It is a bit hard to believe that any story involving China has been underreported, given China's large role in the global public debate.
But China's transformation into a major auto exporter has been wildly underreported.
(see the hockey stick in exports of finished cars)
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China has gone from a large net importer of finished (mostly from the EU, the Japanese firms never thought they could sell in China w/o producing in China) to a net exporter remarkably quickly ...
(China has been a net exporter of auto parts for some time)
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The US has long been a net importer of autos (mostly from Japan and Korea, but to a degree from Europe too).
And the EU has long been a net exporter of autos.
China has suddenly become a major global competitor
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I suspect that you need a Ph.D in political science -- or perhaps psychology and trade law :) -- to understand why the Commission's main response to a surge in Chinese competition (primarily in EVs) has been to threaten to challenge the US in the WTO ...
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I do understand that the IRA discriminates against European EV exports to the US (there aren't very many yet & the EU EV market is also undersupplied & will absorb any lost sales)
But the big swing in global demand for EU autos right now is coming from China, not the US.
5/5
this thread was inspired both by this Bloomberg story, and the EU's current freakout over the IRA (& its long silence over China's obviously discriminatory policies in the EV sector, which have had a much bigger impact on EU auto exports and employment)
A bit of background. Taiwan's lifers hold $700 billion in foreign currency assets abroad (more counting their holdings of local ETFs that invest heavily in foreign bonds) v ~ $200 billion in domestic fx policies -- so fx gap (pre hedging) of $500 billion
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Taiwan's regulator (perhaps the most complicit regulator on earth) not allows the lifers NOT to mark their fx holdings to the fx market -- so the lifers are incentivized not to hedge (and they are rapidly reducing their hedge ratio)
Japan is an interesting case in a lot of ways. It has a ton of domestic debt (and significant domestic financial assets) which generates heated concerns about its solvency/ ability to manage higher rates. But it is also a massive global creditor --
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Japan's net holdings of bonds (net of foreign holdings of JGBs) is close to 50% of its GDP (a creditor position as big v GDP as the US net det position). That includes $1 trillion in bonds held in Japan's $1.175 trillion in reserves, + over $2 trillion in other holdings
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That translates into big holdings of US debt -- the MoF's Treasuries all show up in the US TIC data, but the corporate bonds held by the lifers, postbank and the GPIF are only partially captured in the US data b/c of third party management/ the use of EU custodians
14m cars would be roughly 1/4th of the global market for cars outside China (the Chinese market is ~ 25m cars) ... no way that doesn't have a disruptive impact.
China would go from 6 to 14m cars in a two year period if 2025 isn't an outlier ...
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Not clear that German/ European politics can caught up to the scale of China's export tsunami. And some European firms think they can profit from China's subsidies and strong local supply chain by producing in China for the European market
For some reason I decided to look at the external financial of investments of the main Scandinavian countries in a bit more depth --
Big surpluses, and tend to split the outflow equally between bonds and stocks
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For the big 3 collectively, portfolio flows map well to the current account surplus -- which is a common outcome now that there is less intermediation via the central bank. Denmark's portfolio flows tho are now a bit smaller than its accumulated surplus
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The Danes hold about $40 billion (per the IMF's coordinated investment survey) of US bonds, and $260 billion in US equities. The teacher's pension fund played the news well -- in aggregate, it would be hard for the Danish public funds to move the US bond market
China's premier says China wants to be a market for the world, not just a source of supply.
He might want to get get started.
China exported over 7m passenger cars in 2025, and the pace of growth accelerated at the end of the year
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Passenger car imports are down to half a million, and falling fast ... no market for the world there
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As an aside the pace of China's (N)EV exports doubled over the course of 2025 -- huge, huge growth ... China is still a source of global supply there, not a source of global demand
The technicals around the long-end of the Japanese curve are difficult: the natural buyers are all underwater on their legacy holdings, making it a hedge fund playground.
I tho would love to hear a good explanation of the fiscal concerns, gross debt isn't the only metric
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Maybe the IMF's data is off, but it has the general government deficit in 2025 at under 2 pp pf GDP (way better than the US) and it likely would be ~ 2% of GDP even with Takaichi's 0.7 pp of GDP(?) stimulus
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Net debt is much more clearly on a downward trajectory than the US -- and the net interest bill is very modest comparatively (even with high gross debt); it will get worse JGBs are refinanced but there is room to give a bit ...