In today's #vatnik soup, I'll talk about Russiagate and the Russian interference in the 2016 US elections. Twitter Files by @mtaibbi and The Grayzone blogger @aaronjmate have often suggested that the Russians had no effect on the election, which simply isn't true.
1/17
Many pro-Russian actors have been downplaying the effects of Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns during the 2016 elections.
In Jan, 2023, Eady et al. published their research on Nature Communications which concluded that ...
2/17
on Twitter, 1) the Russian disinformation was heavily concentrated, 2) the exposure was focused on people who identify as Republicans, and 3) the Russian influence campaign was eclipsed by content from domestic news media and politicians.
3/17
This led to a publishing of several news articles, for example from @LukewSavage, @BrettWilkinsSF and @samfbiddle, claiming that "Russia bots" weren't effective during the 2016 US elections, even though the study doesn't even have the word "bot" in it.
4/17
The study itself had nothing to do with bots, which are automated user accounts that are often used to spread and augment content on social media.
Second, the study's scope was very small, and it looked into the relationship between Russian ...
5/17
... propaganda tweets and attitudes and voting behavior. This effect wasn't found, but because the scope was so small, it's impossible to make any real conclusions in regards to actual voting behavior or attitude change.
6/17
In 2016, Russia spent 1,5 billion USD per year on online disinformation and propaganda. They ran campaigns in Reddit, Youtube, 4chan, Instagram, Twitter, fake news blogs, Facebook and FB groups.
7/17
They also organized rallies, demonstrations and infiltrated activist groups. Internet Research Agency (IRA) also spammed comment sections of various domestic newspapers and other websites.
8/17
For example, MIT Tech Review from 2021 exposed the incredible Russian infiltration in Facebook - 19/20 of top American Christian FB groups were troll farms, from African-American FB groups this number was
10/15.
9/17
So called "hack and leak" operations were also effective in swaying the public opinion, and Russian hacker groups targeted especially the Democrats. For example the Podesta e-mails led to Pizzagate conspiracy theory which again helped QAnon to become extremely popular.
10/17
Russians also forged documents that were then spread online by the IRA employees and useful idiots like Trump-fanboy Roger Stone. RT, Ruptly and Sputnik also conducted propaganda campaigns for people in the US and in the West.
11/17
Memes and political news and ads were just a tiny part of this impressive campaigning, and research has found that organic online discussions were the most effective tools for the IRA.
12/17
The organization activated people on the far end of both spectrum and heavily promoted sensationalist and conspiratorial content. IRA employees goal was to "set Americans against their own government".
13/17
Stating that the research proves that "Russian bots" were ineffective is either ignorance or conscious lying, and it completely disregards the dynamics of Russia's disinformation and propaganda campaigns.
14/17
36th Parallel made a nice graph of various aspects of the Russian information operation, and it shows that Twitter was just a tiny part of a huge campaign, affecting all levels of society.
15/17
It's quite telling that most major US news outlets have used IRA tweets as sources for partisan opinions, and many of their conspiracy theories and narratives already constructed in 2016 just won't die.
16/17
When someone's stating that Russia's tactics consisted of "Jesus masturbation memes", they're either being stupid or dishonest. anyone who's looked into Russia's "active measures" and IRA's campaigns knows, that they were so much more, and that they had real impact in 2016.
17/17
In today’s Vatnik Soup REBREW, I’ll re-introduce a Latvian politician and former MEP, Tatjana Ždanoka. She’s best-known for her history in the Communist Party of Latvia, for her pro-Russian politics in the country, and her connections to Russian intelligence.
1/22
Based on Ždanoka’s speeches and social media posts, she has a deep hatred towards the people of Latvia. The reason for this can only be speculated, but part of it could be due to her paternal family being killed by the Latvian Auxiliary Police,…
2/22
…a paramilitary force supported by the Nazis, during the early 1940s. Ždanoka became politically active in the late 80s. She was one of the leaders of Interfront, a political party that supported Latvia remaining part of the USSR.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce the main themes of Russian disinformation on TikTok. Each day, there are thousands of new videos promoting pro-Kremlin narratives and propaganda.
It’s worth noting that Russians can only access European TikTok via VPN.
1/10
There is currently a massive TikTok campaign aimed at promoting a positive image of Russia. The videos typically feature relatively attractive young women and focus on themes of nationalism and cultural heritage.
2/10
Ironically, many of these videos from Moscow or St. Petersburg are deceptively edited to portray Ukraine in a false light — claiming there is no war and that international aid is being funneled to corrupt elites.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll talk about Finland and how pro-Kremlin propagandists have become more active in the Finnish political space since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For the first time since 2022, they’ve gained some political power in Finland.
1/16
Russia’s political strategy in countries with Russian-speaking minorities (such as Finland and the Baltics) is typically quite similar: it seeks to rally these minorities around issues like language and minority rights, and then frames the situation as oppression.
2/16
At the same time, Russian speakers are extremely wary and skeptical of local media, and instead tend to follow Russian domestic outlets like Russia-1 and NTV, thereby reinforcing an almost impenetrable information bubble.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll discuss the Ukrainian SBU’s “Spiderweb” operation and the main disinformation narrative vatniks have been spreading during the afterfall. While domestic Russian media stays silent, the vatniks and Russian milbloggers have been extremely loud.
1/20
This operation was probably the most impactful strike since the drowning of the Moskva, massively reducing Russia’s capability to bomb Ukrainian cities (or anyone else’s). It involved smuggling 117 FPV drones hidden in trucks into Russia. Once near airbases,…
2/20
…the roofs opened remotely, launching drones in synchronized waves to strike targets up to 4,000 km away. The mission took 18 months to plan. The unsuspecting Russian truck drivers who transported them had no idea they were delivering weapons deep behind their own lines.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce a Russian movie director, propagandist, and former priest: Ivan Okhlobystin. He’s best known for his strong support for the war on Ukraine and for his radical views, which are often used as a testbed for the domestic Russian audience.
1/20
Ivan was born in 1966 from a short-lived marriage between a 62-year-old chief physician and a 19-year-old engineering student. She later remarried, and the family moved from Kaluga province to Moscow. Ivan kept the surname Okhlobystin from his biological father.
2/20
After moving to Moscow, Ivan began studying at VGIK film school. He soon became a playwright for theatre productions and also wrote for Stolitsa magazine, which he later left because, as he put it, “it had become a brothel.”
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce a Ukrainian-born former State Duma deputy, Vladimir Medinsky. He is best known as one of the ideologues of the “Russkiy Mir”, for his close ties to Vladimir Putin, and for leading the “peace talks” in Turkey in 2022 and 2025.
1/20
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Medinsky interned as a correspondent on the international desk of the TASS news agency, learning the ways of propaganda at an early age. Some time later, he earned two PhDs – one in political science and the other in history.
2/20
As is tradition in Russia, Medinsky’s academic work was largely pseudo-scientific and plagiarized. Dissernet found that 87 of 120 pages in his dissertation were copied from his supervisor’s thesis. His second dissertation was also heavily plagiarized.