It is a bit hard to believe that any story involving China has been underreported, given China's large role in the global public debate.
But China's transformation into a major auto exporter has been wildly underreported.
(see the hockey stick in exports of finished cars)
1/
China has gone from a large net importer of finished (mostly from the EU, the Japanese firms never thought they could sell in China w/o producing in China) to a net exporter remarkably quickly ...
(China has been a net exporter of auto parts for some time)
2/
The US has long been a net importer of autos (mostly from Japan and Korea, but to a degree from Europe too).
And the EU has long been a net exporter of autos.
China has suddenly become a major global competitor
3/
I suspect that you need a Ph.D in political science -- or perhaps psychology and trade law :) -- to understand why the Commission's main response to a surge in Chinese competition (primarily in EVs) has been to threaten to challenge the US in the WTO ...
4/
I do understand that the IRA discriminates against European EV exports to the US (there aren't very many yet & the EU EV market is also undersupplied & will absorb any lost sales)
But the big swing in global demand for EU autos right now is coming from China, not the US.
5/5
this thread was inspired both by this Bloomberg story, and the EU's current freakout over the IRA (& its long silence over China's obviously discriminatory policies in the EV sector, which have had a much bigger impact on EU auto exports and employment)
The real story isn't that Kenya is saving ~ 200m in debt service costs by restructuring into CNY --
It is that China has already gotten $1.5 b of the principal on the original railway loan back
1/
It is well known in sovereign debt circles (but not among the foreign policy world) that the amortization structures on Chinese policy bank loans are super steep, and that China has taken big $$$ off the table between 22 and 25 ...
2/
I am working on a piece on Ecuador that will show that IMF support (and a bond restructuring) effectively allowed Exim and CDB to dramatically reduce their exposure ...
3/
Argentina's governemtn has two pools of fx assets. The Treasury fx account -- which can be sold "inside" the band agreed with the IMF, and the BCRA's fx. The Treasury account is close to being empty
1/
The Treasury bought ~$2b in fx from the ag exporters when the ag export tax was dropped (irritating US farmers) ... but that pool of funds is about gone. The BCRA also has a bit of cash but that can only be sold at the edge of the band
2/
The BCRA's actual cash position is much lower than its reported fx reserves b/c $13b of the reported reserves is from the PBOC swap, & that cannot really be used (open question as to whether it should be counted toward gross reserves as it isn't really available to the GoA)
3/
Bessent: US Treasury wants to support Argentina's strong policies ...
The message seems a bit off. Countries with strong policies don't usually need a second bailout in a year. Argentina already blew through $14b from the IMF
Bessent's rhetoric overlooks the fact that Argentina doesn't in fact, have a strong balance sheet. The central bank has as many fx liabilities as fx reserves (fx reserves net of the PBOC swap are in the low double digits)
Have the tariffs reduced the trade deficit? The answer is actually not obvious ...
The headline data misleads because of massive swings in the pharmaceuticals balance and the gold balance
1/ many
If you look at goods trade net of pharma and gold, imports are down a bit from earlier in the year (consistent with a tariff impact) but the base earlier in the year was inflated by a bit of front running
2/
Recent monthly deficits (last data point is July, August will likely be down but this calculation takes the detailed data) are running a bit below last year in recent months -- but the YTD numbers are still driven by q1 (front running)
One of the arguments I made at last week's Federal Reserve (Board +FRBNY) Conference on the international role of the dollar is that the dollar's share of reserves gets too much attention, and the absolute stock of reserve holdings gets too little ...
1/many
Central banks did add a bit to their Euro holdings in dollar terms (or rather, they didn't sell euros just because the euro rose against the dollar in q2). But the bigger story is that dollar holdings are basically constant ...
2/
There has been essentially no flow from foreign central banks/ reserve managers into dollars in the last year plus -- and global reserve growth has also stalled ...
A simple explanation of the changes that China made back in 2021 might help others understand the issue, and why many people (even some at the IMF) question the size of China's reported current account surplus. 1/
The adjustments made to the data lowered the "BoP" goods surplus relative to the customs balance --
it though is easy to replicate the old methodology and report what the surplus would be absent the new "survey" rather than customs based methodology
2/
This methodological shift is lowering the reported surplus by about $250b (over a pp of GDP) relative to what it would be with an unchanged BoP methodology. And the reasons why the new approach has generated a lower number haven't really been explained 3/