It is a bit hard to believe that any story involving China has been underreported, given China's large role in the global public debate.
But China's transformation into a major auto exporter has been wildly underreported.
(see the hockey stick in exports of finished cars)
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China has gone from a large net importer of finished (mostly from the EU, the Japanese firms never thought they could sell in China w/o producing in China) to a net exporter remarkably quickly ...
(China has been a net exporter of auto parts for some time)
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The US has long been a net importer of autos (mostly from Japan and Korea, but to a degree from Europe too).
And the EU has long been a net exporter of autos.
China has suddenly become a major global competitor
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I suspect that you need a Ph.D in political science -- or perhaps psychology and trade law :) -- to understand why the Commission's main response to a surge in Chinese competition (primarily in EVs) has been to threaten to challenge the US in the WTO ...
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I do understand that the IRA discriminates against European EV exports to the US (there aren't very many yet & the EU EV market is also undersupplied & will absorb any lost sales)
But the big swing in global demand for EU autos right now is coming from China, not the US.
5/5
this thread was inspired both by this Bloomberg story, and the EU's current freakout over the IRA (& its long silence over China's obviously discriminatory policies in the EV sector, which have had a much bigger impact on EU auto exports and employment)
The IMF has been struggling with the apparent contradiction between the policies needed for internal balance (monetary easing, weaker currency) and external balance (a stronger currency)
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But the contradiction is apparent not real -- it hinges on assumption that China lacks fiscal space, and thus fiscal policy is off the table.
Hallelujah. The IMF has recognized that China's weak real exchange rate is a problem, and that it has contributed to China's export surplus and growing trade tensions. From @KeithBradsher in the NYT
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The IMF has lagged on this issue, not led ... and it still isn't quite calling for a nominal appreciation (though Georgieva may have hinted at the need for nominal appreciation to offset inflation differentials). The EU Chamber is more explicit (from the FT)
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The IMF's formal press statement attributes the Yuan's real depreciation to inflation differentials (nominal moves v the USD also played a role in 22/23)
Brutal -- but accurate -- assessment of the results of Trump's year one policies by @wsj_douglasj and @JonathanEmont of the WSJ
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"Strip out imports of energy, food and raw materials, and China is on track this year to post a surplus in manufactured goods of around $2 trillion, a huge sum that is on a par with the annual national income of Russia or Italy" 2/
Exports are a big enough share of China's economy (~ 20%) that two years of 10% or more export volume growth can drive an overall increase in manufacturing output even if the domestic economy is the in doldrums
"China is now the world’s ... largest exporter, but ... It has never believed in balanced trade nor comparative advantage. Even as it imported critical technology from the West, its long-term goal was always self-sufficiency
Nice chart too
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Very much agree with his overall thesis, and with his policy prescription
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The title of Ip's piece more of less speaks for itself
One feature of today's global economy: the incredible concentration of the global goods surplus in East Asia (using customs data). Way more so than in Trump one
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Implicit in the chart is the observation that the rest of oil-importing East Asia has maintained its goods surplus even as China's surplus has soared (helped by demand for Korean and Taiwanese chips)
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There is another point here -- one relevant for both @imfnews and France as they think about global trace and macro imbalances -- the current account surplus of East Asia ex China far exceeds their customs goods surplus ....