It is a bit hard to believe that any story involving China has been underreported, given China's large role in the global public debate.
But China's transformation into a major auto exporter has been wildly underreported.
(see the hockey stick in exports of finished cars)
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China has gone from a large net importer of finished (mostly from the EU, the Japanese firms never thought they could sell in China w/o producing in China) to a net exporter remarkably quickly ...
(China has been a net exporter of auto parts for some time)
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The US has long been a net importer of autos (mostly from Japan and Korea, but to a degree from Europe too).
And the EU has long been a net exporter of autos.
China has suddenly become a major global competitor
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I suspect that you need a Ph.D in political science -- or perhaps psychology and trade law :) -- to understand why the Commission's main response to a surge in Chinese competition (primarily in EVs) has been to threaten to challenge the US in the WTO ...
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I do understand that the IRA discriminates against European EV exports to the US (there aren't very many yet & the EU EV market is also undersupplied & will absorb any lost sales)
But the big swing in global demand for EU autos right now is coming from China, not the US.
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this thread was inspired both by this Bloomberg story, and the EU's current freakout over the IRA (& its long silence over China's obviously discriminatory policies in the EV sector, which have had a much bigger impact on EU auto exports and employment)
China doesn't have one industrial policy; it has 30!
Just a portion of the insights in Bloomberg's big take on where China's economy now stands.
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As this chart shows, China has not yet reversed the fall in the consumption share of its economy that occurred after Zhu Rongji's reforms, & coincided with WTO entry. In my NYT piece, I argued that this is China's original sin: it created a structurally unbalanced economy
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Bloomberg notes -- I would argue correctly -- that "a more decisive shift toward domestic consumption is needed to meet the country’s long-term goals" and also highlights the impediments to such a shift
A chart showing imports in some the sectors where the Trump Administration is likely considering sectoral 232 tariffs --
The US imports almost as many pharmaceuticals as it does finished cars (and pharma imports from Ireland are about equal to vehicle imports from Mexico)
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And a chart showing why tariffs on semiconductors (imports of around $60b) are no substitute for a "CHIPS act" -- imports of semiconductors are only 1/5th of imports of products that use semiconductors
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Tariff semiconductors but not circuit boards and the US will import circuit boards; tariff chips but not computers, routers and phones and the US will import computers, routers and phones
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I understand the political logic of an IMF/ Milei alliance -- it highlights the IMF's utility to the new US administration.
But increased the IMF's net exposure to Argentina when the peso is enormously overvalued is a classic error --
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Argentina's fiscal looks better than the IMF expected pre-Milei (though the non transferable USD bills held by the BCRA mask the true fiscal deficit/ true interest expense). The BoP tho looks bad -- the predictable result of an overvalued peso.
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The IMF's classic error in Argentina (imo) hasn't been financing bad fiscal -- it has been funding an overvalued exchange rate and the current account deficit (covering interest payments to IMF = CA financing!)
The tariffs on China (and on Apple, 20% of the $400 import price of an iphone is $80) have rightly been overshadowed by the tariffs on Canada/ Mexico.
But China has said it will retaliate, which means US agricultural exports to China will get a new moment in the sun
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One thing about agricultural exports is that they are, well, seasonal. The biggest US ag export to China by far is soybeans, and the '24 harvest has already shipped out ...
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Soybean exports to China are within shouting distance of their pre-trade war levels, but never quite recovered (this is clear in a chart of US v Brazilian exports). But they are high enough to make farmers nervous about a new ' bean embargo ...
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CNY fix is still fixed. Mid point of today's band was set at 7.174 -- essentially unchanged from yesterday.
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Spot is at 7.29 -- weaker than the fix no doubt, but not yet at the edge of the band.
Nothing that yet suggests a weaker CNY is part of China's reaction to the Trump tariffs (of course, the move could come with a lag)
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Big unknown is whether the weak current level of the yuan makes Xi and his economic team less willing to weaken the yuan further even as tariffs ratchet up ...
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