The most important aspect of the 7 October export control package released by the US Commerce Department is arguably its unilateral nature, and the struggle to get other key players onboard, primarily the Netherlands and Japan, continues. A thread. 🧵
We are clearly in a new era in US China Technology competition. #USChinaTechColdWar has never been a more accurate description of the situation. The “forcing third countries to take sides” element was always the most salient part of the meme I pioneered with @paulmozur
The stakes for semiconductor industry got bigger with the #7OctoberSurprise and comments from National Security Advisor Sullivan in September.
Sullivan: "..computing-related technologies, biotech, and clean tech are truly “force multipliers” throughout the tech ecosystem. And leadership in each of these is a national security imperative.” whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…
The past week saw media stories culminating Friday indicating some type of agreement between the Netherlands, Japan and US on elements of the export controls, specifically the end use controls, new controls on equipment, and the US persons controls. See: ft.com/content/baa27f…
However, the apparent agreement comes with no details, in a situation where the devil is in fact in the details, given the complexity of the 7 October controls, and the fact that most elements were not agreed to beforehand by the most impacted parties.
Significantly, Dutch PM Mark Rutte suggested there will be no announcement: "Those talks have been going on for a long time and we're not saying anything about it..it's really in doubt that if something comes out of them, that it will be very visible." reuters.com/technology/dut…
Why the silence around the details of what is a major issue, with significant impact on global semiconductor supply chains, tool makers, market access, R&D budgets, and the future of China’s semiconductor industry?
Hinting at one element of the answer to this question, EU Internal Markets Commissioner Theirry Breton noted: “You will always find Europe by your side when it comes to ensuring our common security in technology.” scmp.com/news/china/dip…
Breton also noted, however: "But action should be limited to what is necessary from security point of view, and done in full, transparent and open partnership with Europe.”
This suggests major lingering concern about how unilateral the controls were, and feathers remain ruffled.
The issue is complex, as will be the full Dutch and European response. First, this is not really a "win" as some media outlets are portraying it, and the lack of announcement or details supports this.
The lack of a public announcement from the White House or Commerce also reflects sensitivity to the fact that these were unilateral controls--dropped after 18 months of negotiation--and four months after 7 October....
...and perceived, particularly in Europe, as the US basically saying, we are going to do this and you must sign on the dotted line under conditions dictated solely from Washington.
Today the Dutch press confirmed agreement, but Trade Minister Schrienemacher was still skeptical on messaging – “We tekenen niet bij het kruisje” (literally, “we do not sign on the cross” meaning just blindly sign on the dotted line. nos.nl/artikel/246151…
The Dutch and ASML still do not understand the national security rationale for controlling DUV, and the rest of the semiconductor industry continues to grapple with the inclusion of memory in the end use controls, as memory is a commodity product....thechinaproject.com/2022/11/11/mem…
Also, so far, and going forward, the big losers are all US and western companies. Chinese companies will find workarounds, it will be hard, but this arrangement has just incentivized the entire industry, including Chinese and non-Chinese firms, to design out US technology.
Finally, the lack of announcement suggests that agreement on the details of key elements of the controls, such as the domestic persons controls, specific end use node thresholds, and additional equipment controls remain contentious, and will take time to work out, along with...
....how they will be implemented in legislation or regulations that do not yet exist in either the Netherlands or Japan. Commerce Secretary Raimondo last November suggested this could take at least 6-9 months...so the jury remains out on how big the "win" is, much more to come..
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It is a purely Chinese product: the 64-bit instruction set LoongArch comes from Loongson, with roots in MIPS , there are also additional logic blocks from China, such as memory controllers from Innosilicon, and a manufacturing process is provided by SMIC.
A glimpse of the future
Loongson has announced the LS2K2000, still no working pre-production models. It uses two faster LA364 CPU cores with a clock frequency of 1.5 GHz and integrates a 64-bit controller for DDR4-2400 RAM.
Tencent Holdings, Alibaba Group Holding and Huawei Technologies are among the top 10 companies producing AI research, according to the study. The Chinese contingent is steadily gaining representation in an area dominated by U.S. players.
For 2012, the U.S. led with 629 of these most-cited papers, with China in second place at 425. China later made dramatic progress and eventually overtook the U.S. in 2019. In 2021, China accounted for 7,401 of the most-cited papers, topping the American tally by 70% or so.
Wei Shaojun knows the industry well.
Prediction: "The United States' containment China's semiconductor industry will gradually move towards a one-way "semi-decoupling".
Prediction: The new government will re-examine the development of semiconductors, formulate new development strategies and measures, and invest more resources. There is a high probability that it will adopt a different organizational form from the past.
Wei: "It is impossible for an industrial plan to remain unchanged for ten years, and it must be re-examined. In addition to some problems that have been exposed with the plan, adjustments in the middle are inevitable.
Japan: “Chips Act” focused on R&D, advanced node manufacturing: Japan in late 2021 passed its own version of a semiconductor industry investment strategy, authorized around $7 billion for the domestic industry.
While governments in developed economies have long subsidized some level of advanced manufacturing such as semiconductors, over past two years, geopolitical pressures have forced governments to ramp up subsidies in major new ways. How will this impact the industry? A thread. 🧵
Government support has been a constant in the semiconductor industry, but for a considerable period before 2020, market forces + competition largely dominated, leading to regional specialization, optimized supply chains, and high levels of innovation. See: amazon.com/Chip-War-World…
There has been much debate over how subsidies work, what are good and bad subsidies, and which firms/subsectors have benefited more from government support. For a good look at the period 2014-2018, see this OECD study: oecd.org/officialdocume…
Ultimately, Washington faces a strategic problem with a defense component, not a military problem with a military solution.
Yes.... foreignaffairs.com/china/taiwan-l…
The more the United States narrows its focus to military fixes, the greater the risk to its own interests, as well as to those of its allies and Taiwan itself.
US must also develop a more nuanced understanding of Beijing’s current calculus, one that moves beyond the simplistic and inaccurate speculation that Xi is accelerating plans to invade Taiwan.