It is a bit hard to believe that any story involving China has been underreported, given China's large role in the global public debate.
But China's transformation into a major auto exporter has been wildly underreported.
(see the hockey stick in exports of finished cars)
1/
China has gone from a large net importer of finished (mostly from the EU, the Japanese firms never thought they could sell in China w/o producing in China) to a net exporter remarkably quickly ...
(China has been a net exporter of auto parts for some time)
2/
The US has long been a net importer of autos (mostly from Japan and Korea, but to a degree from Europe too).
And the EU has long been a net exporter of autos.
China has suddenly become a major global competitor
3/
I suspect that you need a Ph.D in political science -- or perhaps psychology and trade law :) -- to understand why the Commission's main response to a surge in Chinese competition (primarily in EVs) has been to threaten to challenge the US in the WTO ...
4/
I do understand that the IRA discriminates against European EV exports to the US (there aren't very many yet & the EU EV market is also undersupplied & will absorb any lost sales)
But the big swing in global demand for EU autos right now is coming from China, not the US.
5/5
this thread was inspired both by this Bloomberg story, and the EU's current freakout over the IRA (& its long silence over China's obviously discriminatory policies in the EV sector, which have had a much bigger impact on EU auto exports and employment)
I see that the pre global financial crisis Chinese fears about "Plaza" (meaning a negotiations that results in a coordinated currency appreciation to reduce imbalances and trade tensions) hasn't disappeared ...
Fair enough -- call a deal Shanghai accord ...
1/
The name doesn't really matter. And if China doesn't see value in an agreement that tries to raise the value of all the big Asian currencies together and wants to get points at home for rejecting a "plaza" and instead chooses to appreciate I certainly won't complain
2/
The notion that China cannot accept any appreciation is absurd. From the end of 2006 to the end of 2011 China's currency appreciated by ~ 20% v the dollar even with a two year pause during the global financial crisis.
3/
As @Aligarciaherrer has already observed, May's data shows ongoing domestic weakness (even increasing domestic weakness) even as China's exports continue to outperform global trade. It is an explosive combination.
The retail sales numbers speak for themselves -- tho there is a goods v services distinction, and the rolloff of some of last year's incentives for durables purchases matters.
The investment numbers also aren't good
2/
China's property market slump is now 5 years old and there is no sign that it has bottomed ... which it in and of itself remarkable. clearly time to clean up and recap the property developers, painful as that will be. on this I fully agree with the IMF
Korea's won is incredibly weak (global financial crisis or Korean BoP crisis levels ... ) even though Korea's fundamentals are sound (BoP has a massive surplus, fiscal debt is modest, etc).
Will be interesting to see if the Koreans can mount a defense this week ...
1/
A bit of background: Korea is experiencing a massive, positive terms of trade shock (chip prices are up so much that it has overwhelmed the rise in price of oil) and Samsung and Hynix are generating massive profits that have pushed the KOPSI way up
2/
Korea's fiscal position is solid too - not much government debt (thanks to a still stingy system of retirement benefits) and there will be a massive tax windfall from Samsung and Hynix. KRW weakness is all flow driven
For a few months now I have been hearing from folks close to the PBOC that the outflow from the state banks was driven by fx deposit growth, not by backdoor intervention. The blog takes that argument VERY seriously
2/
One is that onshore fx deposits themselves are a bit funky -- and have been for a long time. They don't move with rate differentials or any other obvious economic variable, so they could be (but I have no smoking gun proof) policy driven
The argument that China has a comparative advantage at industrial policy is a bit like the argument that the US has a comparative advantage at exporting debt. It is a good line, but even quips need a limiting principle ...
1/
I am not sure this week's Free Lunch column came up with that limiting principle; the notion that "the west might be better off simply leveraging the benefits of Chinese scale" suggests getting out of China's way across the board
But China has -- in Greg Ip's phrase (based on Rhodium's analysis) -- an "industrial policy for everything," which would imply that China is on track (with its comparative advantage at industrial policy) to dominate most industrial sectors
Germany's goods and services surplus has collapsed, and its surplus is now down to 2.5% of its GDP -- about half the level of China's far larger economy
Germany unlike China does report that its accumulated surpluses have generated an investment income surplus -- and China's reported deficit by all accounts (even that of the IMF, which grades China on a very generous curve) makes no sense
2/
I have criticized Germany for overly restrictive budgeting and excess surpluses in the past -- but fiscal has changed (thanks to the defense budget) and the surplus has fallen substantially ...
3/