It is a bit hard to believe that any story involving China has been underreported, given China's large role in the global public debate.
But China's transformation into a major auto exporter has been wildly underreported.
(see the hockey stick in exports of finished cars)
1/
China has gone from a large net importer of finished (mostly from the EU, the Japanese firms never thought they could sell in China w/o producing in China) to a net exporter remarkably quickly ...
(China has been a net exporter of auto parts for some time)
2/
The US has long been a net importer of autos (mostly from Japan and Korea, but to a degree from Europe too).
And the EU has long been a net exporter of autos.
China has suddenly become a major global competitor
3/
I suspect that you need a Ph.D in political science -- or perhaps psychology and trade law :) -- to understand why the Commission's main response to a surge in Chinese competition (primarily in EVs) has been to threaten to challenge the US in the WTO ...
4/
I do understand that the IRA discriminates against European EV exports to the US (there aren't very many yet & the EU EV market is also undersupplied & will absorb any lost sales)
But the big swing in global demand for EU autos right now is coming from China, not the US.
5/5
this thread was inspired both by this Bloomberg story, and the EU's current freakout over the IRA (& its long silence over China's obviously discriminatory policies in the EV sector, which have had a much bigger impact on EU auto exports and employment)
Martin Wolf seems to think China's recent export surge has reached its natural limits: "investing even more in manufacturing just guarantees ever more excess capacity and thus protection aimed against the inevitable surges of Chinese exports"
nice chart too ;)
Wolf confirms that China seems a real upside in Trump's global trade war --
"what is happening to the US has clear upsides for their own country [China]. It has dawned on just about everybody by now that Trump’s signature is worthless. A man who is trying to demolish the Canadian economy is not going to be a reliable friend to anybody else"
The Saudi balance of payments for q4 is out, and it confirms that Saudi Arabia ran a current account deficit in 2024 -- and (per my estimates), the balance of payments "breakeven" for Saudi Arabia is around $90 a barrel.
1/
One implication, of course, is that the Saudis are on track to run a substantial external deficit in 2025 --
(@Rory_Johnston can improve the estimated breakeven with a better net oil exports number for 2024!)
2/
@Rory_Johnston Spending on imports (broadly defined, includes services) is above where it was back in 2014 -- The various MBS visions didn't come cheap
Say a US firm gets access to Korea's local market to sell insurance. It won't employ Americans to run that business ... the firm's global business benefits, but there is little impact on the US economy
The classic example is TPP, where the US would have liberalized the US auto market (the 'TPP" content requirement was lower than the "NAFTA" content requirement) in exchange for stronger protection of offshore pharmaceutical IP
2/
That would have raised the offshore profits of US big pharma (i.e. more production and profit in Singapore) but not generated more direct activity in the US as big pharma never liked manufacturing in the US for global sales (and paying US tax)
3/
One sign of "American exceptionalism" (US equity outperformance + sustained demand for US debt through thick and thin) is that the US has a lot more external liabilities than external assets.
A lot more!
1/
I have focused heavily on the net external debt position precisely because it doesn't hinge heavily on stock market valuations (and the FDI position is a bit problematic as foreign FDI is valued using the US stock market). 2/
Of course valuation still plays a small rose there -- the market value of foreign holdings of US bonds is about $1.5 trillion below the purchase price (using the sum of flows)
I usually focus on non-petrol trade because oil has its own unique dynamics. But if there really is an across the board 20% tariff on all imports, the pre-tariff baseline is imports of 11% of GDP ...
1/
Some simple tariff math. The "just pay it" cost is thus 2.2% of GDP. But actual tax revenue from the tariff will be lower. If the short-term elasticity is 1, imports fall by a little more than 2% of GDP, to around 9 pp of GDP & the direct tax revenue is 1.75 pp of GDP. 2/
That is a big sum, particularly as it is being put in place ahead of any offsetting tax cuts. Moreover as @jnordvig highlighted over the weekend, Trump is taking a real risk by implementing the tariff in a way that maximizes uncertainty ... 3/
The most important fact about China's q4 balance of payments is that the surplus is still way below what it should be -- a $1 trillion in goods surplus, $200-250b deficit in services and positive $3 trillion net investment position should generate a surplus of over $750b ...
1/
But even if the current account surplus is understated, it isn't quite as understated as it was in the first half of 2024 ... the reported surplus, FDI flows and portfolio inflows do imply that Chinese residents should be accumulating about $125b a quarter in foreign assets. 2/
And there has been a resumption in the state bank outflow ... including notable purchases of foreign bonds by the state banks