It is a bit hard to believe that any story involving China has been underreported, given China's large role in the global public debate.
But China's transformation into a major auto exporter has been wildly underreported.
(see the hockey stick in exports of finished cars)
1/
China has gone from a large net importer of finished (mostly from the EU, the Japanese firms never thought they could sell in China w/o producing in China) to a net exporter remarkably quickly ...
(China has been a net exporter of auto parts for some time)
2/
The US has long been a net importer of autos (mostly from Japan and Korea, but to a degree from Europe too).
And the EU has long been a net exporter of autos.
China has suddenly become a major global competitor
3/
I suspect that you need a Ph.D in political science -- or perhaps psychology and trade law :) -- to understand why the Commission's main response to a surge in Chinese competition (primarily in EVs) has been to threaten to challenge the US in the WTO ...
4/
I do understand that the IRA discriminates against European EV exports to the US (there aren't very many yet & the EU EV market is also undersupplied & will absorb any lost sales)
But the big swing in global demand for EU autos right now is coming from China, not the US.
5/5
this thread was inspired both by this Bloomberg story, and the EU's current freakout over the IRA (& its long silence over China's obviously discriminatory policies in the EV sector, which have had a much bigger impact on EU auto exports and employment)
US imports are on track to be up modestly for the year
(with strong electronics imports driven by the AI boom and the tariff exclusion for chips offsetting weakness in vehicle trade)
2/
Set aside the craziness in pharmaceuticals and gold -- which drove enormous volatility in the reported trade balance in both q1 and q2 -- and the monthly trade data looks surprisingly normal
Probably time for China to try a different strategy
The IMF article IV is due this fall. Shouldn't the IMF be recommending that the central government use its obvious fiscal space to directly support household spending?
1/
The FT stated the obvious "Beijing has relied on exports in recent years to meet its ambitious annual growth targets" - the IMF should too ...
The IMF staff, in an excellent 2023 working paper, found that the central government doesn't really have any net debt (unlike some of the more indebted local governments). Time for the IMF to start reflecting those findings in its policy advice ...
A chart that I always find interesting -- global reserves v Treasury notes and bonds (reserve managers generally don't buy bills) as a share of US GDP
Period between 03 and 08 notable for reserve growth w-o // increase in supply of US classic reserve assets
1/
Always striking to me that there is a lot more talk about the dollar as a reserve currency now, when the impact of reserve holdings on markets is waning, than there was talk of the market impact massive reserve growth back when it was happening
2/
A similar chart for the euro area -- there haven't been enough euro area securities to meet all global reserve demand since 2006!
Not a fan of most of the Miran paper (and the Treasury restructuring proposals), but also not a fan of Employ America's claim that dollar strength doesn't impact the US manufacturing sector
This argument in particular has two particular problems --
a) it ignores lags, and treats 02 to 08 as one period of dollar weakness
b) it doesn't look at petrol and non-petrol trade
2/
In reality, dollar strength impacts trade flows with long lags (8 to 12qs on exports is standard), so the dollar's exceptional strength in 2000 and 01 and still relatively strong levels in 02 and 03 were weighing on exports for some time (see graph)
Set aside politics for a moment (which no one in Argentina ever does) and focus on the numbers. Milei's core problem is that fiscal adjustment hasn't generated balance of payments adjustment. Net out IMF lending and Argentina has been burning through its reserves
1/
and set aside funds borrowed from the IMF and SDR conversion -- even so Argentina's net fx reserves are flat (data through July). And ~ half of that fx more or less is CNY from the PBOC swap line which isn't freely convertible into USD ...
2/
A strong harvest (plus Chinese buying as China isn't buying from the US) actually brought the current account deficit down this summer -- but those inflows aren't expected to last, and the real problem is that there is once again a deficit ...
Some additional detail on China's trade surplus, which is up about $400b since the IMF (in)famously declared imbalances were receding back in the summer of 2024 ...
1/many
First things first -- don't obsess too much about the slowdown in exports relative to July. That is mostly a base effect. Exports in dollar terms have been pretty constant the last few months, at levels (in USD terms) a bit higher than last year
2/
The interesting stuff is all under the hood - the relentless rise in exports to Europe even as China's imports of European goods are weak for example ...