Despite protestations to the contrary, it's increasingly clear that Ukraine is indeed a distraction from our stated priority: Asia, China, and Taiwan. We can admit it and try to adapt. Or we can deny it and pay the price later. I advise the former. 1/
We can and should still support Ukraine *but* only consistent with *genuinely* prioritizing defense of Taiwan. Regardless of what a lot of prominent people are saying, that's *not* what we're doing. 2/
Honestly the flood of denials that this is *precisely* the case despite clear evidence that Ukraine is taking resources and attention from Taiwan is one of the most compelling pieces of evidence. "Doth protest too much" is usually a tell that the accusation is true. 3/
It's especially important to reckon with reality because 1) the war in Ukraine doesn't look like it's going to end anytime soon and 2) the military balance over Taiwan is deteriorating. 4/
There's a lot of hand waving that Russia can be decisively defeated and that the defense industrial base must be quickly revamped. Yet if we're being serious and realistic, neither of these seems plausible, especially in the near term. Are we going to deal with reality or not? 5/
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People sometimes say realism has no purchase in Washington. I think that's true for academic neo-realism. But I think it's only partially true.
I think the dominant model in DC is *a realism-liberalism hybrid.*
This sounds academic, but I think it's helpful. 1/
DC's rhetoric tends liberal, especially in this administration, but if you look at behavior, it's quite realist in many ways. Policymakers, in my experience, don't think of themselves as realists a la Morgenthau, but they *do* think of themselves as practical, "realistic." 2/
The dominant mental model in DC wants *both* to be tough-minded and realistic *and* to be liberal. Eg: "A balance of power favoring freedom." 3/
"The United States has not devoted sufficient attention to the current approach to deterrence—and whether it is adequate to meet an accelerated threat." 1/
"Washington has suggested that it would come to Taiwan’s aid if China invaded. Yet the United States has not taken adequate steps to put military resources in place and increase its own capacity to resupply those resources in anticipation of such an event." 2/
"Washington would not have time to prepare a response once an invasion was underway. Were the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense without sufficient planning, the outcome could be truly catastrophic." 3/
Despite many doth protest too much-style protestations to the contrary, this (excellent) report from @SethGJones@CSIS highlights some of the very real tradeoffs between supporting Ukraine and getting ready for a Taiwan fight. 1/
For example: "There are workforce and supply chain
constraints to increase the supply of weapons systems
and munitions required for major war...In some cases, there are single sources for key components and sub-components." 2/
"There is one company, Williams International,
that builds turbofan engines for most cruise missiles, such as the JASSM, JASSM-ER, and LRASM. There is also one main company, PacSci EMC, that produces the energetics for most missiles." 3/
Some critical, commendable strategic clarity from @JohnCornyn:
"That it'll take years to replenish stocks of weapons supplied to Ukraine ought to be a “flashing red light” that the defense industrial base is not prepared for superpower competition." 1/
It is becoming untenable to argue a) we are as ready as we should be for a war with China and b) there is no tradeoff between Taiwan/Asia and Ukraine/Europe. We clearly are not ready enough, and there is a tradeoff. Better to reckon with facts.
"The war in Ukraine has exposed widespread problems in the American armaments industry that may hobble the U.S. military’s ability to fight a protracted war against China, according to a new study." 2/
"But the protracted conflict has also exposed the strategic peril facing the U.S. as weapons inventories fall to a low level and defense companies aren’t equipped to replenish them rapidly...'“The bottom line is the defense industrial base is not prepared.'" @SethGJones 3/