Thread. It's good news that NATO members will provide modern tanks to Ukraine. Tanks remain a critical component in ground warfare, and Ukraine has the most experienced tank crews in the world. However, we should be realistic about what these deliveries mean.
Ukraine's goal is to retake all of its territory occupied by Russia. Breaking through well-prepared defensive lines (and exploiting success) is difficult without significant combined arms advantages, and Ukraine is unlikely to have air superiority. 2/
Challenger 2, Leopard 2, and Abrams are more survivable and have better optics and fire control systems. That will give Ukrainian tankers an advantage in tank-on-tank fights and other engagements, and tank crews will be more likely to survive (and keep fighting). 3/
These new tanks also open up a new line of ammunition available to Ukraine, which is critical since they have been using tanks as artillery. Procuring 3 new types of tanks will be a logistical headache, but it will also give them more options for replacing future tank losses. 4/
Tanks will undoubtedly play a key role in Ukraine's future offensives as in Kharkiv and Kherson. The new tanks will increase Kyiv's chances for success but not guarantee it. They are just one component of combined arms, and can only partially compensate for other weaknesses. 5/
Personally, I think deliveries of new IFVs and APCs, like the Bradley and Stryker, are more significant than tanks because Ukraine lacks enough IFVs/APCs and the relative improvement of a Bradley/Stryker over BMP-1/MRAP is even greater than Leopard 2 over many Ukrainian tanks. 6/
The question is whether the decision by NATO to provide tanks signals that the alliance may be willing to consider other systems needed by Ukraine in the future. These tanks are also another step in the Ukrainian military being equipped with NATO weapons. 7/
So this is good news, but NATO tanks are not a silver bullet. If NATO's goal is to help Kyiv so that it can retake all of its territory, this will likely need to include other systems like fighters and ATACMS to improve Ukraine's combined arms capabilities even more. 8/
This is particularly true if continued attrition in Bakhmut and elsewhere along the front weakens Ukrainian units that will need to be available for offensives later this year. 9/
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Some thoughts about the supplemental bill. This is good news, but it will primarily help Ukraine defend in 2024 and into 2025. Russia will still likely make further gains this year, and it doesn't fix all of Ukraine's issues. It should be seen as one part of a long-term strategy.
Ukraine has had three main problems since Russia seized the initiative in October: ammunition, manpower, and fortifications. Ukraine is making progress building fortifications and multiple defensive lines, but defenses on many of the key parts of the front are still underdeveloped, contributing to Russian advances. 2/
The bill and first PDA aid package announced this week will provide a quick boost to Ukraine's defenses. But it is important to keep in mind that the limitations aren't just appropriated funds but also production capacity and size of stockpiles. Greater artillery ammunition deliveries will help reduce Russia's 5-6:1 artillery advantage, but it will not give Ukraine parity. 3/
Russian sources are saying that Ukraine is dropping caltrops on roads to damage their vehicles' wheels. When the vehicles stop, they are then targeted by artillery or FPVs. vk.com/milinfolive?w=…
Videos posted over the past ten days by a Russian Telegram channel associated with the VDV’s 106th Airborne Division of Russian Su-25 attack aircraft operating in the Bakhmut - Chasiv Yar area. 2/
Videos from the past two weeks showing reported Russian FAB-250 and FAB-1500 UMPK, UK RBP Grom, and artillery or S-8 strikes in the Chasiv Yar area. 3/
This was an interesting article about how Ukraine reopened grain exports by putting Russian ports at risk, particularly given Ukraine's current campaign targeting Russian oil refineries.
From HUR's Vadym Skibitsky:
-Russia produced ~2 million 122mm/152mm artillery rounds in 2023 and received 1 million 122mm/152mm rounds from North Korea
-Russia produces ~115-130 "strategic" (>350km range) missiles per month
-~330-350 Shahed drones can be produced per month
He notes that actual production of Shaheds and missiles each month varies due to parts.
-Russia can produce 100-115 operational-tactical class of missiles (e.g. Kh-31, Kh-59) per month
-He says ~4% of Shahed drones fail to launch or explode immediately 2/ rbc.ua/rus/news/vadim…
Compared to last year, Russia's missile campaign this winter hasn't focused on energy infrastructure, but instead primarily on other infrastructure like Ukraine's defense industry and C2. He says Russia has started to use Shahed drones against military targets at the front. 3/