It is a bit hard to believe that any story involving China has been underreported, given China's large role in the global public debate.
But China's transformation into a major auto exporter has been wildly underreported.
(see the hockey stick in exports of finished cars)
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China has gone from a large net importer of finished (mostly from the EU, the Japanese firms never thought they could sell in China w/o producing in China) to a net exporter remarkably quickly ...
(China has been a net exporter of auto parts for some time)
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The US has long been a net importer of autos (mostly from Japan and Korea, but to a degree from Europe too).
And the EU has long been a net exporter of autos.
China has suddenly become a major global competitor
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I suspect that you need a Ph.D in political science -- or perhaps psychology and trade law :) -- to understand why the Commission's main response to a surge in Chinese competition (primarily in EVs) has been to threaten to challenge the US in the WTO ...
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I do understand that the IRA discriminates against European EV exports to the US (there aren't very many yet & the EU EV market is also undersupplied & will absorb any lost sales)
But the big swing in global demand for EU autos right now is coming from China, not the US.
5/5
this thread was inspired both by this Bloomberg story, and the EU's current freakout over the IRA (& its long silence over China's obviously discriminatory policies in the EV sector, which have had a much bigger impact on EU auto exports and employment)
The massive March v April monthly swing tho washes out of the trailing 12m sum, and what shows are the more structural shifts -- like the huge run up in imports from Ireland
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Ireland now breaks the scale if it is included but the same trend shows up in a plot of imports from other centers of pharmaceutical tax avoidance
Some more interesting (and likely more important) things happening right now, but still wanted to highlight a couple of the details of the US trade data.
Seems pretty clear what is happening here
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A bit more refined analysis shows the same thing -- namely that US imports from Vietnam and China were inversely correlated in the last few months (as happened with the initial section 301 China tariffs)
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The consumer goods from Asia tariff front running was more subtle than the pharma front running -- it shows up as higher than usual imports from Asia overall in q1 (usually a seasonal low). April saw the first overall fall in imports from the most relevant set of countries
The Treasury's foreign exchange report is out -- no fireworks (as well, most countries weren't intervening to hold their currencies down last year or early this year), but it does preview some significant methodological changes
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And true to form, the report indicates that tariffs are the preferred tool to address any future findings of manipulation
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Clear language on China
"[China's] lack of transparency will not preclude Treasury from designating China if available evidence suggests that it is intervening through formal or informal channels to resist RMB appreciation in the future."
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"The foreign exchange reserves of the Republic of China (Taiwan) amounted to US$592.95 billion as of the end of May 2025, ... an increase of US$10.12 billion from the end of the previous month"
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$10b a month/ $120b a year (annualized) is a lot -- it is roughly 15% of Taiwan's GDP. It is also roughly the number than may be needed to keep Taiwan's exchange rate stable for the rest of the year given Taiwan's massive external surplus
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That highlights the dilemma Taiwan now faces. Its lifers have a massive open fx position, and the cost hedging is prohibitive (especially because the lifers are stuck hold legacy low yielding bonds bought before 2021 in their hold to maturity books)
I actually think most of the world now recognizes Trump's desired end game: he wants other countries to accept a big increase in US tariffs (10% base, maybe higher for some, plus sectoral tariffs) & make additional concessions to avoid even higher tariffs
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The problem is that this kind of deal sounds a like China's phase one deal, which China now rejects (and never implemented).
And it isn't an end game/ end state that traditional US allies are willing to accept
The 2025 US trade data is going to be crazy. The advance numbers show the deficit collapsed in April, after the "liberation" day tariffs on China brought trade to something of a standstill
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The deficit in consumer goods (a category dominated by pharmaceuticals and China) unsurprisingly collapsed --
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Imports of consumer goods normalized (don't know if the pharma import wave ended because firms had enough inventory, or it this was a reduction in imports from China/ others -- need the full data for more detail)