It is a bit hard to believe that any story involving China has been underreported, given China's large role in the global public debate.
But China's transformation into a major auto exporter has been wildly underreported.
(see the hockey stick in exports of finished cars)
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China has gone from a large net importer of finished (mostly from the EU, the Japanese firms never thought they could sell in China w/o producing in China) to a net exporter remarkably quickly ...
(China has been a net exporter of auto parts for some time)
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The US has long been a net importer of autos (mostly from Japan and Korea, but to a degree from Europe too).
And the EU has long been a net exporter of autos.
China has suddenly become a major global competitor
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I suspect that you need a Ph.D in political science -- or perhaps psychology and trade law :) -- to understand why the Commission's main response to a surge in Chinese competition (primarily in EVs) has been to threaten to challenge the US in the WTO ...
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I do understand that the IRA discriminates against European EV exports to the US (there aren't very many yet & the EU EV market is also undersupplied & will absorb any lost sales)
But the big swing in global demand for EU autos right now is coming from China, not the US.
5/5
this thread was inspired both by this Bloomberg story, and the EU's current freakout over the IRA (& its long silence over China's obviously discriminatory policies in the EV sector, which have had a much bigger impact on EU auto exports and employment)
Good chart from the Times; would love to see EU broken out between Ireland and the rest of the EU ... and line items for Singapore and Switzerland for the patent protected/ branded meds
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And useful detail on a number of meds, including those where there is a well known (but not yet resolved) dependence on a few factories in China
An interesting additional bit of color -- the tariffs won't have a big impact on Novo Nordisk even though it makes the active ingredient for Wegovy in Denmark? Why? B/c of its tax structure ...
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Euro area exports fell back to earth in June, after pharma front running inflated the q1 number.
Imports (excluding fuels) continue to march up even with slow growth. China ...
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Imports from China continue to be on an strong upward trend (Chinese industrial policies, China's undervalued CNY .. ). They are now running around EUR 40b a month/ EUR 500b a year. The EV case didn't have a macro impact
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Wild swings in monthly exports to the US (pharma!) ...
Weak June is likely a payback for a crazy strong March, but could reflect some tariff impact.
Exports to China continue to slowly whither away ...
Chinese state banks were buying fx to keep the CNY at the fix during the second quarter; with China now intervening to hold the CNY down (v the USD) it would not be hard to engineer a stronger yuan ...
Apart from a brief period in q1 when the market feared China would respond to Trump tariffs with a CNY depreciation, fx settlement has been positive since September --indicating that China's state actors are generally pushing the CNY down.
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China can also guide the yuan stronger through a series of stronger fixes -- as the yuan starts to appreciation, exporters tend to convert dollars back into yuan, adding to the underlying pressure
According to the WSJ, the "transshipment" provisions will in reality be rules of origin that limited embedded Chinese content --
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This potentially matters quite a lot, as the primary impact of the tariffs on China to date have been a reallocation of the point of final assembly inside Asia -- so rising imports from the ASEAN countries and the NIEs (Korea, Taiwan)
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This is obvious in a graph showing the bilateral trade deficits with different parts of Asia. The initial trade war led to a reallocation of the deficit away from China -- not a reduction in the overall deficit with "manufacturing" Asia