goals.
3/ Ru is still a significant power, if not in terms of the quality of weapons, but in terms of their quantity.
Since the beginning of the war, Ru has removed approximately 6,000 howitzers from its storage facilities.
Read 24 tweets
Oct 31, 2023
Russia spent $22.8 billion on missile attacks on Ukraine.
This is more than half of all US military aid to Ukraine ($43 billion).
A short thread about missile attacks this winter: 1/7 Image
2/7 Despite the sanctions, Russia has increased its missile production and can now produce about 100 missiles per month.
In October, Russia reduced the intensity of its use of missiles, apparently preparing for winter attacks on UA energy.
3/7 Air Defense Ukraine has become much more effective than a year ago. If until October 2022, Ukrainian air defenses shot down about 30% of missiles, then after the transfer of NASAMS, Iris-T, Patriot, Samp-T, Ukrainian air defenses began to intercept up to 80-90% of missiles.
Read 7 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(