It is a bit hard to believe that any story involving China has been underreported, given China's large role in the global public debate.
But China's transformation into a major auto exporter has been wildly underreported.
(see the hockey stick in exports of finished cars)
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China has gone from a large net importer of finished (mostly from the EU, the Japanese firms never thought they could sell in China w/o producing in China) to a net exporter remarkably quickly ...
(China has been a net exporter of auto parts for some time)
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The US has long been a net importer of autos (mostly from Japan and Korea, but to a degree from Europe too).
And the EU has long been a net exporter of autos.
China has suddenly become a major global competitor
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I suspect that you need a Ph.D in political science -- or perhaps psychology and trade law :) -- to understand why the Commission's main response to a surge in Chinese competition (primarily in EVs) has been to threaten to challenge the US in the WTO ...
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I do understand that the IRA discriminates against European EV exports to the US (there aren't very many yet & the EU EV market is also undersupplied & will absorb any lost sales)
But the big swing in global demand for EU autos right now is coming from China, not the US.
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this thread was inspired both by this Bloomberg story, and the EU's current freakout over the IRA (& its long silence over China's obviously discriminatory policies in the EV sector, which have had a much bigger impact on EU auto exports and employment)
The export price of an iPhone (the most significant good made by contract manufacturers in China for an offshore company -- Apple) is of course central to SAFE's (i.e. China's) argument that China's goods surplus is much smaller than its customs surplus
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SAFE's argument has been that the customs price of the iPhone (reported by the contract manufacturer, i.e. a firm like Honhai) is much higher than the price Apple actually paid the contact manufacturer ...
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Some on this site have challenged my decision to highlight the size of China’s manufacturing surplus in the New York Times… and also questioned why I question China’s (modest) reported current account surplus.
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The decision to highlight the manufacturing surplus was easy.
Why: the $1 trillion increase in the manufacturing surplus (& the $500+ billion increase in the goods surplus) is in fact the story. The services deficit is basically unchanged relative to its pre-pandemic size.
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China’s estimated auto capacity also comes straight from the Times and their very good auto reporter. I did add a forecast for the increase in EV capacity over the next few years, but my argument maps to that industry exports like Mike Dunne.
1) Trade with China has benefitted commodity exporters, the owners of firms like Apple that profited off China's export model (w/o losing their competitive edge to Chinese rivals) and Western consumers. Manufacturing sectors much less so
2) Many developing economies do have large concerns about unbalanced trade with China; India is the best example (their policy elite thinks letting China into the WTO was a mistake!). Brazil worries that Chinese steel is undercutting its industry
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Brazil, Turkey and others imposed limits on Chinese auto imports (insisting on local production); Chile wasn't happy that its only steel plant closed b/c of Chinse competition and now even Korea is worrying about Chinese steel dumping
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Mr. Hauge's comment here reflects a common critique of my NYT essay, namely that it puts too much emphasis on China and not enough on the US, which choose not to compete with China and benefits from cheap Chinese goods ...
As Michael Pettis noted in a thread of his own, China bears responsibility for its exceptionally high savings rate -- and if that savings level isn't absorbed domestically, it by definition requires offsetting imbalances elsewhere in the global economy.
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China's 45% savings rate is an extreme outlier globally, and it is problematic globally when one of the world's largest economies is also one of the most imbalanced economies.
Trump's second term economic policy will be ... "foe"-shoring?
Less trade with Canada, Mexico, Europe and likely Japan (reciprocal tariffs, 232 sectoral tariffs) and more trade with China and Russia?
Creative I guess.
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A big trade deal with China that keeps the US market open to Chinese goods and perhaps rolls back some term 1 tariffs wasn't what Mr. Trump campaigned on.
And a big deal with China (and maybe Russia) while fighting trade wars with the EU, Canada, Mexico and others is a radical shift in years of US international economic policy.
The FT today touches on the US "TIC" data on foreign holdings -- highlighting the two big trends of the past few years: the drop in China's visible holdings in US custodians, and the rise holdings in the UK and Europe
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The FT story highlights that the large fall in China's visible holdings in the US should be taken with a grain of salt, as it is an open secret that China holds securities through Clearstream and Euroclear