It is a bit hard to believe that any story involving China has been underreported, given China's large role in the global public debate.
But China's transformation into a major auto exporter has been wildly underreported.
(see the hockey stick in exports of finished cars)
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China has gone from a large net importer of finished (mostly from the EU, the Japanese firms never thought they could sell in China w/o producing in China) to a net exporter remarkably quickly ...
(China has been a net exporter of auto parts for some time)
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The US has long been a net importer of autos (mostly from Japan and Korea, but to a degree from Europe too).
And the EU has long been a net exporter of autos.
China has suddenly become a major global competitor
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I suspect that you need a Ph.D in political science -- or perhaps psychology and trade law :) -- to understand why the Commission's main response to a surge in Chinese competition (primarily in EVs) has been to threaten to challenge the US in the WTO ...
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I do understand that the IRA discriminates against European EV exports to the US (there aren't very many yet & the EU EV market is also undersupplied & will absorb any lost sales)
But the big swing in global demand for EU autos right now is coming from China, not the US.
5/5
this thread was inspired both by this Bloomberg story, and the EU's current freakout over the IRA (& its long silence over China's obviously discriminatory policies in the EV sector, which have had a much bigger impact on EU auto exports and employment)
Alas, I see a lot of evidence that the Trump Administration has bit hard into the corporate tax lobby's arguments against the OECD deal, and no sign that it recognizes that TCJA led a big part of the US tax base to set up camp in Ireland.
Two examples -- big pharma (top 6 by revenue) made ~ $250b in the last 3ys, and paid less than $10b in tax to the US (and probably closer to $5b ... ); and Apple pays about $5b a year in US federal income tax on a global profit of over $100b ...
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Rather than complaining about the O.E.C.D's threat to America first it might be useful for the Trump team to make a few signals indicating that they realize the nature of the underlying problem (the incentives from GILTI) and are willing to fix it despite corporate pressure
The November TIC data is out -- in an unusual Friday data release. November is a long time ago of course --
But there is no sign that China did anything significant with its US holdings in November. Visible holdings are up slightly.
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Bill holdings are a little elevated relative to history -- but nothing wild
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SAFE reported (or bragged) that its 2019 dollar share was 55% (it releases its dollar share with a 5y lag in its annual report), well below the global average in COFER. So I put a bit more weight on the blue line in this chart now --
Appreciate the quick response to my paper with Sander Tordoir from @lugaricano -- there does seem to be a real consensus that Germany is now facing a China shock, even if there is still a healthy debate on the right response.
First, the solar example isn't an example of the failure of German industrial policy so much as an example of the failure of using demand side incentives alone -- Chinese producers ended up capturing the demand created by German PV subsidies.
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That to me is part of the case of de facto buy European requirements during the green transition even if they do raise costs a bit (there are trade offs) -- otherwise demand incentives only fuel China's effort to scale up and ride the cost curve down.
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China's GDP growth would have been 3.5%, not 5%, but for the 1.5 percentage point contribution from net exports -- that's a huge contribution from net exports for a big economy
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The average contribution of net exports over the last 5 years has been close to a percentage point of GDP -- a big change from the 10 years after the global financial crisis --
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A reminder that the contribution of net exports isn't the efficiency gains of trade; it is the net demand that exports provided to the economy. getting 4 pp of net demand over 5 ys from the rest of the world isn't easy ...
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I have a new joint paper with @SanderTordoir or CER out today that makes the argument that Germany should not passively accept deindustrialization in the face of the second China shock, and a course correction in German policy is needed
The need for a rethink should be obvious: Chinese industrial policies have created Chinese competitors that are pushing Germany out of key European and global markets. German auto exports for example are down, and German net exports are now a fraction of Chinse net exports
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Case for need for a shift was summarized forcefully by the FT in Europe Express "German industry once believed China was its saviour — now it looks more like its executioner"
I will be blunt: Milei's "unorthodox currency policy" (the FT is right) is only consistent with repaying Argentina's external debt (another Milei goal) because the 2020 restructuring limited the amount Argentina has to pay ...
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Let's review the data -- Argentina's central bank has $25b in fx reserves (including a lot of CNY that it cannot use). But it has borrowed $18b from the PBOC and $14b from its domestic banks -- and fully converted its SDR balance into fx
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Argentina also owes the IMF over $40b, and it has shown no ability (or inclination) to pay down the principal on its massive loan (Caputo has prioritized paying the 2020 exchange bonds)