In Gonzalez v. Google, SCOTUS has a chance to clarify #Section230's meaning. Courts interpret Section 230 as shielding #BigTech from practically all civil liability when 3rd party content is at issue. I argue that nothing in the text supports that reading. newsweek.com/gonzalez-v-goo…
One option to rectify this is that tech companies should only be protected from causes of action that target a speaker or publisher, such as defamation suits—as opposed to protecting them from enforcement actions via federal civil statutes.
Another option would be to shield companies from liability for hosting and displaying content, but hold them responsible when they take actions beyond those of a traditional publisher, such as when they algorithmically push certain content to users.
Yet another possibility would be to allow this case to proceed and hold Google liable as a distributer of the illegal content, the same way mail couriers or newspaper stands would be. Neither the text nor the structure of Section 230 suggests that the Court can't do so.
In the case of finding distributor liability, the Court should remand the case for the parties to argue whether Google knew, or should have known, that ISIS was using its platform as a recruiting tool.
Current interpretations of Section 230 support protecting tech companies when they commit basic torts, violate various civil statutes, and even when they fail to adhere to their own user agreements. The Court in Gonzalez can rectify this by relying on the text.
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